FKIE_CVE-2026-23323
Vulnerability from fkie_nvd - Published: 2026-03-25 11:16 - Updated: 2026-06-17 10:21| Vendor | Product | Version | |
|---|---|---|---|
| linux | linux_kernel | * | |
| linux | linux_kernel | 6.19 | |
| linux | linux_kernel | 7.0 | |
| linux | linux_kernel | 7.0 | |
| linux | linux_kernel | 7.0 | |
| linux | linux_kernel | 7.0 | |
| linux | linux_kernel | 7.0 | |
| linux | linux_kernel | 7.0 | |
| linux | linux_kernel | 7.0 |
{
"affected": [
{
"affectedData": [
{
"defaultStatus": "unaffected",
"product": "Linux",
"programFiles": [
"drivers/hwmon/macsmc-hwmon.c"
],
"repo": "https://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/stable/linux.git",
"vendor": "Linux",
"versions": [
{
"lessThan": "625ef35b70d3883fb9a41cd5a988e64dd3e447d6",
"status": "affected",
"version": "785205fd81399bd8e49065aee3362a99d5702321",
"versionType": "git"
},
{
"lessThan": "5dd69b864911ae3847365e8bafe7854e79fbeecb",
"status": "affected",
"version": "785205fd81399bd8e49065aee3362a99d5702321",
"versionType": "git"
}
]
},
{
"defaultStatus": "affected",
"product": "Linux",
"programFiles": [
"drivers/hwmon/macsmc-hwmon.c"
],
"repo": "https://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/stable/linux.git",
"vendor": "Linux",
"versions": [
{
"status": "affected",
"version": "6.19"
},
{
"lessThan": "6.19",
"status": "unaffected",
"version": "0",
"versionType": "semver"
},
{
"lessThanOrEqual": "6.19.*",
"status": "unaffected",
"version": "6.19.7",
"versionType": "semver"
},
{
"lessThanOrEqual": "*",
"status": "unaffected",
"version": "7.0",
"versionType": "original_commit_for_fix"
}
]
}
],
"source": "416baaa9-dc9f-4396-8d5f-8c081fb06d67"
}
],
"configurations": [
{
"nodes": [
{
"cpeMatch": [
{
"criteria": "cpe:2.3:o:linux:linux_kernel:*:*:*:*:*:*:*:*",
"matchCriteriaId": "8ACF56ED-6FE0-41DE-BECE-41134CC7BD44",
"versionEndExcluding": "6.19.7",
"versionStartIncluding": "6.19.1",
"vulnerable": true
},
{
"criteria": "cpe:2.3:o:linux:linux_kernel:6.19:-:*:*:*:*:*:*",
"matchCriteriaId": "35C8A871-4971-433E-A046-FC9F7B7D190A",
"vulnerable": true
},
{
"criteria": "cpe:2.3:o:linux:linux_kernel:7.0:rc1:*:*:*:*:*:*",
"matchCriteriaId": "F253B622-8837-4245-BCE5-A7BF8FC76A16",
"vulnerable": true
},
{
"criteria": "cpe:2.3:o:linux:linux_kernel:7.0:rc2:*:*:*:*:*:*",
"matchCriteriaId": "4AE85AD8-4641-4E7C-A2F4-305E2CD9EE64",
"vulnerable": true
},
{
"criteria": "cpe:2.3:o:linux:linux_kernel:7.0:rc3:*:*:*:*:*:*",
"matchCriteriaId": "F666C8D8-6538-46D4-B318-87610DE64C34",
"vulnerable": true
},
{
"criteria": "cpe:2.3:o:linux:linux_kernel:7.0:rc4:*:*:*:*:*:*",
"matchCriteriaId": "02259FDA-961B-47BC-AE7F-93D7EC6E90C2",
"vulnerable": true
},
{
"criteria": "cpe:2.3:o:linux:linux_kernel:7.0:rc5:*:*:*:*:*:*",
"matchCriteriaId": "58A9FEFF-C040-420D-8F0A-BFDAAA1DF258",
"vulnerable": true
},
{
"criteria": "cpe:2.3:o:linux:linux_kernel:7.0:rc6:*:*:*:*:*:*",
"matchCriteriaId": "1D2315C0-D46F-4F85-9754-F9E5E11374A6",
"vulnerable": true
},
{
"criteria": "cpe:2.3:o:linux:linux_kernel:7.0:rc7:*:*:*:*:*:*",
"matchCriteriaId": "512EE3A8-A590-4501-9A94-5D4B268D6138",
"vulnerable": true
}
],
"negate": false,
"operator": "OR"
}
]
}
],
"cveTags": [],
"descriptions": [
{
"lang": "en",
"value": "In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:\n\nhwmon: (macsmc) Fix regressions in Apple Silicon SMC hwmon driver\n\nThe recently added macsmc-hwmon driver contained several critical\nbugs in its sensor population logic and float conversion routines.\n\nSpecifically:\n- The voltage sensor population loop used the wrong prefix (\"volt-\"\n instead of \"voltage-\") and incorrectly assigned sensors to the\n temperature sensor array (hwmon-\u003etemp.sensors) instead of the\n voltage sensor array (hwmon-\u003evolt.sensors). This would lead to\n out-of-bounds memory access or data corruption when both temperature\n and voltage sensors were present.\n- The float conversion in macsmc_hwmon_write_f32() had flawed exponent\n logic for values \u003e= 2^24 and lacked masking for the mantissa, which\n could lead to incorrect values being written to the SMC.\n\nFix these issues to ensure correct sensor registration and reliable\nmanual fan control.\n\nConfirm that the reported overflow in FIELD_PREP is fixed by declaring\nmacsmc_hwmon_write_f32() as __always_inline for a compile test."
},
{
"lang": "es",
"value": "En el kernel de Linux, la siguiente vulnerabilidad ha sido resuelta:\n\nhwmon: (macsmc) Corrige regresiones en el controlador hwmon SMC de Apple Silicon\n\nEl controlador macsmc-hwmon recientemente a\u00f1adido conten\u00eda varios errores cr\u00edticos en su l\u00f3gica de poblaci\u00f3n de sensores y rutinas de conversi\u00f3n de coma flotante.\n\nEspec\u00edficamente:\n- El bucle de poblaci\u00f3n del sensor de voltaje usaba el prefijo incorrecto (\u0027volt-\u0027 en lugar de \u0027voltage-\u0027) y asignaba incorrectamente los sensores al array de sensores de temperatura (hwmon-\u0026gt;temp.sensors) en lugar del array de sensores de voltaje (hwmon-\u0026gt;volt.sensors). Esto llevar\u00eda a acceso a memoria fuera de l\u00edmites o corrupci\u00f3n de datos cuando ambos sensores de temperatura y voltaje estaban presentes.\n- La conversi\u00f3n de coma flotante en macsmc_hwmon_write_f32() ten\u00eda una l\u00f3gica de exponente defectuosa para valores \u0026gt;= 2^24 y carec\u00eda de enmascaramiento para la mantisa, lo que podr\u00eda llevar a que se escribieran valores incorrectos en el SMC.\n\nSoluciona estos problemas para asegurar un registro correcto de los sensores y un control manual fiable del ventilador.\n\nConfirma que el desbordamiento reportado en FIELD_PREP est\u00e1 solucionado declarando macsmc_hwmon_write_f32() como __always_inline para una prueba de compilaci\u00f3n."
}
],
"id": "CVE-2026-23323",
"lastModified": "2026-06-17T10:21:19.703",
"metrics": {
"cvssMetricV31": [
{
"cvssData": {
"attackComplexity": "LOW",
"attackVector": "LOCAL",
"availabilityImpact": "HIGH",
"baseScore": 7.8,
"baseSeverity": "HIGH",
"confidentialityImpact": "HIGH",
"integrityImpact": "HIGH",
"privilegesRequired": "LOW",
"scope": "UNCHANGED",
"userInteraction": "NONE",
"vectorString": "CVSS:3.1/AV:L/AC:L/PR:L/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:H",
"version": "3.1"
},
"exploitabilityScore": 1.8,
"impactScore": 5.9,
"source": "nvd@nist.gov",
"type": "Primary"
}
]
},
"published": "2026-03-25T11:16:29.250",
"references": [
{
"source": "416baaa9-dc9f-4396-8d5f-8c081fb06d67",
"tags": [
"Patch"
],
"url": "https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/5dd69b864911ae3847365e8bafe7854e79fbeecb"
},
{
"source": "416baaa9-dc9f-4396-8d5f-8c081fb06d67",
"tags": [
"Patch"
],
"url": "https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/625ef35b70d3883fb9a41cd5a988e64dd3e447d6"
}
],
"sourceIdentifier": "416baaa9-dc9f-4396-8d5f-8c081fb06d67",
"vulnStatus": "Analyzed",
"weaknesses": [
{
"description": [
{
"lang": "en",
"value": "CWE-787"
}
],
"source": "nvd@nist.gov",
"type": "Primary"
}
]
}
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Sightings
| Author | Source | Type | Date | Other |
|---|
Nomenclature
- Seen: The vulnerability was mentioned, discussed, or observed by the user.
- Confirmed: The vulnerability has been validated from an analyst's perspective.
- Published Proof of Concept: A public proof of concept is available for this vulnerability.
- Exploited: The vulnerability was observed as exploited by the user who reported the sighting.
- Patched: The vulnerability was observed as successfully patched by the user who reported the sighting.
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- Not confirmed: The user expressed doubt about the validity of the vulnerability.
- Not patched: The vulnerability was not observed as successfully patched by the user who reported the sighting.
Vulnerability timeline
Sightings and recorded dates, grouped by day · UTC
How durations are calculated
Following the VTEM framework (Black Hat USA 2015), time to patch starts when the vendor or a coordinator was informed, total time to patch at discovery, and disclosure to patch at public disclosure; vendor response time runs from the report to its acknowledgement. Time to exploit and time unpatched start at the earliest discovery or report, falling back to public disclosure. Unpatched time ends at the first recorded patch, or the calculation time when no patch is recorded. Exploitation to patch shows the interval between those two events; a published proof of concept is a public exploit, not exploitation.
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