FKIE_CVE-2026-23294
Vulnerability from fkie_nvd - Published: 2026-03-25 11:16 - Updated: 2026-03-25 15:41
Severity ?
Summary
In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
bpf: Fix race in devmap on PREEMPT_RT
On PREEMPT_RT kernels, the per-CPU xdp_dev_bulk_queue (bq) can be
accessed concurrently by multiple preemptible tasks on the same CPU.
The original code assumes bq_enqueue() and __dev_flush() run atomically
with respect to each other on the same CPU, relying on
local_bh_disable() to prevent preemption. However, on PREEMPT_RT,
local_bh_disable() only calls migrate_disable() (when
PREEMPT_RT_NEEDS_BH_LOCK is not set) and does not disable
preemption, which allows CFS scheduling to preempt a task during
bq_xmit_all(), enabling another task on the same CPU to enter
bq_enqueue() and operate on the same per-CPU bq concurrently.
This leads to several races:
1. Double-free / use-after-free on bq->q[]: bq_xmit_all() snapshots
cnt = bq->count, then iterates bq->q[0..cnt-1] to transmit frames.
If preempted after the snapshot, a second task can call bq_enqueue()
-> bq_xmit_all() on the same bq, transmitting (and freeing) the
same frames. When the first task resumes, it operates on stale
pointers in bq->q[], causing use-after-free.
2. bq->count and bq->q[] corruption: concurrent bq_enqueue() modifying
bq->count and bq->q[] while bq_xmit_all() is reading them.
3. dev_rx/xdp_prog teardown race: __dev_flush() clears bq->dev_rx and
bq->xdp_prog after bq_xmit_all(). If preempted between
bq_xmit_all() return and bq->dev_rx = NULL, a preempting
bq_enqueue() sees dev_rx still set (non-NULL), skips adding bq to
the flush_list, and enqueues a frame. When __dev_flush() resumes,
it clears dev_rx and removes bq from the flush_list, orphaning the
newly enqueued frame.
4. __list_del_clearprev() on flush_node: similar to the cpumap race,
both tasks can call __list_del_clearprev() on the same flush_node,
the second dereferences the prev pointer already set to NULL.
The race between task A (__dev_flush -> bq_xmit_all) and task B
(bq_enqueue -> bq_xmit_all) on the same CPU:
Task A (xdp_do_flush) Task B (ndo_xdp_xmit redirect)
---------------------- --------------------------------
__dev_flush(flush_list)
bq_xmit_all(bq)
cnt = bq->count /* e.g. 16 */
/* start iterating bq->q[] */
<-- CFS preempts Task A -->
bq_enqueue(dev, xdpf)
bq->count == DEV_MAP_BULK_SIZE
bq_xmit_all(bq, 0)
cnt = bq->count /* same 16! */
ndo_xdp_xmit(bq->q[])
/* frames freed by driver */
bq->count = 0
<-- Task A resumes -->
ndo_xdp_xmit(bq->q[])
/* use-after-free: frames already freed! */
Fix this by adding a local_lock_t to xdp_dev_bulk_queue and acquiring
it in bq_enqueue() and __dev_flush(). These paths already run under
local_bh_disable(), so use local_lock_nested_bh() which on non-RT is
a pure annotation with no overhead, and on PREEMPT_RT provides a
per-CPU sleeping lock that serializes access to the bq.
References
Impacted products
| Vendor | Product | Version |
|---|
{
"cveTags": [],
"descriptions": [
{
"lang": "en",
"value": "In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:\n\nbpf: Fix race in devmap on PREEMPT_RT\n\nOn PREEMPT_RT kernels, the per-CPU xdp_dev_bulk_queue (bq) can be\naccessed concurrently by multiple preemptible tasks on the same CPU.\n\nThe original code assumes bq_enqueue() and __dev_flush() run atomically\nwith respect to each other on the same CPU, relying on\nlocal_bh_disable() to prevent preemption. However, on PREEMPT_RT,\nlocal_bh_disable() only calls migrate_disable() (when\nPREEMPT_RT_NEEDS_BH_LOCK is not set) and does not disable\npreemption, which allows CFS scheduling to preempt a task during\nbq_xmit_all(), enabling another task on the same CPU to enter\nbq_enqueue() and operate on the same per-CPU bq concurrently.\n\nThis leads to several races:\n\n1. Double-free / use-after-free on bq-\u003eq[]: bq_xmit_all() snapshots\n cnt = bq-\u003ecount, then iterates bq-\u003eq[0..cnt-1] to transmit frames.\n If preempted after the snapshot, a second task can call bq_enqueue()\n -\u003e bq_xmit_all() on the same bq, transmitting (and freeing) the\n same frames. When the first task resumes, it operates on stale\n pointers in bq-\u003eq[], causing use-after-free.\n\n2. bq-\u003ecount and bq-\u003eq[] corruption: concurrent bq_enqueue() modifying\n bq-\u003ecount and bq-\u003eq[] while bq_xmit_all() is reading them.\n\n3. dev_rx/xdp_prog teardown race: __dev_flush() clears bq-\u003edev_rx and\n bq-\u003exdp_prog after bq_xmit_all(). If preempted between\n bq_xmit_all() return and bq-\u003edev_rx = NULL, a preempting\n bq_enqueue() sees dev_rx still set (non-NULL), skips adding bq to\n the flush_list, and enqueues a frame. When __dev_flush() resumes,\n it clears dev_rx and removes bq from the flush_list, orphaning the\n newly enqueued frame.\n\n4. __list_del_clearprev() on flush_node: similar to the cpumap race,\n both tasks can call __list_del_clearprev() on the same flush_node,\n the second dereferences the prev pointer already set to NULL.\n\nThe race between task A (__dev_flush -\u003e bq_xmit_all) and task B\n(bq_enqueue -\u003e bq_xmit_all) on the same CPU:\n\n Task A (xdp_do_flush) Task B (ndo_xdp_xmit redirect)\n ---------------------- --------------------------------\n __dev_flush(flush_list)\n bq_xmit_all(bq)\n cnt = bq-\u003ecount /* e.g. 16 */\n /* start iterating bq-\u003eq[] */\n \u003c-- CFS preempts Task A --\u003e\n bq_enqueue(dev, xdpf)\n bq-\u003ecount == DEV_MAP_BULK_SIZE\n bq_xmit_all(bq, 0)\n cnt = bq-\u003ecount /* same 16! */\n ndo_xdp_xmit(bq-\u003eq[])\n /* frames freed by driver */\n bq-\u003ecount = 0\n \u003c-- Task A resumes --\u003e\n ndo_xdp_xmit(bq-\u003eq[])\n /* use-after-free: frames already freed! */\n\nFix this by adding a local_lock_t to xdp_dev_bulk_queue and acquiring\nit in bq_enqueue() and __dev_flush(). These paths already run under\nlocal_bh_disable(), so use local_lock_nested_bh() which on non-RT is\na pure annotation with no overhead, and on PREEMPT_RT provides a\nper-CPU sleeping lock that serializes access to the bq."
}
],
"id": "CVE-2026-23294",
"lastModified": "2026-03-25T15:41:33.977",
"metrics": {},
"published": "2026-03-25T11:16:24.697",
"references": [
{
"source": "416baaa9-dc9f-4396-8d5f-8c081fb06d67",
"url": "https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/1872e75375c40add4a35990de3be77b5741c252c"
},
{
"source": "416baaa9-dc9f-4396-8d5f-8c081fb06d67",
"url": "https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/6c10b019785dc282c5f45d21e4a3f468b8fd6476"
},
{
"source": "416baaa9-dc9f-4396-8d5f-8c081fb06d67",
"url": "https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/ab1a56c9d99189aa5c6e03940d06e40ba6a28240"
}
],
"sourceIdentifier": "416baaa9-dc9f-4396-8d5f-8c081fb06d67",
"vulnStatus": "Awaiting Analysis"
}
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Sightings
| Author | Source | Type | Date |
|---|
Nomenclature
- Seen: The vulnerability was mentioned, discussed, or observed by the user.
- Confirmed: The vulnerability has been validated from an analyst's perspective.
- Published Proof of Concept: A public proof of concept is available for this vulnerability.
- Exploited: The vulnerability was observed as exploited by the user who reported the sighting.
- Patched: The vulnerability was observed as successfully patched by the user who reported the sighting.
- Not exploited: The vulnerability was not observed as exploited by the user who reported the sighting.
- Not confirmed: The user expressed doubt about the validity of the vulnerability.
- Not patched: The vulnerability was not observed as successfully patched by the user who reported the sighting.
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