FKIE_CVE-2026-31719

Vulnerability from fkie_nvd - Published: 2026-05-01 14:16 - Updated: 2026-05-06 20:59
Severity ?
7.5 (High) - CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:N/I:H/A:N
Summary
In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: crypto: krb5enc - fix async decrypt skipping hash verification krb5enc_dispatch_decrypt() sets req->base.complete as the skcipher callback, which is the caller's own completion handler. When the skcipher completes asynchronously, this signals "done" to the caller without executing krb5enc_dispatch_decrypt_hash(), completely bypassing the integrity verification (hash check). Compare with the encrypt path which correctly uses krb5enc_encrypt_done as an intermediate callback to chain into the hash computation on async completion. Fix by adding krb5enc_decrypt_done as an intermediate callback that chains into krb5enc_dispatch_decrypt_hash() upon async skcipher completion, matching the encrypt path's callback pattern. Also fix EBUSY/EINPROGRESS handling throughout: remove krb5enc_request_complete() which incorrectly swallowed EINPROGRESS notifications that must be passed up to callers waiting on backlogged requests, and add missing EBUSY checks in krb5enc_encrypt_ahash_done for the dispatch_encrypt return value. Unset MAY_BACKLOG on the async completion path so the user won't see back-to-back EINPROGRESS notifications.
References
416baaa9-dc9f-4396-8d5f-8c081fb06d67https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/07cbb1bd424370671814a862913c99a6e1441588Patch
416baaa9-dc9f-4396-8d5f-8c081fb06d67https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/3bfbf5f0a99c991769ec562721285df7ab69240bPatch
416baaa9-dc9f-4396-8d5f-8c081fb06d67https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/e51f42114abbdf47f29dda43e7826be28907fcd2Patch
Impacted products
Vendor Product Version
linux linux_kernel *
linux linux_kernel *
linux linux_kernel 7.1
To clipboard 

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      "value": "In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:\n\ncrypto: krb5enc - fix async decrypt skipping hash verification\n\nkrb5enc_dispatch_decrypt() sets req-\u003ebase.complete as the skcipher\ncallback, which is the caller\u0027s own completion handler. When the\nskcipher completes asynchronously, this signals \"done\" to the caller\nwithout executing krb5enc_dispatch_decrypt_hash(), completely bypassing\nthe integrity verification (hash check).\n\nCompare with the encrypt path which correctly uses\nkrb5enc_encrypt_done as an intermediate callback to chain into the\nhash computation on async completion.\n\nFix by adding krb5enc_decrypt_done as an intermediate callback that\nchains into krb5enc_dispatch_decrypt_hash() upon async skcipher\ncompletion, matching the encrypt path\u0027s callback pattern.\n\nAlso fix EBUSY/EINPROGRESS handling throughout: remove\nkrb5enc_request_complete() which incorrectly swallowed EINPROGRESS\nnotifications that must be passed up to callers waiting on backlogged\nrequests, and add missing EBUSY checks in krb5enc_encrypt_ahash_done\nfor the dispatch_encrypt return value.\n\n\nUnset MAY_BACKLOG on the async completion path so the user won\u0027t\nsee back-to-back EINPROGRESS notifications."
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  "id": "CVE-2026-31719",
  "lastModified": "2026-05-06T20:59:16.007",
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          "availabilityImpact": "NONE",
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          "baseSeverity": "HIGH",
          "confidentialityImpact": "NONE",
          "integrityImpact": "HIGH",
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          "scope": "UNCHANGED",
          "userInteraction": "NONE",
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