FKIE_CVE-2026-24413
Vulnerability from fkie_nvd - Published: 2026-01-29 18:16 - Updated: 2026-06-17 10:23
Severity
Summary
Icinga 2 is an open source monitoring system. Starting in version 2.3.0 and prior to versions 2.13.14, 2.14.8, and 2.15.2, the Icinga 2 MSI did not set appropriate permissions for the `%ProgramData%\icinga2\var` folder on Windows. This resulted in the its contents - including the private key of the user and synced configuration - being readable by all local users. All installations on Windows are affected. Versions 2.13.14, 2.14.8, and 2.15.2 contains a fix. There are two possibilities to work around the issue without upgrading Icinga 2. Upgrade Icinga for Windows to at least version v1.13.4, v1.12.4, or v1.11.2. These version will automatically fix the ACLs for the Icinga 2 agent as well. Alternatively, manually update the ACL for the given folder `C:\ProgramData\icinga2\var` (and `C:\Program Files\WindowsPowerShell\modules\icinga-powershell-framework\certificate` to fix the issue for the Icinga for Windows as well) including every sub-folder and item to restrict access for general users, only allowing the Icinga service user and administrators access.
References
{
"affected": [
{
"affectedData": [
{
"product": "icinga2",
"vendor": "Icinga",
"versions": [
{
"status": "affected",
"version": "\u003e= 2.3.0, \u003c 2.13.14"
},
{
"status": "affected",
"version": "\u003e= 2.14.0, \u003c 2.14.8"
},
{
"status": "affected",
"version": "\u003e= 2.15.0, \u003c 2.15.2"
}
]
}
],
"source": "security-advisories@github.com"
}
],
"configurations": [
{
"nodes": [
{
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"criteria": "cpe:2.3:a:icinga:icinga:*:*:*:*:*:*:*:*",
"matchCriteriaId": "EF4A8D01-2AF4-42AB-BD24-FFFBA30B2BE9",
"versionEndExcluding": "2.13.14",
"versionStartIncluding": "2.3.0",
"vulnerable": true
},
{
"criteria": "cpe:2.3:a:icinga:icinga:*:*:*:*:*:*:*:*",
"matchCriteriaId": "EF121DB1-2B90-40BB-ACC2-A4E15D48DA80",
"versionEndExcluding": "2.14.8",
"versionStartIncluding": "2.14.0",
"vulnerable": true
},
{
"criteria": "cpe:2.3:a:icinga:icinga:*:*:*:*:*:*:*:*",
"matchCriteriaId": "0C5F1C29-FC79-492C-A2A9-1DA4E65268F6",
"versionEndExcluding": "2.15.2",
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}
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"operator": "OR"
},
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"criteria": "cpe:2.3:o:microsoft:windows:-:*:*:*:*:*:*:*",
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"vulnerable": false
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"operator": "OR"
}
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"operator": "AND"
}
],
"cveTags": [],
"descriptions": [
{
"lang": "en",
"value": "Icinga 2 is an open source monitoring system. Starting in version 2.3.0 and prior to versions 2.13.14, 2.14.8, and 2.15.2, the Icinga 2 MSI did not set appropriate permissions for the `%ProgramData%\\icinga2\\var` folder on Windows. This resulted in the its contents - including the private key of the user and synced configuration - being readable by all local users. All installations on Windows are affected. Versions 2.13.14, 2.14.8, and 2.15.2 contains a fix. There are two possibilities to work around the issue without upgrading Icinga 2. Upgrade Icinga for Windows to at least version v1.13.4, v1.12.4, or v1.11.2. These version will automatically fix the ACLs for the Icinga 2 agent as well. Alternatively, manually update the ACL for the given folder `C:\\ProgramData\\icinga2\\var` (and `C:\\Program Files\\WindowsPowerShell\\modules\\icinga-powershell-framework\\certificate` to fix the issue for the Icinga for Windows as well) including every sub-folder and item to restrict access for general users, only allowing the Icinga service user and administrators access."
},
{
"lang": "es",
"value": "Icinga 2 es un sistema de monitoreo de c\u00f3digo abierto. A partir de la versi\u00f3n 2.3.0 y antes de las versiones 2.13.14, 2.14.8 y 2.15.2, el MSI de Icinga 2 no configuraba los permisos adecuados para la carpeta \u0027%ProgramData%\\icinga2\\var\u0027 en Windows. Esto resultaba en que su contenido - incluyendo la clave privada del usuario y la configuraci\u00f3n sincronizada - fuera legible por todos los usuarios locales. Todas las instalaciones en Windows est\u00e1n afectadas. Las versiones 2.13.14, 2.14.8 y 2.15.2 contienen una soluci\u00f3n. Existen dos posibilidades para solucionar el problema sin actualizar Icinga 2. Actualice Icinga para Windows a al menos la versi\u00f3n v1.13.4, v1.12.4 o v1.11.2. Estas versiones corregir\u00e1n autom\u00e1ticamente las ACL para el agente de Icinga 2 tambi\u00e9n. Alternativamente, actualice manualmente la ACL para la carpeta dada \u0027C:\\ProgramData\\icinga2\\var\u0027 (y \u0027C:\\Program Files\\WindowsPowerShell\\modules\\icinga-powershell-framework\\certificate\u0027 para solucionar el problema tambi\u00e9n para Icinga para Windows) incluyendo cada subcarpeta y elemento para restringir el acceso a los usuarios generales, permitiendo el acceso solo al usuario de servicio de Icinga y a los administradores."
}
],
"id": "CVE-2026-24413",
"lastModified": "2026-06-17T10:23:01.910",
"metrics": {
"cvssMetricV31": [
{
"cvssData": {
"attackComplexity": "LOW",
"attackVector": "LOCAL",
"availabilityImpact": "NONE",
"baseScore": 5.5,
"baseSeverity": "MEDIUM",
"confidentialityImpact": "HIGH",
"integrityImpact": "NONE",
"privilegesRequired": "LOW",
"scope": "UNCHANGED",
"userInteraction": "NONE",
"vectorString": "CVSS:3.1/AV:L/AC:L/PR:L/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:N/A:N",
"version": "3.1"
},
"exploitabilityScore": 1.8,
"impactScore": 3.6,
"source": "nvd@nist.gov",
"type": "Primary"
}
],
"cvssMetricV40": [
{
"cvssData": {
"Automatable": "NOT_DEFINED",
"Recovery": "NOT_DEFINED",
"Safety": "NOT_DEFINED",
"attackComplexity": "LOW",
"attackRequirements": "NONE",
"attackVector": "LOCAL",
"availabilityRequirement": "NOT_DEFINED",
"baseScore": 6.8,
"baseSeverity": "MEDIUM",
"confidentialityRequirement": "NOT_DEFINED",
"exploitMaturity": "NOT_DEFINED",
"integrityRequirement": "NOT_DEFINED",
"modifiedAttackComplexity": "NOT_DEFINED",
"modifiedAttackRequirements": "NOT_DEFINED",
"modifiedAttackVector": "NOT_DEFINED",
"modifiedPrivilegesRequired": "NOT_DEFINED",
"modifiedSubAvailabilityImpact": "NOT_DEFINED",
"modifiedSubConfidentialityImpact": "NOT_DEFINED",
"modifiedSubIntegrityImpact": "NOT_DEFINED",
"modifiedUserInteraction": "NOT_DEFINED",
"modifiedVulnAvailabilityImpact": "NOT_DEFINED",
"modifiedVulnConfidentialityImpact": "NOT_DEFINED",
"modifiedVulnIntegrityImpact": "NOT_DEFINED",
"privilegesRequired": "LOW",
"providerUrgency": "NOT_DEFINED",
"subAvailabilityImpact": "NONE",
"subConfidentialityImpact": "NONE",
"subIntegrityImpact": "NONE",
"userInteraction": "NONE",
"valueDensity": "NOT_DEFINED",
"vectorString": "CVSS:4.0/AV:L/AC:L/AT:N/PR:L/UI:N/VC:H/VI:N/VA:N/SC:N/SI:N/SA:N/E:X/CR:X/IR:X/AR:X/MAV:X/MAC:X/MAT:X/MPR:X/MUI:X/MVC:X/MVI:X/MVA:X/MSC:X/MSI:X/MSA:X/S:X/AU:X/R:X/V:X/RE:X/U:X",
"version": "4.0",
"vulnAvailabilityImpact": "NONE",
"vulnConfidentialityImpact": "HIGH",
"vulnIntegrityImpact": "NONE",
"vulnerabilityResponseEffort": "NOT_DEFINED"
},
"source": "security-advisories@github.com",
"type": "Secondary"
}
],
"ssvcV203": [
{
"source": "134c704f-9b21-4f2e-91b3-4a467353bcc0",
"ssvcData": {
"id": "CVE-2026-24413",
"options": [
{
"exploitation": "none"
},
{
"automatable": "no"
},
{
"technicalImpact": "partial"
}
],
"role": "CISA Coordinator",
"timestamp": "2026-01-29T21:23:06.715208Z",
"version": "2.0.3"
}
}
]
},
"published": "2026-01-29T18:16:15.450",
"references": [
{
"source": "security-advisories@github.com",
"tags": [
"Not Applicable"
],
"url": "https://github.com/Icinga/icinga-powershell-framework/security/advisories/GHSA-88h5-rrm6-5973"
},
{
"source": "security-advisories@github.com",
"tags": [
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],
"url": "https://github.com/Icinga/icinga2/security/advisories/GHSA-vfjg-6fpv-4mmr"
},
{
"source": "security-advisories@github.com",
"tags": [
"Patch",
"Press/Media Coverage"
],
"url": "https://icinga.com/blog/releasing-icinga-2-v2-15-2-v2-14-8-v2-13-14-and-icinga-for-windows-v1-13-4-v1-12-4-v1-11-2"
}
],
"sourceIdentifier": "security-advisories@github.com",
"vulnStatus": "Analyzed",
"weaknesses": [
{
"description": [
{
"lang": "en",
"value": "CWE-276"
}
],
"source": "security-advisories@github.com",
"type": "Secondary"
}
]
}
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Forecast uses a logistic model when the trend is rising, or an exponential decay model when the trend is falling. Fitted via linearized least squares.
Sightings
| Author | Source | Type | Date | Other |
|---|
Nomenclature
- Seen: The vulnerability was mentioned, discussed, or observed by the user.
- Confirmed: The vulnerability has been validated from an analyst's perspective.
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- Exploited: The vulnerability was observed as exploited by the user who reported the sighting.
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Vulnerability timeline
Sightings and recorded dates, grouped by day · UTC
How durations are calculated
Following the VTEM framework (Black Hat USA 2015), time to patch starts when the vendor or a coordinator was informed, total time to patch at discovery, and disclosure to patch at public disclosure; vendor response time runs from the report to its acknowledgement. Time to exploit and time unpatched start at the earliest discovery or report, falling back to public disclosure. Unpatched time ends at the first recorded patch, or the calculation time when no patch is recorded. Exploitation to patch shows the interval between those two events; a published proof of concept is a public exploit, not exploitation.
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The MITRE ATT&CK techniques below are AI-generated suggestions, inferred from the description of the
vulnerability by the CIRCL/vulnerability-attack-technique-classification-roberta-base
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They have not been verified by an analyst and are provided for guidance only.
The approach is described in our paper Mapping CVEs to MITRE ATT&CK Techniques: A Curated Gold-Set Classifier and the Limits of LLM-Assisted Label Expansion.
Browse all ATT&CK techniques and the vulnerabilities related to each.
The approach is described in our paper Mapping CVEs to MITRE ATT&CK Techniques: A Curated Gold-Set Classifier and the Limits of LLM-Assisted Label Expansion.
Browse all ATT&CK techniques and the vulnerabilities related to each.
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Related by attack behaviour
Vulnerabilities whose description is nearest to this one in the vector space of the CIRCL/vulnerability-attack-technique-biencoder model. This is a similarity search over the bi-encoder space (plain cosine), not a classification, and it has no measured accuracy.