GHSA-25PW-4H6W-QWVM

Vulnerability from github – Published: 2026-03-03 22:54 – Updated: 2026-03-30 13:47
VLAI?
Summary
OpenClaw has a BlueBubbles group allowlist mismatch via DM pairing-store fallback
Details

Summary

In openclaw@2026.2.25, BlueBubbles group authorization could incorrectly treat DM pairing-store identities as group allowlist identities when dmPolicy=pairing and groupPolicy=allowlist.

A sender that was only DM-paired (not explicitly present in groupAllowFrom) could pass group sender checks for message and reaction ingress.

Per OpenClaw's SECURITY.md trust model, this is a constrained authorization-consistency issue, not a multi-tenant boundary bypass or host-privilege escalation.

Affected Packages / Versions

  • Package: openclaw (npm)
  • Latest published npm version at triage time: 2026.2.25
  • Affected versions: <= 2026.2.25
  • Patched versions: >= 2026.2.26 (planned next release)

Technical Details

Root cause was DM/group allowlist composition where DM pairing-store identities could flow into group authorization decisions.

Fix approach: - centralize DM/group authorization composition via shared resolvers - remove local DM/group list recomposition at channel callsites - add cross-channel regression coverage for message + reaction ingress - add CI guard to block future pairing-store leakage into group auth composition

Impact

  • Affects deployments using BlueBubbles with groupPolicy=allowlist and dmPolicy=pairing when pairing-store entries are present.
  • Could allow DM-authorized identities to be treated as group-authorized without explicit groupAllowFrom membership.
  • Does not bypass gateway auth, sandbox boundaries, or create new host-level privilege beyond existing DM authorization.

Fix Commit(s)

  • 051fdcc428129446e7c084260f837b7284279ce9

Release Process Note

patched_versions is pre-set to the planned next release (2026.2.26) so once npm 2026.2.26 is published, this advisory can be published without further content edits.

OpenClaw thanks @tdjackey for reporting.

Show details on source website

{
  "affected": [
    {
      "database_specific": {
        "last_known_affected_version_range": "\u003c= 2026.2.25"
      },
      "package": {
        "ecosystem": "npm",
        "name": "openclaw"
      },
      "ranges": [
        {
          "events": [
            {
              "introduced": "0"
            },
            {
              "fixed": "2026.2.26"
            }
          ],
          "type": "ECOSYSTEM"
        }
      ]
    }
  ],
  "aliases": [
    "CVE-2026-32006"
  ],
  "database_specific": {
    "cwe_ids": [
      "CWE-863"
    ],
    "github_reviewed": true,
    "github_reviewed_at": "2026-03-03T22:54:46Z",
    "nvd_published_at": "2026-03-19T22:16:33Z",
    "severity": "MODERATE"
  },
  "details": "### Summary\nIn `openclaw@2026.2.25`, BlueBubbles group authorization could incorrectly treat DM pairing-store identities as group allowlist identities when `dmPolicy=pairing` and `groupPolicy=allowlist`.\n\nA sender that was only DM-paired (not explicitly present in `groupAllowFrom`) could pass group sender checks for message and reaction ingress.\n\nPer OpenClaw\u0027s `SECURITY.md` trust model, this is a constrained authorization-consistency issue, not a multi-tenant boundary bypass or host-privilege escalation.\n\n### Affected Packages / Versions\n- Package: `openclaw` (npm)\n- Latest published npm version at triage time: `2026.2.25`\n- Affected versions: `\u003c= 2026.2.25`\n- Patched versions: `\u003e= 2026.2.26` (planned next release)\n\n### Technical Details\nRoot cause was DM/group allowlist composition where DM pairing-store identities could flow into group authorization decisions.\n\nFix approach:\n- centralize DM/group authorization composition via shared resolvers\n- remove local DM/group list recomposition at channel callsites\n- add cross-channel regression coverage for message + reaction ingress\n- add CI guard to block future pairing-store leakage into group auth composition\n\n### Impact\n- Affects deployments using BlueBubbles with `groupPolicy=allowlist` and `dmPolicy=pairing` when pairing-store entries are present.\n- Could allow DM-authorized identities to be treated as group-authorized without explicit `groupAllowFrom` membership.\n- Does **not** bypass gateway auth, sandbox boundaries, or create new host-level privilege beyond existing DM authorization.\n\n### Fix Commit(s)\n- `051fdcc428129446e7c084260f837b7284279ce9`\n\n### Release Process Note\n`patched_versions` is pre-set to the planned next release (`2026.2.26`) so once npm `2026.2.26` is published, this advisory can be published without further content edits.\n\nOpenClaw thanks @tdjackey for reporting.",
  "id": "GHSA-25pw-4h6w-qwvm",
  "modified": "2026-03-30T13:47:34Z",
  "published": "2026-03-03T22:54:46Z",
  "references": [
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://github.com/openclaw/openclaw/security/advisories/GHSA-25pw-4h6w-qwvm"
    },
    {
      "type": "ADVISORY",
      "url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2026-32006"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://github.com/openclaw/openclaw/commit/051fdcc428129446e7c084260f837b7284279ce9"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://github.com/openclaw/openclaw/commit/1aadf26f9acc399affabd859937a09468a9c5cb4"
    },
    {
      "type": "PACKAGE",
      "url": "https://github.com/openclaw/openclaw"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://www.vulncheck.com/advisories/openclaw-authorization-bypass-via-dm-pairing-store-fallback-in-group-allowlist"
    }
  ],
  "schema_version": "1.4.0",
  "severity": [
    {
      "score": "CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:L/UI:N/S:U/C:N/I:L/A:N",
      "type": "CVSS_V3"
    },
    {
      "score": "CVSS:4.0/AV:N/AC:L/AT:N/PR:L/UI:N/VC:N/VI:L/VA:N/SC:N/SI:N/SA:N",
      "type": "CVSS_V4"
    }
  ],
  "summary": "OpenClaw has a BlueBubbles group allowlist mismatch via DM pairing-store fallback"
}


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