FKIE_CVE-2026-45904

Vulnerability from fkie_nvd - Published: 2026-05-27 14:17 - Updated: 2026-05-27 14:48
Severity
Summary
In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: powerpc/eeh: fix recursive pci_lock_rescan_remove locking in EEH event handling The recent commit 1010b4c012b0 ("powerpc/eeh: Make EEH driver device hotplug safe") restructured the EEH driver to improve synchronization with the PCI hotplug layer. However, it inadvertently moved pci_lock_rescan_remove() outside its intended scope in eeh_handle_normal_event(), leading to broken PCI error reporting and improper EEH event triggering. Specifically, eeh_handle_normal_event() acquired pci_lock_rescan_remove() before calling eeh_pe_bus_get(), but eeh_pe_bus_get() itself attempts to acquire the same lock internally, causing nested locking and disrupting normal EEH event handling paths. This patch adds a boolean parameter do_lock to _eeh_pe_bus_get(), with two public wrappers: eeh_pe_bus_get() with locking enabled. eeh_pe_bus_get_nolock() that skips locking. Callers that already hold pci_lock_rescan_remove() now use eeh_pe_bus_get_nolock() to avoid recursive lock acquisition. Additionally, pci_lock_rescan_remove() calls are restored to the correct position—after eeh_pe_bus_get() and immediately before iterating affected PEs and devices. This ensures EEH-triggered PCI removes occur under proper bus rescan locking without recursive lock contention. The eeh_pe_loc_get() function has been split into two functions: eeh_pe_loc_get(struct eeh_pe *pe) which retrieves the loc for given PE. eeh_pe_loc_get_bus(struct pci_bus *bus) which retrieves the location code for given bus. This resolves lockdep warnings such as: <snip> [ 84.964298] [ T928] ============================================ [ 84.964304] [ T928] WARNING: possible recursive locking detected [ 84.964311] [ T928] 6.18.0-rc3 #51 Not tainted [ 84.964315] [ T928] -------------------------------------------- [ 84.964320] [ T928] eehd/928 is trying to acquire lock: [ 84.964324] [ T928] c000000003b29d58 (pci_rescan_remove_lock){+.+.}-{3:3}, at: pci_lock_rescan_remove+0x28/0x40 [ 84.964342] [ T928] but task is already holding lock: [ 84.964347] [ T928] c000000003b29d58 (pci_rescan_remove_lock){+.+.}-{3:3}, at: pci_lock_rescan_remove+0x28/0x40 [ 84.964357] [ T928] other info that might help us debug this: [ 84.964363] [ T928] Possible unsafe locking scenario: [ 84.964367] [ T928] CPU0 [ 84.964370] [ T928] ---- [ 84.964373] [ T928] lock(pci_rescan_remove_lock); [ 84.964378] [ T928] lock(pci_rescan_remove_lock); [ 84.964383] [ T928] *** DEADLOCK *** [ 84.964388] [ T928] May be due to missing lock nesting notation [ 84.964393] [ T928] 1 lock held by eehd/928: [ 84.964397] [ T928] #0: c000000003b29d58 (pci_rescan_remove_lock){+.+.}-{3:3}, at: pci_lock_rescan_remove+0x28/0x40 [ 84.964408] [ T928] stack backtrace: [ 84.964414] [ T928] CPU: 2 UID: 0 PID: 928 Comm: eehd Not tainted 6.18.0-rc3 #51 VOLUNTARY [ 84.964417] [ T928] Hardware name: IBM,9080-HEX POWER10 (architected) 0x800200 0xf000006 of:IBM,FW1060.00 (NH1060_022) hv:phyp pSeries [ 84.964419] [ T928] Call Trace: [ 84.964420] [ T928] [c0000011a7157990] [c000000001705de4] dump_stack_lvl+0xc8/0x130 (unreliable) [ 84.964424] [ T928] [c0000011a71579d0] [c0000000002f66e0] print_deadlock_bug+0x430/0x440 [ 84.964428] [ T928] [c0000011a7157a70] [c0000000002fd0c0] __lock_acquire+0x1530/0x2d80 [ 84.964431] [ T928] [c0000011a7157ba0] [c0000000002fea54] lock_acquire+0x144/0x410 [ 84.964433] [ T928] [c0000011a7157cb0] [c0000011a7157cb0] __mutex_lock+0xf4/0x1050 [ 84.964436] [ T928] [c0000011a7157e00] [c000000000de21d8] pci_lock_rescan_remove+0x28/0x40 [ 84.964439] [ T928] [c0000011a7157e20] [c00000000004ed98] eeh_pe_bus_get+0x48/0xc0 [ 84.964442] [ T928] [c0000011a7157e50] [c00000 ---truncated---
References
416baaa9-dc9f-4396-8d5f-8c081fb06d67https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/6e6561231c6cfc32c5631aeecc0928ff2b14265c
416baaa9-dc9f-4396-8d5f-8c081fb06d67https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/788dd28fd49610d6047cbb15dbf1186afffdfbaf
416baaa9-dc9f-4396-8d5f-8c081fb06d67https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/815a8d2feb5615ae7f0b5befd206af0b0160614c
416baaa9-dc9f-4396-8d5f-8c081fb06d67https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/87a1f93986aa1500b85aeff16b0b71c29ea116ea
416baaa9-dc9f-4396-8d5f-8c081fb06d67https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/89810e2d80281d42f855fac813786758ee16e323
416baaa9-dc9f-4396-8d5f-8c081fb06d67https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/b85ee287bfe52c6b2d9b41758b5e0d08679d5b39
416baaa9-dc9f-4396-8d5f-8c081fb06d67https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/f49faa4a64f8ac0e38983e606075b25dfcfc9ad4
416baaa9-dc9f-4396-8d5f-8c081fb06d67https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/f8b16d5764ee1e78c1ef333017ad383ffe76fcdc
Impacted products
Vendor Product Version
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{
  "cveTags": [],
  "descriptions": [
    {
      "lang": "en",
      "value": "In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:\n\npowerpc/eeh: fix recursive pci_lock_rescan_remove locking in EEH event handling\n\nThe recent commit 1010b4c012b0 (\"powerpc/eeh: Make EEH driver device\nhotplug safe\") restructured the EEH driver to improve synchronization\nwith the PCI hotplug layer.\n\nHowever, it inadvertently moved pci_lock_rescan_remove() outside its\nintended scope in eeh_handle_normal_event(), leading to broken PCI\nerror reporting and improper EEH event triggering. Specifically,\neeh_handle_normal_event() acquired pci_lock_rescan_remove() before\ncalling eeh_pe_bus_get(), but eeh_pe_bus_get() itself attempts to\nacquire the same lock internally, causing nested locking and disrupting\nnormal EEH event handling paths.\n\nThis patch adds a boolean parameter do_lock to _eeh_pe_bus_get(),\nwith two public wrappers:\n    eeh_pe_bus_get() with locking enabled.\n    eeh_pe_bus_get_nolock() that skips locking.\n\nCallers that already hold pci_lock_rescan_remove() now use\neeh_pe_bus_get_nolock() to avoid recursive lock acquisition.\n\nAdditionally, pci_lock_rescan_remove() calls are restored to the correct\nposition\u2014after eeh_pe_bus_get() and immediately before iterating affected\nPEs and devices. This ensures EEH-triggered PCI removes occur under proper\nbus rescan locking without recursive lock contention.\n\nThe eeh_pe_loc_get() function has been split into two functions:\n    eeh_pe_loc_get(struct eeh_pe *pe) which retrieves the loc for given PE.\n    eeh_pe_loc_get_bus(struct pci_bus *bus) which retrieves the location\n    code for given bus.\n\nThis resolves lockdep warnings such as:\n\u003csnip\u003e\n[   84.964298] [    T928] ============================================\n[   84.964304] [    T928] WARNING: possible recursive locking detected\n[   84.964311] [    T928] 6.18.0-rc3 #51 Not tainted\n[   84.964315] [    T928] --------------------------------------------\n[   84.964320] [    T928] eehd/928 is trying to acquire lock:\n[   84.964324] [    T928] c000000003b29d58 (pci_rescan_remove_lock){+.+.}-{3:3}, at: pci_lock_rescan_remove+0x28/0x40\n[   84.964342] [    T928]\n                       but task is already holding lock:\n[   84.964347] [    T928] c000000003b29d58 (pci_rescan_remove_lock){+.+.}-{3:3}, at: pci_lock_rescan_remove+0x28/0x40\n[   84.964357] [    T928]\n                       other info that might help us debug this:\n[   84.964363] [    T928]  Possible unsafe locking scenario:\n\n[   84.964367] [    T928]        CPU0\n[   84.964370] [    T928]        ----\n[   84.964373] [    T928]   lock(pci_rescan_remove_lock);\n[   84.964378] [    T928]   lock(pci_rescan_remove_lock);\n[   84.964383] [    T928]\n                       *** DEADLOCK ***\n\n[   84.964388] [    T928]  May be due to missing lock nesting notation\n\n[   84.964393] [    T928] 1 lock held by eehd/928:\n[   84.964397] [    T928]  #0: c000000003b29d58 (pci_rescan_remove_lock){+.+.}-{3:3}, at: pci_lock_rescan_remove+0x28/0x40\n[   84.964408] [    T928]\n                       stack backtrace:\n[   84.964414] [    T928] CPU: 2 UID: 0 PID: 928 Comm: eehd Not tainted 6.18.0-rc3 #51 VOLUNTARY\n[   84.964417] [    T928] Hardware name: IBM,9080-HEX POWER10 (architected) 0x800200 0xf000006 of:IBM,FW1060.00 (NH1060_022) hv:phyp pSeries\n[   84.964419] [    T928] Call Trace:\n[   84.964420] [    T928] [c0000011a7157990] [c000000001705de4] dump_stack_lvl+0xc8/0x130 (unreliable)\n[   84.964424] [    T928] [c0000011a71579d0] [c0000000002f66e0] print_deadlock_bug+0x430/0x440\n[   84.964428] [    T928] [c0000011a7157a70] [c0000000002fd0c0] __lock_acquire+0x1530/0x2d80\n[   84.964431] [    T928] [c0000011a7157ba0] [c0000000002fea54] lock_acquire+0x144/0x410\n[   84.964433] [    T928] [c0000011a7157cb0] [c0000011a7157cb0] __mutex_lock+0xf4/0x1050\n[   84.964436] [    T928] [c0000011a7157e00] [c000000000de21d8] pci_lock_rescan_remove+0x28/0x40\n[   84.964439] [    T928] [c0000011a7157e20] [c00000000004ed98] eeh_pe_bus_get+0x48/0xc0\n[   84.964442] [    T928] [c0000011a7157e50] [c00000\n---truncated---"
    }
  ],
  "id": "CVE-2026-45904",
  "lastModified": "2026-05-27T14:48:31.480",
  "metrics": {},
  "published": "2026-05-27T14:17:04.820",
  "references": [
    {
      "source": "416baaa9-dc9f-4396-8d5f-8c081fb06d67",
      "url": "https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/6e6561231c6cfc32c5631aeecc0928ff2b14265c"
    },
    {
      "source": "416baaa9-dc9f-4396-8d5f-8c081fb06d67",
      "url": "https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/788dd28fd49610d6047cbb15dbf1186afffdfbaf"
    },
    {
      "source": "416baaa9-dc9f-4396-8d5f-8c081fb06d67",
      "url": "https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/815a8d2feb5615ae7f0b5befd206af0b0160614c"
    },
    {
      "source": "416baaa9-dc9f-4396-8d5f-8c081fb06d67",
      "url": "https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/87a1f93986aa1500b85aeff16b0b71c29ea116ea"
    },
    {
      "source": "416baaa9-dc9f-4396-8d5f-8c081fb06d67",
      "url": "https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/89810e2d80281d42f855fac813786758ee16e323"
    },
    {
      "source": "416baaa9-dc9f-4396-8d5f-8c081fb06d67",
      "url": "https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/b85ee287bfe52c6b2d9b41758b5e0d08679d5b39"
    },
    {
      "source": "416baaa9-dc9f-4396-8d5f-8c081fb06d67",
      "url": "https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/f49faa4a64f8ac0e38983e606075b25dfcfc9ad4"
    },
    {
      "source": "416baaa9-dc9f-4396-8d5f-8c081fb06d67",
      "url": "https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/f8b16d5764ee1e78c1ef333017ad383ffe76fcdc"
    }
  ],
  "sourceIdentifier": "416baaa9-dc9f-4396-8d5f-8c081fb06d67",
  "vulnStatus": "Awaiting Analysis"
}


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