FKIE_CVE-2026-41059

Vulnerability from fkie_nvd - Published: 2026-04-22 00:16 - Updated: 2026-11-11 23:10
Summary
OAuth2 Proxy is a reverse proxy that provides authentication using OAuth2 providers. Versions 7.5.0 through 7.15.1 have a configuration-dependent authentication bypass. Deployments are affected when all of the following are true: Use of `skip_auth_routes` or the legacy `skip_auth_regex`; use of patterns that can be widened by attacker-controlled suffixes, such as `^/foo/.*/bar$` causing potential exposure of `/foo/secret`; and protected upstream applications that interpret `#` as a fragment delimiter or otherwise route the request to the protected base path. In deployments that rely on these settings, an unauthenticated attacker can send a crafted request containing a number sign in the path, including the browser-safe encoded form `%23`, so that OAuth2 Proxy matches a public allowlist rule while the backend serves a protected resource. Deployments that do not use these skip-auth options, or that only allow exact public paths with tightly scoped method and path rules, are not affected. A fix has been implemented in version 7.15.2 to normalize request paths more conservatively before skip-auth matching so fragment content does not influence allowlist decisions. Users who cannot upgrade immediately can reduce exposure by tightening or removing `skip_auth_routes` and `skip_auth_regex` rules, especially patterns that use broad wildcards across path segments. Recommended mitigations include replacing broad rules with exact, anchored public paths and explicit HTTP methods; rejecting requests whose path contains `%23` or `#` at the ingress, load balancer, or WAF level; and/or avoiding placing sensitive application paths behind broad `skip_auth_routes` rules.
Impacted products
Vendor Product Version
oauth2_proxy_project oauth2_proxy *

{
  "affected": [
    {
      "affectedData": [
        {
          "product": "oauth2-proxy",
          "vendor": "oauth2-proxy",
          "versions": [
            {
              "status": "affected",
              "version": "\u003e= 7.5.0, \u003c 7.15.2"
            }
          ]
        }
      ],
      "source": "security-advisories@github.com"
    }
  ],
  "configurations": [
    {
      "nodes": [
        {
          "cpeMatch": [
            {
              "criteria": "cpe:2.3:a:oauth2_proxy_project:oauth2_proxy:*:*:*:*:*:*:*:*",
              "matchCriteriaId": "03587628-7B66-41FF-B89D-DF35A5134CD7",
              "versionEndExcluding": "7.15.2",
              "versionStartIncluding": "7.5.0",
              "vulnerable": true
            }
          ],
          "negate": false,
          "operator": "OR"
        }
      ]
    }
  ],
  "cveTags": [],
  "descriptions": [
    {
      "lang": "en",
      "value": "OAuth2 Proxy is a reverse proxy that provides authentication using OAuth2 providers. Versions 7.5.0 through 7.15.1 have a configuration-dependent authentication bypass. Deployments are affected when all of the following are true: Use of `skip_auth_routes` or the legacy `skip_auth_regex`; use of patterns that can be widened by attacker-controlled suffixes, such as `^/foo/.*/bar$` causing potential exposure of `/foo/secret`; and protected upstream applications that interpret `#` as a fragment delimiter or otherwise route the request to the protected base path. In deployments that rely on these settings, an unauthenticated attacker can send a crafted request containing a number sign in the path, including the browser-safe encoded form `%23`, so that OAuth2 Proxy matches a public allowlist rule while the backend serves a protected resource. Deployments that do not use these skip-auth options, or that only allow exact public paths with tightly scoped method and path rules, are not affected. A fix has been implemented in version 7.15.2 to normalize request paths more conservatively before skip-auth matching so fragment content does not influence allowlist decisions. Users who cannot upgrade immediately can reduce exposure by tightening or removing `skip_auth_routes` and `skip_auth_regex` rules, especially patterns that use broad wildcards across path segments. Recommended mitigations include replacing broad rules with exact, anchored public paths and explicit HTTP methods; rejecting requests whose path contains `%23` or `#` at the ingress, load balancer, or WAF level; and/or avoiding placing sensitive application paths behind broad `skip_auth_routes` rules."
    },
    {
      "lang": "es",
      "value": "OAuth2 Proxy es un proxy inverso que proporciona autenticaci\u00f3n utilizando proveedores OAuth2. Las versiones 7.5.0 a 7.15.1 tienen una omisi\u00f3n de autenticaci\u00f3n dependiente de la configuraci\u00f3n. Las implementaciones se ven afectadas cuando se cumplen todas las siguientes condiciones: Uso de \u201cskip_auth_routes\u201d o del obsoleto \u201cskip_auth_regex\u201d; uso de patrones que pueden ser ampliados por sufijos controlados por el atacante, como \u201c^/foo/.*/bar$\u201d causando una exposici\u00f3n potencial de \u201c/foo/secret\u201d; y aplicaciones ascendentes protegidas que interpretan \u201c#\u201d como un delimitador de fragmento o que de otro modo enrutan la solicitud a la ruta base protegida. En implementaciones que dependen de estas configuraciones, un atacante no autenticado puede enviar una solicitud manipulada que contenga un signo de n\u00famero en la ruta, incluyendo la forma codificada segura para el navegador \u201c%23\u201d, de modo que OAuth2 Proxy coincida con una regla de lista de permitidos p\u00fablica mientras el backend sirve un recurso protegido. Las implementaciones que no utilizan estas opciones de omisi\u00f3n de autenticaci\u00f3n, o que solo permiten rutas p\u00fablicas exactas con reglas de m\u00e9todo y ruta estrictamente definidas, no se ven afectadas. Se ha implementado una correcci\u00f3n en la versi\u00f3n 7.15.2 para normalizar las rutas de solicitud de forma m\u00e1s conservadora antes de la coincidencia de omisi\u00f3n de autenticaci\u00f3n para que el contenido del fragmento no influya en las decisiones de la lista de permitidos. Los usuarios que no pueden actualizar de inmediato pueden reducir la exposici\u00f3n ajustando o eliminando las reglas de \u201cskip_auth_routes\u201d y \u201cskip_auth_regex\u201d, especialmente los patrones que utilizan comodines amplios en los segmentos de ruta. Las mitigaciones recomendadas incluyen reemplazar reglas amplias con rutas p\u00fablicas exactas y ancladas y m\u00e9todos HTTP expl\u00edcitos; rechazar solicitudes cuya ruta contenga \u201c%23\u201d o \u201c#\u201d a nivel de ingreso, balanceador de carga o WAF; y/o evitar colocar rutas de aplicaciones sensibles detr\u00e1s de reglas amplias de \u201cskip_auth_routes\u201d."
    }
  ],
  "id": "CVE-2026-41059",
  "lastModified": "2026-11-11T23:10:00.263",
  "metrics": {
    "cvssMetricV31": [
      {
        "cvssData": {
          "attackComplexity": "LOW",
          "attackVector": "NETWORK",
          "availabilityImpact": "NONE",
          "baseScore": 8.2,
          "baseSeverity": "HIGH",
          "confidentialityImpact": "HIGH",
          "integrityImpact": "LOW",
          "privilegesRequired": "NONE",
          "scope": "UNCHANGED",
          "userInteraction": "NONE",
          "vectorString": "CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:L/A:N",
          "version": "3.1"
        },
        "exploitabilityScore": 3.9,
        "impactScore": 4.2,
        "source": "security-advisories@github.com",
        "type": "Secondary"
      }
    ],
    "ssvcV203": [
      {
        "source": "134c704f-9b21-4f2e-91b3-4a467353bcc0",
        "ssvcData": {
          "id": "CVE-2026-41059",
          "options": [
            {
              "exploitation": "none"
            },
            {
              "automatable": "yes"
            },
            {
              "technicalImpact": "partial"
            }
          ],
          "role": "CISA Coordinator",
          "timestamp": "2026-04-22T13:13:43.229207Z",
          "version": "2.0.3"
        }
      }
    ]
  },
  "published": "2026-04-22T00:16:27.957",
  "references": [
    {
      "source": "security-advisories@github.com",
      "tags": [
        "Vendor Advisory"
      ],
      "url": "https://github.com/oauth2-proxy/oauth2-proxy/security/advisories/GHSA-pxq7-h93f-9jrg"
    }
  ],
  "sourceIdentifier": "security-advisories@github.com",
  "vulnStatus": "Analyzed",
  "weaknesses": [
    {
      "description": [
        {
          "lang": "en",
          "value": "CWE-288"
        }
      ],
      "source": "security-advisories@github.com",
      "type": "Secondary"
    }
  ]
}



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