FKIE_CVE-2026-23248

Vulnerability from fkie_nvd - Published: 2026-03-18 11:16 - Updated: 2026-04-02 15:16
Summary
In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: perf/core: Fix refcount bug and potential UAF in perf_mmap Syzkaller reported a refcount_t: addition on 0; use-after-free warning in perf_mmap. The issue is caused by a race condition between a failing mmap() setup and a concurrent mmap() on a dependent event (e.g., using output redirection). In perf_mmap(), the ring_buffer (rb) is allocated and assigned to event->rb with the mmap_mutex held. The mutex is then released to perform map_range(). If map_range() fails, perf_mmap_close() is called to clean up. However, since the mutex was dropped, another thread attaching to this event (via inherited events or output redirection) can acquire the mutex, observe the valid event->rb pointer, and attempt to increment its reference count. If the cleanup path has already dropped the reference count to zero, this results in a use-after-free or refcount saturation warning. Fix this by extending the scope of mmap_mutex to cover the map_range() call. This ensures that the ring buffer initialization and mapping (or cleanup on failure) happens atomically effectively, preventing other threads from accessing a half-initialized or dying ring buffer.
Impacted products
Vendor Product Version

{
  "cveTags": [],
  "descriptions": [
    {
      "lang": "en",
      "value": "In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:\n\nperf/core: Fix refcount bug and potential UAF in perf_mmap\n\nSyzkaller reported a refcount_t: addition on 0; use-after-free warning\nin perf_mmap.\n\nThe issue is caused by a race condition between a failing mmap() setup\nand a concurrent mmap() on a dependent event (e.g., using output\nredirection).\n\nIn perf_mmap(), the ring_buffer (rb) is allocated and assigned to\nevent-\u003erb with the mmap_mutex held. The mutex is then released to\nperform map_range().\n\nIf map_range() fails, perf_mmap_close() is called to clean up.\nHowever, since the mutex was dropped, another thread attaching to\nthis event (via inherited events or output redirection) can acquire\nthe mutex, observe the valid event-\u003erb pointer, and attempt to\nincrement its reference count. If the cleanup path has already\ndropped the reference count to zero, this results in a\nuse-after-free or refcount saturation warning.\n\nFix this by extending the scope of mmap_mutex to cover the\nmap_range() call. This ensures that the ring buffer initialization\nand mapping (or cleanup on failure) happens atomically effectively,\npreventing other threads from accessing a half-initialized or\ndying ring buffer."
    },
    {
      "lang": "es",
      "value": "En el kernel de Linux, la siguiente vulnerabilidad ha sido resuelta:\n\nperf/core: Correcci\u00f3n de error de conteo de referencias y potencial UAF en perf_mmap\n\nSyzkaller inform\u00f3 una advertencia de refcount_t: adici\u00f3n en 0; uso despu\u00e9s de liberaci\u00f3n en perf_mmap.\n\nEl problema es causado por una condici\u00f3n de carrera entre una configuraci\u00f3n de mmap() fallida y un mmap() concurrente en un evento dependiente (por ejemplo, usando redirecci\u00f3n de salida).\n\nEn perf_mmap(), el ring_buffer (rb) se asigna y se establece en event-\u0026gt;rb con el mmap_mutex retenido. El mutex es entonces liberado para realizar map_range().\n\nSi map_range() falla, se llama a perf_mmap_close() para limpiar. Sin embargo, dado que el mutex fue liberado, otro hilo que se adjunta a este evento (a trav\u00e9s de eventos heredados o redirecci\u00f3n de salida) puede adquirir el mutex, observar el puntero event-\u0026gt;rb v\u00e1lido e intentar incrementar su conteo de referencias. Si la ruta de limpieza ya ha reducido el conteo de referencias a cero, esto resulta en un uso despu\u00e9s de liberaci\u00f3n o una advertencia de saturaci\u00f3n de conteo de referencias.\n\nEsto se corrige al extender el alcance de mmap_mutex para cubrir la llamada a map_range(). Esto asegura que la inicializaci\u00f3n y el mapeo del b\u00fafer de anillo (o la limpieza en caso de fallo) ocurra de manera at\u00f3mica y efectiva, evitando que otros hilos accedan a un b\u00fafer de anillo medio inicializado o en proceso de terminaci\u00f3n."
    }
  ],
  "id": "CVE-2026-23248",
  "lastModified": "2026-04-02T15:16:27.123",
  "metrics": {
    "cvssMetricV31": [
      {
        "cvssData": {
          "attackComplexity": "LOW",
          "attackVector": "LOCAL",
          "availabilityImpact": "HIGH",
          "baseScore": 7.8,
          "baseSeverity": "HIGH",
          "confidentialityImpact": "HIGH",
          "integrityImpact": "HIGH",
          "privilegesRequired": "LOW",
          "scope": "UNCHANGED",
          "userInteraction": "NONE",
          "vectorString": "CVSS:3.1/AV:L/AC:L/PR:L/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:H",
          "version": "3.1"
        },
        "exploitabilityScore": 1.8,
        "impactScore": 5.9,
        "source": "416baaa9-dc9f-4396-8d5f-8c081fb06d67",
        "type": "Secondary"
      }
    ]
  },
  "published": "2026-03-18T11:16:16.863",
  "references": [
    {
      "source": "416baaa9-dc9f-4396-8d5f-8c081fb06d67",
      "url": "https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/77de62ad3de3967818c3dbe656b7336ebee461d2"
    },
    {
      "source": "416baaa9-dc9f-4396-8d5f-8c081fb06d67",
      "url": "https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/ac7ecb65af170a7fc193e7bd8be15dac84ec6a56"
    },
    {
      "source": "416baaa9-dc9f-4396-8d5f-8c081fb06d67",
      "url": "https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/c27dea9f50ed525facb62ef647dddc4722456e07"
    }
  ],
  "sourceIdentifier": "416baaa9-dc9f-4396-8d5f-8c081fb06d67",
  "vulnStatus": "Awaiting Analysis"
}


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