FKIE_CVE-2026-45321

Vulnerability from fkie_nvd - Published: 2026-05-12 01:16 - Updated: 2026-05-12 16:16
Severity ?
Summary
On 2026-05-11, between approximately 19:20 and 19:26 UTC, 84 malicious versions across 42 @tanstack/* packages were published to the npm registry. The publishes were authenticated via the legitimate GitHub Actions OIDC trusted-publisher binding for TanStack/router, but the publish workflow itself was not modified. The attacker chained three known vulnerability classes — a pull_request_target "Pwn Request" misconfiguration, GitHub Actions cache poisoning across the fork↔base trust boundary, and runtime memory extraction of the OIDC token from the Actions runner process — to publish credential-stealing malware under a trusted identity. Each affected package received exactly two malicious versions, published a few minutes apart.
Impacted products
Vendor Product Version

{
  "cveTags": [],
  "descriptions": [
    {
      "lang": "en",
      "value": "On 2026-05-11, between approximately 19:20 and 19:26 UTC, 84 malicious versions across 42 @tanstack/* packages were published to the npm registry. The publishes were authenticated via the legitimate GitHub Actions OIDC trusted-publisher binding for TanStack/router, but the publish workflow itself was not modified. The attacker chained three known vulnerability classes \u2014 a pull_request_target \"Pwn Request\" misconfiguration, GitHub Actions cache poisoning across the fork\u2194base trust boundary, and runtime memory extraction of the OIDC token from the Actions runner process \u2014 to publish credential-stealing malware under a trusted identity. Each affected package received exactly two malicious versions, published a few minutes apart."
    }
  ],
  "id": "CVE-2026-45321",
  "lastModified": "2026-05-12T16:16:24.430",
  "metrics": {
    "cvssMetricV31": [
      {
        "cvssData": {
          "attackComplexity": "LOW",
          "attackVector": "NETWORK",
          "availabilityImpact": "HIGH",
          "baseScore": 9.6,
          "baseSeverity": "CRITICAL",
          "confidentialityImpact": "HIGH",
          "integrityImpact": "HIGH",
          "privilegesRequired": "NONE",
          "scope": "CHANGED",
          "userInteraction": "REQUIRED",
          "vectorString": "CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:R/S:C/C:H/I:H/A:H",
          "version": "3.1"
        },
        "exploitabilityScore": 2.8,
        "impactScore": 6.0,
        "source": "security-advisories@github.com",
        "type": "Secondary"
      }
    ]
  },
  "published": "2026-05-12T01:16:46.820",
  "references": [
    {
      "source": "security-advisories@github.com",
      "url": "https://github.com/TanStack/router/issues/7383"
    },
    {
      "source": "security-advisories@github.com",
      "url": "https://github.com/TanStack/router/security/advisories/GHSA-g7cv-rxg3-hmpx"
    },
    {
      "source": "security-advisories@github.com",
      "url": "https://tanstack.com/blog/npm-supply-chain-compromise-postmortem"
    },
    {
      "source": "security-advisories@github.com",
      "url": "https://www.stepsecurity.io/blog/mini-shai-hulud-is-back-a-self-spreading-supply-chain-attack-hits-the-npm-ecosystem"
    }
  ],
  "sourceIdentifier": "security-advisories@github.com",
  "vulnStatus": "Received",
  "weaknesses": [
    {
      "description": [
        {
          "lang": "en",
          "value": "CWE-506"
        }
      ],
      "source": "security-advisories@github.com",
      "type": "Secondary"
    }
  ]
}


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Sightings

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Nomenclature

  • Seen: The vulnerability was mentioned, discussed, or observed by the user.
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