FKIE_CVE-2026-30843
Vulnerability from fkie_nvd - Published: 2026-03-06 20:16 - Updated: 2026-06-17 10:33| Vendor | Product | Version | |
|---|---|---|---|
| wekan_project | wekan | 8.32 | |
| wekan_project | wekan | 8.33 |
{
"affected": [
{
"affectedData": [
{
"product": "Wekan",
"vendor": "Wekan",
"versions": [
{
"status": "affected",
"version": "\u003e= 8.32, \u003c 8.34"
}
]
},
{
"product": "Wekan",
"vendor": "Wekan",
"versions": [
{
"status": "affected",
"version": "\u003e= 8.32, \u003c 8.34"
}
]
}
],
"source": "security-advisories@github.com"
}
],
"configurations": [
{
"nodes": [
{
"cpeMatch": [
{
"criteria": "cpe:2.3:a:wekan_project:wekan:8.32:*:*:*:*:*:*:*",
"matchCriteriaId": "49FD24D6-7487-4971-B679-E8CB7EF29A64",
"vulnerable": true
},
{
"criteria": "cpe:2.3:a:wekan_project:wekan:8.33:*:*:*:*:*:*:*",
"matchCriteriaId": "24B3EEBA-2A0C-4A5A-B07A-13219B4E03D8",
"vulnerable": true
}
],
"negate": false,
"operator": "OR"
}
]
}
],
"cveTags": [],
"descriptions": [
{
"lang": "en",
"value": "Wekan is an open source kanban tool built with Meteor. Versions 8.32 and 8.33 have a critical Insecure Direct Object Reference (IDOR) issue which could allow unauthorized users to modify custom fields across boards through its custom fields update endpoints, potentially leading to unauthorized data manipulation. The PUT /api/boards/:boardId/custom-fields/:customFieldId endpoint in Wekan validates that the authenticated user has access to the specified boardId, but the subsequent database update uses only the custom field\u0027s _id as a filter without confirming the field actually belongs to that board. This means an attacker who owns any board can modify custom fields on any other board by supplying a foreign custom field ID, and the same flaw exists in the POST, PUT, and DELETE endpoints for dropdown items under custom fields. The required custom field IDs can be obtained by exporting a board (which only needs read access), since the exported JSON includes the IDs of all board components. The authorization check is performed against the wrong resource, allowing cross-board custom field manipulation. This issue has been fixed in version 8.34."
},
{
"lang": "es",
"value": "Wekan es una herramienta kanban de c\u00f3digo abierto construida con Meteor. Las versiones 8.32 y 8.33 tienen un problema cr\u00edtico de Referencia Directa a Objeto Insegura (IDOR) que podr\u00eda permitir a usuarios no autorizados modificar campos personalizados entre tableros a trav\u00e9s de sus puntos finales de actualizaci\u00f3n de campos personalizados, lo que podr\u00eda llevar a la manipulaci\u00f3n no autorizada de datos. El punto final PUT /api/boards/:boardId/custom-fields/:customFieldId en Wekan valida que el usuario autenticado tiene acceso al boardId especificado, pero la subsiguiente actualizaci\u00f3n de la base de datos utiliza solo el _id del campo personalizado como filtro sin confirmar que el campo realmente pertenece a ese tablero. Esto significa que un atacante que posee cualquier tablero puede modificar campos personalizados en cualquier otro tablero al proporcionar un ID de campo personalizado externo, y la misma falla existe en los puntos finales POST, PUT y DELETE para elementos desplegables bajo campos personalizados. Los ID de campo personalizados requeridos se pueden obtener exportando un tablero (lo que solo necesita acceso de lectura), ya que el JSON exportado incluye los ID de todos los componentes del tablero. La verificaci\u00f3n de autorizaci\u00f3n se realiza contra el recurso incorrecto, permitiendo la manipulaci\u00f3n de campos personalizados entre tableros. Este problema ha sido solucionado en la versi\u00f3n 8.34."
}
],
"id": "CVE-2026-30843",
"lastModified": "2026-06-17T10:33:00.967",
"metrics": {
"cvssMetricV31": [
{
"cvssData": {
"attackComplexity": "LOW",
"attackVector": "NETWORK",
"availabilityImpact": "NONE",
"baseScore": 6.5,
"baseSeverity": "MEDIUM",
"confidentialityImpact": "NONE",
"integrityImpact": "HIGH",
"privilegesRequired": "LOW",
"scope": "UNCHANGED",
"userInteraction": "NONE",
"vectorString": "CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:L/UI:N/S:U/C:N/I:H/A:N",
"version": "3.1"
},
"exploitabilityScore": 2.8,
"impactScore": 3.6,
"source": "nvd@nist.gov",
"type": "Primary"
}
],
"cvssMetricV40": [
{
"cvssData": {
"Automatable": "NOT_DEFINED",
"Recovery": "NOT_DEFINED",
"Safety": "NOT_DEFINED",
"attackComplexity": "LOW",
"attackRequirements": "NONE",
"attackVector": "NETWORK",
"availabilityRequirement": "NOT_DEFINED",
"baseScore": 9.3,
"baseSeverity": "CRITICAL",
"confidentialityRequirement": "NOT_DEFINED",
"exploitMaturity": "NOT_DEFINED",
"integrityRequirement": "NOT_DEFINED",
"modifiedAttackComplexity": "NOT_DEFINED",
"modifiedAttackRequirements": "NOT_DEFINED",
"modifiedAttackVector": "NOT_DEFINED",
"modifiedPrivilegesRequired": "NOT_DEFINED",
"modifiedSubAvailabilityImpact": "NOT_DEFINED",
"modifiedSubConfidentialityImpact": "NOT_DEFINED",
"modifiedSubIntegrityImpact": "NOT_DEFINED",
"modifiedUserInteraction": "NOT_DEFINED",
"modifiedVulnAvailabilityImpact": "NOT_DEFINED",
"modifiedVulnConfidentialityImpact": "NOT_DEFINED",
"modifiedVulnIntegrityImpact": "NOT_DEFINED",
"privilegesRequired": "LOW",
"providerUrgency": "NOT_DEFINED",
"subAvailabilityImpact": "NONE",
"subConfidentialityImpact": "HIGH",
"subIntegrityImpact": "HIGH",
"userInteraction": "NONE",
"valueDensity": "NOT_DEFINED",
"vectorString": "CVSS:4.0/AV:N/AC:L/AT:N/PR:L/UI:N/VC:H/VI:H/VA:N/SC:H/SI:H/SA:N/E:X/CR:X/IR:X/AR:X/MAV:X/MAC:X/MAT:X/MPR:X/MUI:X/MVC:X/MVI:X/MVA:X/MSC:X/MSI:X/MSA:X/S:X/AU:X/R:X/V:X/RE:X/U:X",
"version": "4.0",
"vulnAvailabilityImpact": "NONE",
"vulnConfidentialityImpact": "HIGH",
"vulnIntegrityImpact": "HIGH",
"vulnerabilityResponseEffort": "NOT_DEFINED"
},
"source": "security-advisories@github.com",
"type": "Secondary"
}
],
"ssvcV203": [
{
"source": "134c704f-9b21-4f2e-91b3-4a467353bcc0",
"ssvcData": {
"id": "CVE-2026-30843",
"options": [
{
"exploitation": "none"
},
{
"automatable": "no"
},
{
"technicalImpact": "total"
}
],
"role": "CISA Coordinator",
"timestamp": "2026-03-09T20:26:51.142628Z",
"version": "2.0.3"
}
}
]
},
"published": "2026-03-06T20:16:16.860",
"references": [
{
"source": "security-advisories@github.com",
"tags": [
"Patch"
],
"url": "https://github.com/wekan/wekan/commit/73eb98c57afd3d72377a1f7160a52450ab0eeb8b"
},
{
"source": "security-advisories@github.com",
"tags": [
"Release Notes"
],
"url": "https://github.com/wekan/wekan/releases/tag/v8.34"
},
{
"source": "security-advisories@github.com",
"tags": [
"Third Party Advisory"
],
"url": "https://securitylab.github.com/advisories/GHSL-2026-044_Wekan/"
}
],
"sourceIdentifier": "security-advisories@github.com",
"vulnStatus": "Analyzed",
"weaknesses": [
{
"description": [
{
"lang": "en",
"value": "CWE-639"
}
],
"source": "security-advisories@github.com",
"type": "Secondary"
}
]
}
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Sightings
| Author | Source | Type | Date | Other |
|---|
Nomenclature
- Seen: The vulnerability was mentioned, discussed, or observed by the user.
- Confirmed: The vulnerability has been validated from an analyst's perspective.
- Published Proof of Concept: A public proof of concept is available for this vulnerability.
- Exploited: The vulnerability was observed as exploited by the user who reported the sighting.
- Patched: The vulnerability was observed as successfully patched by the user who reported the sighting.
- Not exploited: The vulnerability was not observed as exploited by the user who reported the sighting.
- Not confirmed: The user expressed doubt about the validity of the vulnerability.
- Not patched: The vulnerability was not observed as successfully patched by the user who reported the sighting.
Vulnerability timeline
Sightings and recorded dates, grouped by day · UTC
How durations are calculated
Following the VTEM framework (Black Hat USA 2015), time to patch starts when the vendor or a coordinator was informed, total time to patch at discovery, and disclosure to patch at public disclosure; vendor response time runs from the report to its acknowledgement. Time to exploit and time unpatched start at the earliest discovery or report, falling back to public disclosure. Unpatched time ends at the first recorded patch, or the calculation time when no patch is recorded. Exploitation to patch shows the interval between those two events; a published proof of concept is a public exploit, not exploitation.
Each result shows its source dates. A negative interval means the end event came first; when date-only inputs leave the order open, the result says so. Date-only inputs are approximate. The earliest evidence wins: KEV report dates and sightings are labelled as such. Records describing another vulnerability are listed but never calculated from, and a PoC alone does not establish exploitation. Missing patch evidence does not prove that no patch exists. Filters below change the event list only.
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Vulnerabilities whose description is nearest to this one in the vector space of the CIRCL/vulnerability-attack-technique-biencoder model. This is a similarity search over the bi-encoder space (plain cosine), not a classification, and it has no measured accuracy.