GHSA-25MJ-MFQW-XQM2
Vulnerability from github – Published: 2026-05-06 12:30 – Updated: 2026-10-21 15:40In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
netconsole: avoid OOB reads, msg is not nul-terminated
msg passed to netconsole from the console subsystem is not guaranteed to be nul-terminated. Before recent commit 7eab73b18630 ("netconsole: convert to NBCON console infrastructure") the message would be placed in printk_shared_pbufs, a static global buffer, so KASAN had harder time catching OOB accesses. Now we see:
printk: console [netcon_ext0] enabled
BUG: KASAN: slab-out-of-bounds in string+0x1f7/0x240
Read of size 1 at addr ffff88813b6d4c00 by task pr/netcon_ext0/594
CPU: 65 UID: 0 PID: 594 Comm: pr/netcon_ext0 Not tainted 6.19.0-11754-g4246fd6547c9
Call Trace:
kasan_report+0xe4/0x120
string+0x1f7/0x240
vsnprintf+0x655/0xba0
scnprintf+0xba/0x120
netconsole_write+0x3fe/0xa10
nbcon_emit_next_record+0x46e/0x860
nbcon_kthread_func+0x623/0x750
Allocated by task 1:
nbcon_alloc+0x1ea/0x450
register_console+0x26b/0xe10
init_netconsole+0xbb0/0xda0
The buggy address belongs to the object at ffff88813b6d4000
which belongs to the cache kmalloc-4k of size 4096
The buggy address is located 0 bytes to the right of
allocated 3072-byte region [ffff88813b6d4000, ffff88813b6d4c00)
{
"affected": [],
"aliases": [
"CVE-2026-43197"
],
"database_specific": {
"cwe_ids": [
"CWE-125"
],
"github_reviewed": false,
"github_reviewed_at": null,
"nvd_published_at": "2026-05-06T12:16:38Z",
"severity": "CRITICAL"
},
"details": "In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:\n\nnetconsole: avoid OOB reads, msg is not nul-terminated\n\nmsg passed to netconsole from the console subsystem is not guaranteed\nto be nul-terminated. Before recent\ncommit 7eab73b18630 (\"netconsole: convert to NBCON console infrastructure\")\nthe message would be placed in printk_shared_pbufs, a static global\nbuffer, so KASAN had harder time catching OOB accesses. Now we see:\n\n printk: console [netcon_ext0] enabled\n BUG: KASAN: slab-out-of-bounds in string+0x1f7/0x240\n Read of size 1 at addr ffff88813b6d4c00 by task pr/netcon_ext0/594\n\n CPU: 65 UID: 0 PID: 594 Comm: pr/netcon_ext0 Not tainted 6.19.0-11754-g4246fd6547c9\n Call Trace:\n kasan_report+0xe4/0x120\n string+0x1f7/0x240\n vsnprintf+0x655/0xba0\n scnprintf+0xba/0x120\n netconsole_write+0x3fe/0xa10\n nbcon_emit_next_record+0x46e/0x860\n nbcon_kthread_func+0x623/0x750\n\n Allocated by task 1:\n nbcon_alloc+0x1ea/0x450\n register_console+0x26b/0xe10\n init_netconsole+0xbb0/0xda0\n\n The buggy address belongs to the object at ffff88813b6d4000\n which belongs to the cache kmalloc-4k of size 4096\n The buggy address is located 0 bytes to the right of\n allocated 3072-byte region [ffff88813b6d4000, ffff88813b6d4c00)",
"id": "GHSA-25mj-mfqw-xqm2",
"modified": "2026-10-21T15:40:25Z",
"published": "2026-05-06T12:30:32Z",
"references": [
{
"type": "ADVISORY",
"url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2026-43197"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/3126a2f98beaec5a554a1fb31c46db1e8542665e"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/68fe91df6ea822dae772fceaad0686e4f5839aec"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/74ab1456eaa3b2eb986138f9e1f4cb37e73b6f58"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/82aec772fca2223bc5774bd9af486fd95766e578"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/8fe132c4873f9eb1b86ddbf31216e9d961a0b8b9"
}
],
"schema_version": "1.4.0",
"severity": [
{
"score": "CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:N/A:H",
"type": "CVSS_V3"
}
]
}
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