FKIE_CVE-2026-23248

Vulnerability from fkie_nvd - Published: 2026-03-18 11:16 - Updated: 2026-10-19 19:17
Severity
7.8 (High) - CVSS:3.1/AV:L/AC:L/PR:L/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:H
Summary
In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: perf/core: Fix refcount bug and potential UAF in perf_mmap Syzkaller reported a refcount_t: addition on 0; use-after-free warning in perf_mmap. The issue is caused by a race condition between a failing mmap() setup and a concurrent mmap() on a dependent event (e.g., using output redirection). In perf_mmap(), the ring_buffer (rb) is allocated and assigned to event->rb with the mmap_mutex held. The mutex is then released to perform map_range(). If map_range() fails, perf_mmap_close() is called to clean up. However, since the mutex was dropped, another thread attaching to this event (via inherited events or output redirection) can acquire the mutex, observe the valid event->rb pointer, and attempt to increment its reference count. If the cleanup path has already dropped the reference count to zero, this results in a use-after-free or refcount saturation warning. Fix this by extending the scope of mmap_mutex to cover the map_range() call. This ensures that the ring buffer initialization and mapping (or cleanup on failure) happens atomically effectively, preventing other threads from accessing a half-initialized or dying ring buffer.
References
416baaa9-dc9f-4396-8d5f-8c081fb06d67https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/77de62ad3de3967818c3dbe656b7336ebee461d2Patch
416baaa9-dc9f-4396-8d5f-8c081fb06d67https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/ac7ecb65af170a7fc193e7bd8be15dac84ec6a56Patch
416baaa9-dc9f-4396-8d5f-8c081fb06d67https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/c27dea9f50ed525facb62ef647dddc4722456e07Patch
Impacted products
Vendor Product Version
linux linux_kernel *
linux linux_kernel *
linux linux_kernel 7.0
To clipboard 

{
  "affected": [
    {
      "affectedData": [
        {
          "defaultStatus": "unaffected",
          "product": "Linux",
          "programFiles": [
            "kernel/events/core.c"
          ],
          "repo": "https://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/stable/linux.git",
          "vendor": "Linux",
          "versions": [
            {
              "lessThan": "c27dea9f50ed525facb62ef647dddc4722456e07",
              "status": "affected",
              "version": "b709eb872e19a19607bbb6d2975bc264d59735cf",
              "versionType": "git"
            },
            {
              "lessThan": "ac7ecb65af170a7fc193e7bd8be15dac84ec6a56",
              "status": "affected",
              "version": "b709eb872e19a19607bbb6d2975bc264d59735cf",
              "versionType": "git"
            },
            {
              "lessThan": "77de62ad3de3967818c3dbe656b7336ebee461d2",
              "status": "affected",
              "version": "b709eb872e19a19607bbb6d2975bc264d59735cf",
              "versionType": "git"
            }
          ]
        },
        {
          "defaultStatus": "affected",
          "product": "Linux",
          "programFiles": [
            "kernel/events/core.c"
          ],
          "repo": "https://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/stable/linux.git",
          "vendor": "Linux",
          "versions": [
            {
              "status": "affected",
              "version": "6.14"
            },
            {
              "lessThan": "6.14",
              "status": "unaffected",
              "version": "0",
              "versionType": "semver"
            },
            {
              "lessThanOrEqual": "6.18.*",
              "status": "unaffected",
              "version": "6.18.17",
              "versionType": "semver"
            },
            {
              "lessThanOrEqual": "6.19.*",
              "status": "unaffected",
              "version": "6.19.7",
              "versionType": "semver"
            },
            {
              "lessThanOrEqual": "*",
              "status": "unaffected",
              "version": "7.0",
              "versionType": "original_commit_for_fix"
            }
          ]
        }
      ],
      "source": "416baaa9-dc9f-4396-8d5f-8c081fb06d67"
    }
  ],
  "configurations": [
    {
      "nodes": [
        {
          "cpeMatch": [
            {
              "criteria": "cpe:2.3:o:linux:linux_kernel:*:*:*:*:*:*:*:*",
              "matchCriteriaId": "E367EC2E-72DB-4555-9BE2-A5B9C97AD4E6",
              "versionEndExcluding": "6.18.17",
              "versionStartIncluding": "6.14",
              "vulnerable": true
            },
            {
              "criteria": "cpe:2.3:o:linux:linux_kernel:*:*:*:*:*:*:*:*",
              "matchCriteriaId": "69245D10-0B71-485E-80C3-A64F077004D3",
              "versionEndExcluding": "6.19.7",
              "versionStartIncluding": "6.19",
              "vulnerable": true
            },
            {
              "criteria": "cpe:2.3:o:linux:linux_kernel:7.0:rc1:*:*:*:*:*:*",
              "matchCriteriaId": "F253B622-8837-4245-BCE5-A7BF8FC76A16",
              "vulnerable": true
            }
          ],
          "negate": false,
          "operator": "OR"
        }
      ]
    }
  ],
  "cveTags": [],
  "descriptions": [
    {
      "lang": "en",
      "value": "In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:\n\nperf/core: Fix refcount bug and potential UAF in perf_mmap\n\nSyzkaller reported a refcount_t: addition on 0; use-after-free warning\nin perf_mmap.\n\nThe issue is caused by a race condition between a failing mmap() setup\nand a concurrent mmap() on a dependent event (e.g., using output\nredirection).\n\nIn perf_mmap(), the ring_buffer (rb) is allocated and assigned to\nevent-\u003erb with the mmap_mutex held. The mutex is then released to\nperform map_range().\n\nIf map_range() fails, perf_mmap_close() is called to clean up.\nHowever, since the mutex was dropped, another thread attaching to\nthis event (via inherited events or output redirection) can acquire\nthe mutex, observe the valid event-\u003erb pointer, and attempt to\nincrement its reference count. If the cleanup path has already\ndropped the reference count to zero, this results in a\nuse-after-free or refcount saturation warning.\n\nFix this by extending the scope of mmap_mutex to cover the\nmap_range() call. This ensures that the ring buffer initialization\nand mapping (or cleanup on failure) happens atomically effectively,\npreventing other threads from accessing a half-initialized or\ndying ring buffer."
    },
    {
      "lang": "es",
      "value": "En el kernel de Linux, la siguiente vulnerabilidad ha sido resuelta:\n\nperf/core: Correcci\u00f3n de error de conteo de referencias y potencial UAF en perf_mmap\n\nSyzkaller inform\u00f3 una advertencia de refcount_t: adici\u00f3n en 0; uso despu\u00e9s de liberaci\u00f3n en perf_mmap.\n\nEl problema es causado por una condici\u00f3n de carrera entre una configuraci\u00f3n de mmap() fallida y un mmap() concurrente en un evento dependiente (por ejemplo, usando redirecci\u00f3n de salida).\n\nEn perf_mmap(), el ring_buffer (rb) se asigna y se establece en event-\u0026gt;rb con el mmap_mutex retenido. El mutex es entonces liberado para realizar map_range().\n\nSi map_range() falla, se llama a perf_mmap_close() para limpiar. Sin embargo, dado que el mutex fue liberado, otro hilo que se adjunta a este evento (a trav\u00e9s de eventos heredados o redirecci\u00f3n de salida) puede adquirir el mutex, observar el puntero event-\u0026gt;rb v\u00e1lido e intentar incrementar su conteo de referencias. Si la ruta de limpieza ya ha reducido el conteo de referencias a cero, esto resulta en un uso despu\u00e9s de liberaci\u00f3n o una advertencia de saturaci\u00f3n de conteo de referencias.\n\nEsto se corrige al extender el alcance de mmap_mutex para cubrir la llamada a map_range(). Esto asegura que la inicializaci\u00f3n y el mapeo del b\u00fafer de anillo (o la limpieza en caso de fallo) ocurra de manera at\u00f3mica y efectiva, evitando que otros hilos accedan a un b\u00fafer de anillo medio inicializado o en proceso de terminaci\u00f3n."
    }
  ],
  "id": "CVE-2026-23248",
  "lastModified": "2026-10-19T19:17:43.737",
  "metrics": {
    "cvssMetricV31": [
      {
        "cvssData": {
          "attackComplexity": "LOW",
          "attackVector": "LOCAL",
          "availabilityImpact": "HIGH",
          "baseScore": 7.8,
          "baseSeverity": "HIGH",
          "confidentialityImpact": "HIGH",
          "integrityImpact": "HIGH",
          "privilegesRequired": "LOW",
          "scope": "UNCHANGED",
          "userInteraction": "NONE",
          "vectorString": "CVSS:3.1/AV:L/AC:L/PR:L/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:H",
          "version": "3.1"
        },
        "exploitabilityScore": 1.8,
        "impactScore": 5.9,
        "source": "416baaa9-dc9f-4396-8d5f-8c081fb06d67",
        "type": "Secondary"
      }
    ],
    "ssvcV203": [
      {
        "source": "134c704f-9b21-4f2e-91b3-4a467353bcc0",
        "ssvcData": {
          "id": "CVE-2026-23248",
          "options": [
            {
              "exploitation": "none"
            },
            {
              "automatable": "no"
            },
            {
              "technicalImpact": "total"
            }
          ],
          "role": "CISA Coordinator",
          "timestamp": "2026-10-16T15:06:58.307161Z",
          "version": "2.0.3"
        }
      }
    ]
  },
  "published": "2026-03-18T11:16:16.863",
  "references": [
    {
      "source": "416baaa9-dc9f-4396-8d5f-8c081fb06d67",
      "tags": [
        "Patch"
      ],
      "url": "https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/77de62ad3de3967818c3dbe656b7336ebee461d2"
    },
    {
      "source": "416baaa9-dc9f-4396-8d5f-8c081fb06d67",
      "tags": [
        "Patch"
      ],
      "url": "https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/ac7ecb65af170a7fc193e7bd8be15dac84ec6a56"
    },
    {
      "source": "416baaa9-dc9f-4396-8d5f-8c081fb06d67",
      "tags": [
        "Patch"
      ],
      "url": "https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/c27dea9f50ed525facb62ef647dddc4722456e07"
    }
  ],
  "sourceIdentifier": "416baaa9-dc9f-4396-8d5f-8c081fb06d67",
  "vulnStatus": "Modified",
  "weaknesses": [
    {
      "description": [
        {
          "lang": "en",
          "value": "CWE-416"
        }
      ],
      "source": "nvd@nist.gov",
      "type": "Primary"
    },
    {
      "description": [
        {
          "lang": "en",
          "value": "CWE-362"
        }
      ],
      "source": "134c704f-9b21-4f2e-91b3-4a467353bcc0",
      "type": "Secondary"
    }
  ]
}



Log in or create an account to share your comment.




Tags
Taxonomy of the tags.




Drag nodes to arrange them. Double-click a related vulnerability to open it, or a source to visit its link. The Physics button on the left tunes the layout and the simulation; the legend at the bottom left hides or shows nodes by kind and by sighting type.

Forecast uses a logistic model when the trend is rising, or an exponential decay model when the trend is falling. Fitted via linearized least squares.

Sightings

Author Source Type Date Other

Nomenclature

  • Seen: The vulnerability was mentioned, discussed, or observed by the user.
  • Confirmed: The vulnerability has been validated from an analyst's perspective.
  • Published Proof of Concept: A public proof of concept is available for this vulnerability.
  • Exploited: The vulnerability was observed as exploited by the user who reported the sighting.
  • Patched: The vulnerability was observed as successfully patched by the user who reported the sighting.
  • Not exploited: The vulnerability was not observed as exploited by the user who reported the sighting.
  • Not confirmed: The user expressed doubt about the validity of the vulnerability.
  • Not patched: The vulnerability was not observed as successfully patched by the user who reported the sighting.
Vulnerability timeline

Sightings and recorded dates, grouped by day · UTC

JSON
How durations are calculated

Following the VTEM framework (Black Hat USA 2015), time to patch starts when the vendor or a coordinator was informed, total time to patch at discovery, and disclosure to patch at public disclosure; vendor response time runs from the report to its acknowledgement. Time to exploit and time unpatched start at the earliest discovery or report, falling back to public disclosure. Unpatched time ends at the first recorded patch, or the calculation time when no patch is recorded. Exploitation to patch shows the interval between those two events; a published proof of concept is a public exploit, not exploitation.

Each result shows its source dates. A negative interval means the end event came first; when date-only inputs leave the order open, the result says so. Date-only inputs are approximate. The earliest evidence wins: KEV report dates and sightings are labelled as such. Records describing another vulnerability are listed but never calculated from, and a PoC alone does not establish exploitation. Missing patch evidence does not prove that no patch exists. Filters below change the event list only.

Loading timeline…




    Related by attack behaviour

    Vulnerabilities whose description is nearest to this one in the vector space of the CIRCL/vulnerability-attack-technique-biencoder model. This is a similarity search over the bi-encoder space (plain cosine), not a classification, and it has no measured accuracy.