FKIE_CVE-2026-32144

Vulnerability from fkie_nvd - Published: 2026-04-07 13:16 - Updated: 2026-04-23 17:32
Summary
Improper Certificate Validation vulnerability in Erlang OTP public_key (pubkey_ocsp module) allows OCSP designated-responder authorization bypass via missing signature verification. The OCSP response validation in public_key:pkix_ocsp_validate/5 does not verify that a CA-designated responder certificate was cryptographically signed by the issuing CA. Instead, it only checks that the responder certificate's issuer name matches the CA's subject name and that the certificate has the OCSPSigning extended key usage. An attacker who can intercept or control OCSP responses can create a self-signed certificate with a matching issuer name and the OCSPSigning EKU, and use it to forge OCSP responses that mark revoked certificates as valid. This affects SSL/TLS clients using OCSP stapling, which may accept connections to servers with revoked certificates, potentially transmitting sensitive data to compromised servers. Applications using the public_key:pkix_ocsp_validate/5 API directly are also affected, with impact depending on usage context. This vulnerability is associated with program files lib/public_key/src/pubkey_ocsp.erl and program routines pubkey_ocsp:is_authorized_responder/3. This issue affects OTP from OTP 27.0 until OTP 28.4.2 and 27.3.4.10 corresponding to public_key from 1.16 until 1.20.3 and 1.17.1.2, and ssl from 11.2 until 11.5.4 and 11.2.12.7.

{
  "configurations": [
    {
      "nodes": [
        {
          "cpeMatch": [
            {
              "criteria": "cpe:2.3:a:erlang:erlang\\/otp:*:*:*:*:*:*:*:*",
              "matchCriteriaId": "2771D519-4124-4D3F-A8E0-3E4704973B3E",
              "versionEndExcluding": "27.3.4.10",
              "versionStartIncluding": "27.0",
              "vulnerable": true
            },
            {
              "criteria": "cpe:2.3:a:erlang:erlang\\/otp:*:*:*:*:*:*:*:*",
              "matchCriteriaId": "D2E111DA-579A-438F-A2FF-5799B01AF401",
              "versionEndExcluding": "28.4.2",
              "versionStartIncluding": "28.0",
              "vulnerable": true
            },
            {
              "criteria": "cpe:2.3:a:erlang:erlang\\/public_key:*:*:*:*:*:*:*:*",
              "matchCriteriaId": "459DB53B-9049-48D3-86F9-5CB3286BDCFB",
              "versionEndExcluding": "1.17.1.2",
              "versionStartIncluding": "1.16",
              "vulnerable": true
            },
            {
              "criteria": "cpe:2.3:a:erlang:erlang\\/public_key:*:*:*:*:*:*:*:*",
              "matchCriteriaId": "2F0812B0-29FA-4EAB-B557-5FB6C8D2D581",
              "versionEndExcluding": "1.20.3",
              "versionStartIncluding": "1.18",
              "vulnerable": true
            },
            {
              "criteria": "cpe:2.3:a:erlang:erlang\\/ssl:*:*:*:*:*:*:*:*",
              "matchCriteriaId": "BDA65CE8-5C84-4EAE-8709-44240FB9E2A1",
              "versionEndExcluding": "11.2.12.7",
              "versionStartIncluding": "11.2",
              "vulnerable": true
            },
            {
              "criteria": "cpe:2.3:a:erlang:erlang\\/ssl:*:*:*:*:*:*:*:*",
              "matchCriteriaId": "C64F6749-FB4F-4757-B9B9-540612B69606",
              "versionEndExcluding": "11.5.4",
              "versionStartExcluding": "11.3",
              "vulnerable": true
            }
          ],
          "negate": false,
          "operator": "OR"
        }
      ]
    }
  ],
  "cveTags": [],
  "descriptions": [
    {
      "lang": "en",
      "value": "Improper Certificate Validation vulnerability in Erlang OTP public_key (pubkey_ocsp module) allows OCSP designated-responder authorization bypass via missing signature verification.\n\nThe OCSP response validation in public_key:pkix_ocsp_validate/5 does not verify that a CA-designated responder certificate was cryptographically signed by the issuing CA. Instead, it only checks that the responder certificate\u0027s issuer name matches the CA\u0027s subject name and that the certificate has the OCSPSigning extended key usage. An attacker who can intercept or control OCSP responses can create a self-signed certificate with a matching issuer name and the OCSPSigning EKU, and use it to forge OCSP responses that mark revoked certificates as valid.\n\nThis affects SSL/TLS clients using OCSP stapling, which may accept connections to servers with revoked certificates, potentially transmitting sensitive data to compromised servers. Applications using the public_key:pkix_ocsp_validate/5 API directly are also affected, with impact depending on usage context.\n\nThis vulnerability is associated with program files lib/public_key/src/pubkey_ocsp.erl and program routines pubkey_ocsp:is_authorized_responder/3.\n\nThis issue affects OTP from OTP 27.0 until OTP 28.4.2 and 27.3.4.10 corresponding to public_key from 1.16 until 1.20.3 and 1.17.1.2, and ssl from 11.2 until 11.5.4 and 11.2.12.7."
    }
  ],
  "id": "CVE-2026-32144",
  "lastModified": "2026-04-23T17:32:55.830",
  "metrics": {
    "cvssMetricV31": [
      {
        "cvssData": {
          "attackComplexity": "HIGH",
          "attackVector": "NETWORK",
          "availabilityImpact": "NONE",
          "baseScore": 7.4,
          "baseSeverity": "HIGH",
          "confidentialityImpact": "HIGH",
          "integrityImpact": "HIGH",
          "privilegesRequired": "NONE",
          "scope": "UNCHANGED",
          "userInteraction": "NONE",
          "vectorString": "CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:H/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:N",
          "version": "3.1"
        },
        "exploitabilityScore": 2.2,
        "impactScore": 5.2,
        "source": "nvd@nist.gov",
        "type": "Primary"
      }
    ],
    "cvssMetricV40": [
      {
        "cvssData": {
          "Automatable": "NOT_DEFINED",
          "Recovery": "NOT_DEFINED",
          "Safety": "NOT_DEFINED",
          "attackComplexity": "LOW",
          "attackRequirements": "PRESENT",
          "attackVector": "NETWORK",
          "availabilityRequirement": "NOT_DEFINED",
          "baseScore": 7.6,
          "baseSeverity": "HIGH",
          "confidentialityRequirement": "NOT_DEFINED",
          "exploitMaturity": "NOT_DEFINED",
          "integrityRequirement": "NOT_DEFINED",
          "modifiedAttackComplexity": "NOT_DEFINED",
          "modifiedAttackRequirements": "NOT_DEFINED",
          "modifiedAttackVector": "NOT_DEFINED",
          "modifiedPrivilegesRequired": "NOT_DEFINED",
          "modifiedSubAvailabilityImpact": "NOT_DEFINED",
          "modifiedSubConfidentialityImpact": "NOT_DEFINED",
          "modifiedSubIntegrityImpact": "NOT_DEFINED",
          "modifiedUserInteraction": "NOT_DEFINED",
          "modifiedVulnAvailabilityImpact": "NOT_DEFINED",
          "modifiedVulnConfidentialityImpact": "NOT_DEFINED",
          "modifiedVulnIntegrityImpact": "NOT_DEFINED",
          "privilegesRequired": "NONE",
          "providerUrgency": "NOT_DEFINED",
          "subAvailabilityImpact": "NONE",
          "subConfidentialityImpact": "LOW",
          "subIntegrityImpact": "LOW",
          "userInteraction": "PASSIVE",
          "valueDensity": "NOT_DEFINED",
          "vectorString": "CVSS:4.0/AV:N/AC:L/AT:P/PR:N/UI:P/VC:H/VI:H/VA:N/SC:L/SI:L/SA:N/E:X/CR:X/IR:X/AR:X/MAV:X/MAC:X/MAT:X/MPR:X/MUI:X/MVC:X/MVI:X/MVA:X/MSC:X/MSI:X/MSA:X/S:X/AU:X/R:X/V:X/RE:X/U:X",
          "version": "4.0",
          "vulnAvailabilityImpact": "NONE",
          "vulnConfidentialityImpact": "HIGH",
          "vulnIntegrityImpact": "HIGH",
          "vulnerabilityResponseEffort": "NOT_DEFINED"
        },
        "source": "6b3ad84c-e1a6-4bf7-a703-f496b71e49db",
        "type": "Secondary"
      }
    ]
  },
  "published": "2026-04-07T13:16:46.570",
  "references": [
    {
      "source": "6b3ad84c-e1a6-4bf7-a703-f496b71e49db",
      "tags": [
        "Mitigation",
        "Vendor Advisory"
      ],
      "url": "https://cna.erlef.org/cves/CVE-2026-32144.html"
    },
    {
      "source": "6b3ad84c-e1a6-4bf7-a703-f496b71e49db",
      "tags": [
        "Patch"
      ],
      "url": "https://github.com/erlang/otp/commit/49033a6d93a5be0ee0dce04e1fb8b4ae7de1e0c0"
    },
    {
      "source": "6b3ad84c-e1a6-4bf7-a703-f496b71e49db",
      "tags": [
        "Patch"
      ],
      "url": "https://github.com/erlang/otp/commit/ac7ff528be857c5d35eb29c7f24106e3a16d4891"
    },
    {
      "source": "6b3ad84c-e1a6-4bf7-a703-f496b71e49db",
      "tags": [
        "Mitigation",
        "Third Party Advisory"
      ],
      "url": "https://github.com/erlang/otp/security/advisories/GHSA-gxrm-pf64-99xm"
    },
    {
      "source": "6b3ad84c-e1a6-4bf7-a703-f496b71e49db",
      "tags": [
        "Third Party Advisory"
      ],
      "url": "https://osv.dev/vulnerability/EEF-CVE-2026-32144"
    },
    {
      "source": "6b3ad84c-e1a6-4bf7-a703-f496b71e49db",
      "tags": [
        "Vendor Advisory"
      ],
      "url": "https://www.erlang.org/doc/system/versions.html#order-of-versions"
    }
  ],
  "sourceIdentifier": "6b3ad84c-e1a6-4bf7-a703-f496b71e49db",
  "vulnStatus": "Analyzed",
  "weaknesses": [
    {
      "description": [
        {
          "lang": "en",
          "value": "CWE-295"
        }
      ],
      "source": "6b3ad84c-e1a6-4bf7-a703-f496b71e49db",
      "type": "Secondary"
    }
  ]
}


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  • Seen: The vulnerability was mentioned, discussed, or observed by the user.
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