FKIE_CVE-2026-23401

Vulnerability from fkie_nvd - Published: 2026-04-01 09:16 - Updated: 2026-04-02 12:16
Severity ?
Summary
In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: KVM: x86/mmu: Drop/zap existing present SPTE even when creating an MMIO SPTE When installing an emulated MMIO SPTE, do so *after* dropping/zapping the existing SPTE (if it's shadow-present). While commit a54aa15c6bda3 was right about it being impossible to convert a shadow-present SPTE to an MMIO SPTE due to a _guest_ write, it failed to account for writes to guest memory that are outside the scope of KVM. E.g. if host userspace modifies a shadowed gPTE to switch from a memslot to emulted MMIO and then the guest hits a relevant page fault, KVM will install the MMIO SPTE without first zapping the shadow-present SPTE. ------------[ cut here ]------------ is_shadow_present_pte(*sptep) WARNING: arch/x86/kvm/mmu/mmu.c:484 at mark_mmio_spte+0xb2/0xc0 [kvm], CPU#0: vmx_ept_stale_r/4292 Modules linked in: kvm_intel kvm irqbypass CPU: 0 UID: 1000 PID: 4292 Comm: vmx_ept_stale_r Not tainted 7.0.0-rc2-eafebd2d2ab0-sink-vm #319 PREEMPT Hardware name: QEMU Standard PC (Q35 + ICH9, 2009), BIOS 0.0.0 02/06/2015 RIP: 0010:mark_mmio_spte+0xb2/0xc0 [kvm] Call Trace: <TASK> mmu_set_spte+0x237/0x440 [kvm] ept_page_fault+0x535/0x7f0 [kvm] kvm_mmu_do_page_fault+0xee/0x1f0 [kvm] kvm_mmu_page_fault+0x8d/0x620 [kvm] vmx_handle_exit+0x18c/0x5a0 [kvm_intel] kvm_arch_vcpu_ioctl_run+0xc55/0x1c20 [kvm] kvm_vcpu_ioctl+0x2d5/0x980 [kvm] __x64_sys_ioctl+0x8a/0xd0 do_syscall_64+0xb5/0x730 entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x4b/0x53 RIP: 0033:0x47fa3f </TASK> ---[ end trace 0000000000000000 ]---
References
416baaa9-dc9f-4396-8d5f-8c081fb06d67https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/459158151a158a6703b49f3c9de0e536d8bd553f
416baaa9-dc9f-4396-8d5f-8c081fb06d67https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/695320de6eadb75aaed8be1787c4ce4c189e4c7b
416baaa9-dc9f-4396-8d5f-8c081fb06d67https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/aad885e774966e97b675dfe928da164214a71605
416baaa9-dc9f-4396-8d5f-8c081fb06d67https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/bce7fe59d43531623f3e43779127bfb33804925d
416baaa9-dc9f-4396-8d5f-8c081fb06d67https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/fd28c5618699180cd69619801e9ae6a5266c0a22
Impacted products
Vendor Product Version
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{
  "cveTags": [],
  "descriptions": [
    {
      "lang": "en",
      "value": "In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:\n\nKVM: x86/mmu: Drop/zap existing present SPTE even when creating an MMIO SPTE\n\nWhen installing an emulated MMIO SPTE, do so *after* dropping/zapping the\nexisting SPTE (if it\u0027s shadow-present).  While commit a54aa15c6bda3 was\nright about it being impossible to convert a shadow-present SPTE to an\nMMIO SPTE due to a _guest_ write, it failed to account for writes to guest\nmemory that are outside the scope of KVM.\n\nE.g. if host userspace modifies a shadowed gPTE to switch from a memslot\nto emulted MMIO and then the guest hits a relevant page fault, KVM will\ninstall the MMIO SPTE without first zapping the shadow-present SPTE.\n\n  ------------[ cut here ]------------\n  is_shadow_present_pte(*sptep)\n  WARNING: arch/x86/kvm/mmu/mmu.c:484 at mark_mmio_spte+0xb2/0xc0 [kvm], CPU#0: vmx_ept_stale_r/4292\n  Modules linked in: kvm_intel kvm irqbypass\n  CPU: 0 UID: 1000 PID: 4292 Comm: vmx_ept_stale_r Not tainted 7.0.0-rc2-eafebd2d2ab0-sink-vm #319 PREEMPT\n  Hardware name: QEMU Standard PC (Q35 + ICH9, 2009), BIOS 0.0.0 02/06/2015\n  RIP: 0010:mark_mmio_spte+0xb2/0xc0 [kvm]\n  Call Trace:\n   \u003cTASK\u003e\n   mmu_set_spte+0x237/0x440 [kvm]\n   ept_page_fault+0x535/0x7f0 [kvm]\n   kvm_mmu_do_page_fault+0xee/0x1f0 [kvm]\n   kvm_mmu_page_fault+0x8d/0x620 [kvm]\n   vmx_handle_exit+0x18c/0x5a0 [kvm_intel]\n   kvm_arch_vcpu_ioctl_run+0xc55/0x1c20 [kvm]\n   kvm_vcpu_ioctl+0x2d5/0x980 [kvm]\n   __x64_sys_ioctl+0x8a/0xd0\n   do_syscall_64+0xb5/0x730\n   entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x4b/0x53\n  RIP: 0033:0x47fa3f\n   \u003c/TASK\u003e\n  ---[ end trace 0000000000000000 ]---"
    }
  ],
  "id": "CVE-2026-23401",
  "lastModified": "2026-04-02T12:16:19.970",
  "metrics": {},
  "published": "2026-04-01T09:16:15.260",
  "references": [
    {
      "source": "416baaa9-dc9f-4396-8d5f-8c081fb06d67",
      "url": "https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/459158151a158a6703b49f3c9de0e536d8bd553f"
    },
    {
      "source": "416baaa9-dc9f-4396-8d5f-8c081fb06d67",
      "url": "https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/695320de6eadb75aaed8be1787c4ce4c189e4c7b"
    },
    {
      "source": "416baaa9-dc9f-4396-8d5f-8c081fb06d67",
      "url": "https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/aad885e774966e97b675dfe928da164214a71605"
    },
    {
      "source": "416baaa9-dc9f-4396-8d5f-8c081fb06d67",
      "url": "https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/bce7fe59d43531623f3e43779127bfb33804925d"
    },
    {
      "source": "416baaa9-dc9f-4396-8d5f-8c081fb06d67",
      "url": "https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/fd28c5618699180cd69619801e9ae6a5266c0a22"
    }
  ],
  "sourceIdentifier": "416baaa9-dc9f-4396-8d5f-8c081fb06d67",
  "vulnStatus": "Awaiting Analysis"
}


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