GHSA-2238-XC5R-V9HJ

Vulnerability from github – Published: 2026-03-12 17:50 – Updated: 2026-03-12 19:13
VLAI
Summary
@tinacms/graphql has a Path Traversal issue
Details

Description

TinaCMS allows users to create, update, and delete content documents using relative file paths (relativePath, newRelativePath) via GraphQL mutations. Under certain conditions, these paths are combined with the collection path using path.join() without validating that the resolved path remains within the collection root directory.

Because path.join() does not prevent directory traversal, paths containing ../ sequences can escape the intended directory boundary.

Attack Vectors

  1. File Creation: Create files outside the collection directory graphql createDocument( collection: "post" relativePath: "../../config/malicious.md" params: { post: { title: "malicious" } } )

  2. File Move/Rename: Move existing files outside the collection graphql updateDocument( collection: "post" relativePath: "existing.md" params: { relativePath: "../../stolen.md" } )

  3. File Deletion: Delete files outside the collection graphql deleteDocument( collection: "post" relativePath: "../../important-config.md" )

  4. Folder Creation: Create folders outside the collection graphql createFolder( collection: "post" relativePath: "../../malicious-folder" )

Impact

An authenticated user with document mutation permissions can:

  • Create content files outside collection boundaries (subject to schema validation)
  • Move or rename files outside collection boundaries
  • Delete content files outside collection boundaries
  • Read file contents via document retrieval mutations

Mitigating Factors

Several constraints limit the practical impact of this vulnerability:

  1. Schema Validation: Created/updated content must conform to the collection's GraphQL schema. Attackers cannot write arbitrary file content—the params argument is validated against the generated mutation types (e.g., PostMutation).

  2. Authentication Required: Exploitation requires authenticated access with CMS editor permissions. Anonymous users cannot access GraphQL mutations.

  3. Git Tracking: In typical deployments, all file operations are tracked in git (either via GitHub API for Tina Cloud/self-hosted with GitProvider, or local filesystem changes). Malicious changes are visible in version control and can be reverted.

What This Vulnerability Does NOT Allow

  • Writing arbitrary file content (content is schema-validated)
  • Silent/untracked file modifications (changes appear in git)
  • Unauthenticated access

Proof of Concept

See packages/@tinacms/graphql/tests/path-traversal-security/index.test.ts for automated tests demonstrating the vulnerability.

Manual reproduction:

node -e "
const path = require('path');

const collectionPath = 'content/posts';
const maliciousRelativePath = '../../OUTSIDE/poc.md';

const realPath = path.join(collectionPath, maliciousRelativePath);
console.log('Resolved path:', realPath);
// Output: OUTSIDE/poc.md (escaped content/posts)
"
Show details on source website

{
  "affected": [
    {
      "database_specific": {
        "last_known_affected_version_range": "\u003c= 2.1.1"
      },
      "package": {
        "ecosystem": "npm",
        "name": "@tinacms/graphql"
      },
      "ranges": [
        {
          "events": [
            {
              "introduced": "0"
            },
            {
              "fixed": "2.1.2"
            }
          ],
          "type": "ECOSYSTEM"
        }
      ]
    }
  ],
  "aliases": [
    "CVE-2026-24125"
  ],
  "database_specific": {
    "cwe_ids": [
      "CWE-22"
    ],
    "github_reviewed": true,
    "github_reviewed_at": "2026-03-12T17:50:28Z",
    "nvd_published_at": "2026-03-12T17:16:39Z",
    "severity": "MODERATE"
  },
  "details": "### Description\n\nTinaCMS allows users to create, update, and delete content documents using relative file paths (`relativePath`, `newRelativePath`) via GraphQL mutations. Under certain conditions, these paths are combined with the collection path using `path.join()` without validating that the resolved path remains within the collection root directory.\n\nBecause `path.join()` does not prevent directory traversal, paths containing `../` sequences can escape the intended directory boundary.\n\n### Attack Vectors\n\n1. **File Creation**: Create files outside the collection directory\n   ```graphql\n   createDocument(\n     collection: \"post\"\n     relativePath: \"../../config/malicious.md\"\n     params: { post: { title: \"malicious\" } }\n   )\n   ```\n\n2. **File Move/Rename**: Move existing files outside the collection\n   ```graphql\n   updateDocument(\n     collection: \"post\"\n     relativePath: \"existing.md\"\n     params: { relativePath: \"../../stolen.md\" }\n   )\n   ```\n\n3. **File Deletion**: Delete files outside the collection\n   ```graphql\n   deleteDocument(\n     collection: \"post\"\n     relativePath: \"../../important-config.md\"\n   )\n   ```\n\n4. **Folder Creation**: Create folders outside the collection\n   ```graphql\n   createFolder(\n     collection: \"post\"\n     relativePath: \"../../malicious-folder\"\n   )\n   ```\n\n## Impact\n\nAn authenticated user with document mutation permissions can:\n\n- **Create content files** outside collection boundaries (subject to schema validation)\n- **Move or rename files** outside collection boundaries\n- **Delete content files** outside collection boundaries\n- **Read file contents** via document retrieval mutations\n\n## Mitigating Factors\n\nSeveral constraints limit the practical impact of this vulnerability:\n\n1. **Schema Validation**: Created/updated content must conform to the collection\u0027s GraphQL schema. Attackers cannot write arbitrary file content\u2014the `params` argument is validated against the generated mutation types (e.g., `PostMutation`).\n\n2. **Authentication Required**: Exploitation requires authenticated access with CMS editor permissions. Anonymous users cannot access GraphQL mutations.\n\n3. **Git Tracking**: In typical deployments, all file operations are tracked in git (either via GitHub API for Tina Cloud/self-hosted with GitProvider, or local filesystem changes). Malicious changes are visible in version control and can be reverted.\n\n### What This Vulnerability Does NOT Allow\n\n- Writing arbitrary file content (content is schema-validated)\n- Silent/untracked file modifications (changes appear in git)\n- Unauthenticated access\n\n## Proof of Concept\n\nSee `packages/@tinacms/graphql/tests/path-traversal-security/index.test.ts` for automated tests demonstrating the vulnerability.\n\nManual reproduction:\n```bash\nnode -e \"\nconst path = require(\u0027path\u0027);\n\nconst collectionPath = \u0027content/posts\u0027;\nconst maliciousRelativePath = \u0027../../OUTSIDE/poc.md\u0027;\n\nconst realPath = path.join(collectionPath, maliciousRelativePath);\nconsole.log(\u0027Resolved path:\u0027, realPath);\n// Output: OUTSIDE/poc.md (escaped content/posts)\n\"\n```",
  "id": "GHSA-2238-xc5r-v9hj",
  "modified": "2026-03-12T19:13:56Z",
  "published": "2026-03-12T17:50:28Z",
  "references": [
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://github.com/tinacms/tinacms/security/advisories/GHSA-2238-xc5r-v9hj"
    },
    {
      "type": "ADVISORY",
      "url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2026-24125"
    },
    {
      "type": "PACKAGE",
      "url": "https://github.com/tinacms/tinacms"
    }
  ],
  "schema_version": "1.4.0",
  "severity": [
    {
      "score": "CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:L/UI:N/S:U/C:L/I:L/A:L",
      "type": "CVSS_V3"
    }
  ],
  "summary": "@tinacms/graphql has a Path Traversal issue"
}



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