FKIE_CVE-2026-43054
Vulnerability from fkie_nvd - Published: 2026-05-01 15:16 - Updated: 2026-05-01 15:24
Severity ?
Summary
In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
scsi: target: tcm_loop: Drain commands in target_reset handler
tcm_loop_target_reset() violates the SCSI EH contract: it returns SUCCESS
without draining any in-flight commands. The SCSI EH documentation
(scsi_eh.rst) requires that when a reset handler returns SUCCESS the driver
has made lower layers "forget about timed out scmds" and is ready for new
commands. Every other SCSI LLD (virtio_scsi, mpt3sas, ipr, scsi_debug,
mpi3mr) enforces this by draining or completing outstanding commands before
returning SUCCESS.
Because tcm_loop_target_reset() doesn't drain, the SCSI EH reuses in-flight
scsi_cmnd structures for recovery commands (e.g. TUR) while the target core
still has async completion work queued for the old se_cmd. The memset in
queuecommand zeroes se_lun and lun_ref_active, causing
transport_lun_remove_cmd() to skip its percpu_ref_put(). The leaked LUN
reference prevents transport_clear_lun_ref() from completing, hanging
configfs LUN unlink forever in D-state:
INFO: task rm:264 blocked for more than 122 seconds.
rm D 0 264 258 0x00004000
Call Trace:
__schedule+0x3d0/0x8e0
schedule+0x36/0xf0
transport_clear_lun_ref+0x78/0x90 [target_core_mod]
core_tpg_remove_lun+0x28/0xb0 [target_core_mod]
target_fabric_port_unlink+0x50/0x60 [target_core_mod]
configfs_unlink+0x156/0x1f0 [configfs]
vfs_unlink+0x109/0x290
do_unlinkat+0x1d5/0x2d0
Fix this by making tcm_loop_target_reset() actually drain commands:
1. Issue TMR_LUN_RESET via tcm_loop_issue_tmr() to drain all commands that
the target core knows about (those not yet CMD_T_COMPLETE).
2. Use blk_mq_tagset_busy_iter() to iterate all started requests and
flush_work() on each se_cmd — this drains any deferred completion work
for commands that already had CMD_T_COMPLETE set before the TMR (which
the TMR skips via __target_check_io_state()). This is the same pattern
used by mpi3mr, scsi_debug, and libsas to drain outstanding commands
during reset.
References
Impacted products
| Vendor | Product | Version |
|---|
{
"cveTags": [],
"descriptions": [
{
"lang": "en",
"value": "In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:\n\nscsi: target: tcm_loop: Drain commands in target_reset handler\n\ntcm_loop_target_reset() violates the SCSI EH contract: it returns SUCCESS\nwithout draining any in-flight commands. The SCSI EH documentation\n(scsi_eh.rst) requires that when a reset handler returns SUCCESS the driver\nhas made lower layers \"forget about timed out scmds\" and is ready for new\ncommands. Every other SCSI LLD (virtio_scsi, mpt3sas, ipr, scsi_debug,\nmpi3mr) enforces this by draining or completing outstanding commands before\nreturning SUCCESS.\n\nBecause tcm_loop_target_reset() doesn\u0027t drain, the SCSI EH reuses in-flight\nscsi_cmnd structures for recovery commands (e.g. TUR) while the target core\nstill has async completion work queued for the old se_cmd. The memset in\nqueuecommand zeroes se_lun and lun_ref_active, causing\ntransport_lun_remove_cmd() to skip its percpu_ref_put(). The leaked LUN\nreference prevents transport_clear_lun_ref() from completing, hanging\nconfigfs LUN unlink forever in D-state:\n\n INFO: task rm:264 blocked for more than 122 seconds.\n rm D 0 264 258 0x00004000\n Call Trace:\n __schedule+0x3d0/0x8e0\n schedule+0x36/0xf0\n transport_clear_lun_ref+0x78/0x90 [target_core_mod]\n core_tpg_remove_lun+0x28/0xb0 [target_core_mod]\n target_fabric_port_unlink+0x50/0x60 [target_core_mod]\n configfs_unlink+0x156/0x1f0 [configfs]\n vfs_unlink+0x109/0x290\n do_unlinkat+0x1d5/0x2d0\n\nFix this by making tcm_loop_target_reset() actually drain commands:\n\n 1. Issue TMR_LUN_RESET via tcm_loop_issue_tmr() to drain all commands that\n the target core knows about (those not yet CMD_T_COMPLETE).\n\n 2. Use blk_mq_tagset_busy_iter() to iterate all started requests and\n flush_work() on each se_cmd \u2014 this drains any deferred completion work\n for commands that already had CMD_T_COMPLETE set before the TMR (which\n the TMR skips via __target_check_io_state()). This is the same pattern\n used by mpi3mr, scsi_debug, and libsas to drain outstanding commands\n during reset."
}
],
"id": "CVE-2026-43054",
"lastModified": "2026-05-01T15:24:14.893",
"metrics": {},
"published": "2026-05-01T15:16:51.910",
"references": [
{
"source": "416baaa9-dc9f-4396-8d5f-8c081fb06d67",
"url": "https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/05ac3754467363558a0a54ae4bb7c89b2c9574cf"
},
{
"source": "416baaa9-dc9f-4396-8d5f-8c081fb06d67",
"url": "https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/103f79e4949513247d763c6e7f3cbbf62017afdf"
},
{
"source": "416baaa9-dc9f-4396-8d5f-8c081fb06d67",
"url": "https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/1333eee56cdf3f0cf67c6ab4114c2c9e0a952026"
},
{
"source": "416baaa9-dc9f-4396-8d5f-8c081fb06d67",
"url": "https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/15f5241d5a52364a7e7867b49128b0442dbcad9d"
},
{
"source": "416baaa9-dc9f-4396-8d5f-8c081fb06d67",
"url": "https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/757c43c692294cdfad31390accc0e90429b2ef8a"
},
{
"source": "416baaa9-dc9f-4396-8d5f-8c081fb06d67",
"url": "https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/7cbd69aaa507b1245240a28022bf5da0f07c68d9"
},
{
"source": "416baaa9-dc9f-4396-8d5f-8c081fb06d67",
"url": "https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/a836054ea81014117ec6b73529a21626a9e1f829"
}
],
"sourceIdentifier": "416baaa9-dc9f-4396-8d5f-8c081fb06d67",
"vulnStatus": "Awaiting Analysis"
}
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Sightings
| Author | Source | Type | Date | Other |
|---|
Nomenclature
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- Confirmed: The vulnerability has been validated from an analyst's perspective.
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- Not patched: The vulnerability was not observed as successfully patched by the user who reported the sighting.
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