FKIE_CVE-2026-30827
Vulnerability from fkie_nvd - Published: 2026-03-07 06:16 - Updated: 2026-06-17 10:32| Vendor | Product | Version | |
|---|---|---|---|
| express-rate-limit_project | express-rate-limit | * | |
| express-rate-limit_project | express-rate-limit | * | |
| express-rate-limit_project | express-rate-limit | 8.1.0 |
{
"affected": [
{
"affectedData": [
{
"product": "express-rate-limit",
"vendor": "express-rate-limit",
"versions": [
{
"status": "affected",
"version": "\u003e= 8.0.0, \u003c 8.0.2"
},
{
"status": "affected",
"version": "\u003e= 8.1.0, \u003c 8.1.1"
},
{
"status": "affected",
"version": "\u003e= 8.2.0, \u003c 8.2.2"
}
]
}
],
"source": "security-advisories@github.com"
}
],
"configurations": [
{
"nodes": [
{
"cpeMatch": [
{
"criteria": "cpe:2.3:a:express-rate-limit_project:express-rate-limit:*:*:*:*:*:*:*:*",
"matchCriteriaId": "AE5ED6AB-D445-4E61-86B1-FBC0659382A0",
"versionEndExcluding": "8.0.2",
"versionStartIncluding": "8.0.0",
"vulnerable": true
},
{
"criteria": "cpe:2.3:a:express-rate-limit_project:express-rate-limit:*:*:*:*:*:*:*:*",
"matchCriteriaId": "F501D9EB-DFE4-496D-8471-61DE755B9E05",
"versionEndExcluding": "8.2.2",
"versionStartIncluding": "8.2.0",
"vulnerable": true
},
{
"criteria": "cpe:2.3:a:express-rate-limit_project:express-rate-limit:8.1.0:*:*:*:*:*:*:*",
"matchCriteriaId": "C56713D6-533F-424A-B511-5E63014709D8",
"vulnerable": true
}
],
"negate": false,
"operator": "OR"
}
]
}
],
"cveTags": [],
"descriptions": [
{
"lang": "en",
"value": "express-rate-limit is a basic rate-limiting middleware for Express. In versions starting from 8.0.0 and prior to versions 8.0.2, 8.1.1, 8.2.2, and 8.3.0, the default keyGenerator in express-rate-limit applies IPv6 subnet masking (/56 by default) to all addresses that net.isIPv6() returns true for. This includes IPv4-mapped IPv6 addresses (::ffff:x.x.x.x), which Node.js returns as request.ip on dual-stack servers. Because the first 80 bits of all IPv4-mapped addresses are zero, a /56 (or any /32 to /80) subnet mask produces the same network key (::/56) for every IPv4 client. This collapses all IPv4 traffic into a single rate-limit bucket: one client exhausting the limit causes HTTP 429 for all other IPv4 clients. This issue has been patched in versions 8.0.2, 8.1.1, 8.2.2, and 8.3.0."
},
{
"lang": "es",
"value": "express-rate-limit es un middleware b\u00e1sico de limitaci\u00f3n de tasa para Express. En versiones a partir de la 8.0.0 y anteriores a las versiones 8.0.2, 8.1.1, 8.2.2 y 8.3.0, el keyGenerator predeterminado en express-rate-limit aplica enmascaramiento de subred IPv6 (/56 por defecto) a todas las direcciones para las que net.isIPv6() devuelve verdadero. Esto incluye direcciones IPv6 mapeadas a IPv4 (::ffff:x.x.x.x), que Node.js devuelve como request.ip en servidores de doble pila. Debido a que los primeros 80 bits de todas las direcciones mapeadas a IPv4 son cero, una m\u00e1scara de subred /56 (o cualquier /32 a /80) produce la misma clave de red (::/56) para cada cliente IPv4. Esto colapsa todo el tr\u00e1fico IPv4 en un \u00fanico cubo de limitaci\u00f3n de tasa: un cliente que agota el l\u00edmite causa HTTP 429 para todos los dem\u00e1s clientes IPv4. Este problema ha sido parcheado en las versiones 8.0.2, 8.1.1, 8.2.2 y 8.3.0."
}
],
"id": "CVE-2026-30827",
"lastModified": "2026-06-17T10:32:59.050",
"metrics": {
"cvssMetricV31": [
{
"cvssData": {
"attackComplexity": "LOW",
"attackVector": "NETWORK",
"availabilityImpact": "HIGH",
"baseScore": 7.5,
"baseSeverity": "HIGH",
"confidentialityImpact": "NONE",
"integrityImpact": "NONE",
"privilegesRequired": "NONE",
"scope": "UNCHANGED",
"userInteraction": "NONE",
"vectorString": "CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:N/I:N/A:H",
"version": "3.1"
},
"exploitabilityScore": 3.9,
"impactScore": 3.6,
"source": "security-advisories@github.com",
"type": "Secondary"
}
],
"ssvcV203": [
{
"source": "134c704f-9b21-4f2e-91b3-4a467353bcc0",
"ssvcData": {
"id": "CVE-2026-30827",
"options": [
{
"exploitation": "poc"
},
{
"automatable": "yes"
},
{
"technicalImpact": "partial"
}
],
"role": "CISA Coordinator",
"timestamp": "2026-03-09T20:40:59.712815Z",
"version": "2.0.3"
}
}
]
},
"published": "2026-03-07T06:16:10.507",
"references": [
{
"source": "security-advisories@github.com",
"tags": [
"Patch"
],
"url": "https://github.com/express-rate-limit/express-rate-limit/commit/14e53888cdfd1b9798faf5b634c4206409e27fc4"
},
{
"source": "security-advisories@github.com",
"tags": [
"Exploit",
"Patch",
"Vendor Advisory"
],
"url": "https://github.com/express-rate-limit/express-rate-limit/security/advisories/GHSA-46wh-pxpv-q5gq"
}
],
"sourceIdentifier": "security-advisories@github.com",
"vulnStatus": "Analyzed",
"weaknesses": [
{
"description": [
{
"lang": "en",
"value": "CWE-770"
}
],
"source": "security-advisories@github.com",
"type": "Secondary"
}
]
}
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Sightings
| Author | Source | Type | Date | Other |
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Nomenclature
- Seen: The vulnerability was mentioned, discussed, or observed by the user.
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- Published Proof of Concept: A public proof of concept is available for this vulnerability.
- Exploited: The vulnerability was observed as exploited by the user who reported the sighting.
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Vulnerability timeline
Sightings and recorded dates, grouped by day · UTC
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Following the VTEM framework (Black Hat USA 2015), time to patch starts when the vendor or a coordinator was informed, total time to patch at discovery, and disclosure to patch at public disclosure; vendor response time runs from the report to its acknowledgement. Time to exploit and time unpatched start at the earliest discovery or report, falling back to public disclosure. Unpatched time ends at the first recorded patch, or the calculation time when no patch is recorded. Exploitation to patch shows the interval between those two events; a published proof of concept is a public exploit, not exploitation.
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