FKIE_CVE-2026-28434
Vulnerability from fkie_nvd - Published: 2026-03-04 20:16 - Updated: 2026-06-17 10:28| Vendor | Product | Version | |
|---|---|---|---|
| yhirose | cpp-httplib | * |
{
"affected": [
{
"affectedData": [
{
"product": "cpp-httplib",
"vendor": "yhirose",
"versions": [
{
"status": "affected",
"version": "\u003c 0.35.0"
}
]
}
],
"source": "security-advisories@github.com"
}
],
"configurations": [
{
"nodes": [
{
"cpeMatch": [
{
"criteria": "cpe:2.3:a:yhirose:cpp-httplib:*:*:*:*:*:*:*:*",
"matchCriteriaId": "27E6A328-789B-48B3-B888-23C091A0766D",
"versionEndExcluding": "0.35.0",
"vulnerable": true
}
],
"negate": false,
"operator": "OR"
}
]
}
],
"cveTags": [],
"descriptions": [
{
"lang": "en",
"value": "cpp-httplib is a C++11 single-file header-only cross platform HTTP/HTTPS library. Prior to 0.35.0, when a request handler throws a C++ exception and the application has not registered a custom exception handler via set_exception_handler(), the library catches the exception and writes its message directly into the HTTP response as a header named EXCEPTION_WHAT. This header is sent to whoever made the request, with no authentication check and no special configuration required to trigger it. The behavior is on by default. A developer who does not know to opt in to set_exception_handler() will ship a server that leaks internal exception messages to any client. This vulnerability is fixed in 0.35.0."
},
{
"lang": "es",
"value": "cpp-httplib es una librer\u00eda HTTP/HTTPS multiplataforma de un solo archivo de solo encabezado C++11. Antes de la versi\u00f3n 0.35.0, cuando un gestor de solicitudes lanza una excepci\u00f3n de C++ y la aplicaci\u00f3n no ha registrado un gestor de excepciones personalizado a trav\u00e9s de set_exception_handler(), la librer\u00eda captura la excepci\u00f3n y escribe su mensaje directamente en la respuesta HTTP como un encabezado llamado EXCEPTION_WHAT. Este encabezado se env\u00eda a quienquiera que haya realizado la solicitud, sin verificaci\u00f3n de autenticaci\u00f3n y sin necesidad de configuraci\u00f3n especial para activarlo. El comportamiento est\u00e1 activado por defecto. Un desarrollador que no sabe c\u00f3mo optar por set_exception_handler() distribuir\u00e1 un servidor que filtra mensajes de excepci\u00f3n internos a cualquier cliente. Esta vulnerabilidad se corrige en la versi\u00f3n 0.35.0."
}
],
"id": "CVE-2026-28434",
"lastModified": "2026-06-17T10:28:38.347",
"metrics": {
"cvssMetricV31": [
{
"cvssData": {
"attackComplexity": "LOW",
"attackVector": "NETWORK",
"availabilityImpact": "NONE",
"baseScore": 5.3,
"baseSeverity": "MEDIUM",
"confidentialityImpact": "LOW",
"integrityImpact": "NONE",
"privilegesRequired": "NONE",
"scope": "UNCHANGED",
"userInteraction": "NONE",
"vectorString": "CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:L/I:N/A:N",
"version": "3.1"
},
"exploitabilityScore": 3.9,
"impactScore": 1.4,
"source": "security-advisories@github.com",
"type": "Secondary"
}
],
"ssvcV203": [
{
"source": "134c704f-9b21-4f2e-91b3-4a467353bcc0",
"ssvcData": {
"id": "CVE-2026-28434",
"options": [
{
"exploitation": "none"
},
{
"automatable": "yes"
},
{
"technicalImpact": "partial"
}
],
"role": "CISA Coordinator",
"timestamp": "2026-03-04T20:45:05.207964Z",
"version": "2.0.3"
}
}
]
},
"published": "2026-03-04T20:16:19.823",
"references": [
{
"source": "security-advisories@github.com",
"tags": [
"Patch"
],
"url": "https://github.com/yhirose/cpp-httplib/commit/defd907c7469c5c8281247b73bbd07be24c31164"
},
{
"source": "security-advisories@github.com",
"tags": [
"Exploit",
"Mitigation",
"Vendor Advisory"
],
"url": "https://github.com/yhirose/cpp-httplib/security/advisories/GHSA-8mpw-r4gc-xm7q"
}
],
"sourceIdentifier": "security-advisories@github.com",
"vulnStatus": "Analyzed",
"weaknesses": [
{
"description": [
{
"lang": "en",
"value": "CWE-200"
}
],
"source": "security-advisories@github.com",
"type": "Secondary"
},
{
"description": [
{
"lang": "en",
"value": "NVD-CWE-noinfo"
}
],
"source": "nvd@nist.gov",
"type": "Primary"
}
]
}
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Sightings
| Author | Source | Type | Date | Other |
|---|
Nomenclature
- Seen: The vulnerability was mentioned, discussed, or observed by the user.
- Confirmed: The vulnerability has been validated from an analyst's perspective.
- Published Proof of Concept: A public proof of concept is available for this vulnerability.
- Exploited: The vulnerability was observed as exploited by the user who reported the sighting.
- Patched: The vulnerability was observed as successfully patched by the user who reported the sighting.
- Not exploited: The vulnerability was not observed as exploited by the user who reported the sighting.
- Not confirmed: The user expressed doubt about the validity of the vulnerability.
- Not patched: The vulnerability was not observed as successfully patched by the user who reported the sighting.
Vulnerability timeline
Sightings and recorded dates, grouped by day · UTC
How durations are calculated
Following the VTEM framework (Black Hat USA 2015), time to patch starts when the vendor or a coordinator was informed, total time to patch at discovery, and disclosure to patch at public disclosure; vendor response time runs from the report to its acknowledgement. Time to exploit and time unpatched start at the earliest discovery or report, falling back to public disclosure. Unpatched time ends at the first recorded patch, or the calculation time when no patch is recorded. Exploitation to patch shows the interval between those two events; a published proof of concept is a public exploit, not exploitation.
Each result shows its source dates. A negative interval means the end event came first; when date-only inputs leave the order open, the result says so. Date-only inputs are approximate. The earliest evidence wins: KEV report dates and sightings are labelled as such. Records describing another vulnerability are listed but never calculated from, and a PoC alone does not establish exploitation. Missing patch evidence does not prove that no patch exists. Filters below change the event list only.
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Related by attack behaviour
Vulnerabilities whose description is nearest to this one in the vector space of the CIRCL/vulnerability-attack-technique-biencoder model. This is a similarity search over the bi-encoder space (plain cosine), not a classification, and it has no measured accuracy.