FKIE_CVE-2026-23088
Vulnerability from fkie_nvd - Published: 2026-02-04 17:16 - Updated: 2026-03-17 21:09
Severity ?
Summary
In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
tracing: Fix crash on synthetic stacktrace field usage
When creating a synthetic event based on an existing synthetic event that
had a stacktrace field and the new synthetic event used that field a
kernel crash occurred:
~# cd /sys/kernel/tracing
~# echo 's:stack unsigned long stack[];' > dynamic_events
~# echo 'hist:keys=prev_pid:s0=common_stacktrace if prev_state & 3' >> events/sched/sched_switch/trigger
~# echo 'hist:keys=next_pid:s1=$s0:onmatch(sched.sched_switch).trace(stack,$s1)' >> events/sched/sched_switch/trigger
The above creates a synthetic event that takes a stacktrace when a task
schedules out in a non-running state and passes that stacktrace to the
sched_switch event when that task schedules back in. It triggers the
"stack" synthetic event that has a stacktrace as its field (called "stack").
~# echo 's:syscall_stack s64 id; unsigned long stack[];' >> dynamic_events
~# echo 'hist:keys=common_pid:s2=stack' >> events/synthetic/stack/trigger
~# echo 'hist:keys=common_pid:s3=$s2,i0=id:onmatch(synthetic.stack).trace(syscall_stack,$i0,$s3)' >> events/raw_syscalls/sys_exit/trigger
The above makes another synthetic event called "syscall_stack" that
attaches the first synthetic event (stack) to the sys_exit trace event and
records the stacktrace from the stack event with the id of the system call
that is exiting.
When enabling this event (or using it in a historgram):
~# echo 1 > events/synthetic/syscall_stack/enable
Produces a kernel crash!
BUG: unable to handle page fault for address: 0000000000400010
#PF: supervisor read access in kernel mode
#PF: error_code(0x0000) - not-present page
PGD 0 P4D 0
Oops: Oops: 0000 [#1] SMP PTI
CPU: 6 UID: 0 PID: 1257 Comm: bash Not tainted 6.16.3+deb14-amd64 #1 PREEMPT(lazy) Debian 6.16.3-1
Hardware name: QEMU Standard PC (Q35 + ICH9, 2009), BIOS 1.17.0-debian-1.17.0-1 04/01/2014
RIP: 0010:trace_event_raw_event_synth+0x90/0x380
Code: c5 00 00 00 00 85 d2 0f 84 e1 00 00 00 31 db eb 34 0f 1f 00 66 66 2e 0f 1f 84 00 00 00 00 00 66 66 2e 0f 1f 84 00 00 00 00 00 <49> 8b 04 24 48 83 c3 01 8d 0c c5 08 00 00 00 01 cd 41 3b 5d 40 0f
RSP: 0018:ffffd2670388f958 EFLAGS: 00010202
RAX: ffff8ba1065cc100 RBX: 0000000000000000 RCX: 0000000000000000
RDX: 0000000000000001 RSI: fffff266ffda7b90 RDI: ffffd2670388f9b0
RBP: 0000000000000010 R08: ffff8ba104e76000 R09: ffffd2670388fa50
R10: ffff8ba102dd42e0 R11: ffffffff9a908970 R12: 0000000000400010
R13: ffff8ba10a246400 R14: ffff8ba10a710220 R15: fffff266ffda7b90
FS: 00007fa3bc63f740(0000) GS:ffff8ba2e0f48000(0000) knlGS:0000000000000000
CS: 0010 DS: 0000 ES: 0000 CR0: 0000000080050033
CR2: 0000000000400010 CR3: 0000000107f9e003 CR4: 0000000000172ef0
Call Trace:
<TASK>
? __tracing_map_insert+0x208/0x3a0
action_trace+0x67/0x70
event_hist_trigger+0x633/0x6d0
event_triggers_call+0x82/0x130
trace_event_buffer_commit+0x19d/0x250
trace_event_raw_event_sys_exit+0x62/0xb0
syscall_exit_work+0x9d/0x140
do_syscall_64+0x20a/0x2f0
? trace_event_raw_event_sched_switch+0x12b/0x170
? save_fpregs_to_fpstate+0x3e/0x90
? _raw_spin_unlock+0xe/0x30
? finish_task_switch.isra.0+0x97/0x2c0
? __rseq_handle_notify_resume+0xad/0x4c0
? __schedule+0x4b8/0xd00
? restore_fpregs_from_fpstate+0x3c/0x90
? switch_fpu_return+0x5b/0xe0
? do_syscall_64+0x1ef/0x2f0
? do_fault+0x2e9/0x540
? __handle_mm_fault+0x7d1/0xf70
? count_memcg_events+0x167/0x1d0
? handle_mm_fault+0x1d7/0x2e0
? do_user_addr_fault+0x2c3/0x7f0
entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x76/0x7e
The reason is that the stacktrace field is not labeled as such, and is
treated as a normal field and not as a dynamic event that it is.
In trace_event_raw_event_synth() the event is field is still treated as a
dynamic array, but the retrieval of the data is considered a normal field,
and the reference is just the meta data:
// Meta data is retrieved instead of a dynamic array
---truncated---
References
Impacted products
| Vendor | Product | Version | |
|---|---|---|---|
| linux | linux_kernel | * | |
| linux | linux_kernel | * | |
| linux | linux_kernel | * | |
| linux | linux_kernel | * | |
| linux | linux_kernel | * | |
| linux | linux_kernel | * | |
| linux | linux_kernel | 6.19 | |
| linux | linux_kernel | 6.19 | |
| linux | linux_kernel | 6.19 | |
| linux | linux_kernel | 6.19 | |
| linux | linux_kernel | 6.19 | |
| linux | linux_kernel | 6.19 |
{
"configurations": [
{
"nodes": [
{
"cpeMatch": [
{
"criteria": "cpe:2.3:o:linux:linux_kernel:*:*:*:*:*:*:*:*",
"matchCriteriaId": "B227CA05-3F78-4828-9681-ACB2FDB45E80",
"versionEndExcluding": "5.11",
"versionStartIncluding": "5.10.237",
"vulnerable": true
},
{
"criteria": "cpe:2.3:o:linux:linux_kernel:*:*:*:*:*:*:*:*",
"matchCriteriaId": "40EB4F7C-BD50-4C1D-81D7-8364D12117D1",
"versionEndExcluding": "5.16",
"versionStartIncluding": "5.15.124",
"vulnerable": true
},
{
"criteria": "cpe:2.3:o:linux:linux_kernel:*:*:*:*:*:*:*:*",
"matchCriteriaId": "D63292D0-A72D-4CF1-982A-1BE3A4B41404",
"versionEndExcluding": "6.2",
"versionStartIncluding": "6.1.43",
"vulnerable": true
},
{
"criteria": "cpe:2.3:o:linux:linux_kernel:*:*:*:*:*:*:*:*",
"matchCriteriaId": "DA5AD755-3F64-45B9-8709-1D24A061B353",
"versionEndExcluding": "6.6.122",
"versionStartIncluding": "6.3",
"vulnerable": true
},
{
"criteria": "cpe:2.3:o:linux:linux_kernel:*:*:*:*:*:*:*:*",
"matchCriteriaId": "52F38E19-0FDD-4992-9D6D-D4169D689598",
"versionEndExcluding": "6.12.68",
"versionStartIncluding": "6.7",
"vulnerable": true
},
{
"criteria": "cpe:2.3:o:linux:linux_kernel:*:*:*:*:*:*:*:*",
"matchCriteriaId": "E65C6E79-7EBE-4C77-93F0-818CF5B38F4E",
"versionEndExcluding": "6.18.8",
"versionStartIncluding": "6.13",
"vulnerable": true
},
{
"criteria": "cpe:2.3:o:linux:linux_kernel:6.19:rc1:*:*:*:*:*:*",
"matchCriteriaId": "17B67AA7-40D6-4AFA-8459-F200F3D7CFD1",
"vulnerable": true
},
{
"criteria": "cpe:2.3:o:linux:linux_kernel:6.19:rc2:*:*:*:*:*:*",
"matchCriteriaId": "C47E4CC9-C826-4FA9-B014-7FE3D9B318B2",
"vulnerable": true
},
{
"criteria": "cpe:2.3:o:linux:linux_kernel:6.19:rc3:*:*:*:*:*:*",
"matchCriteriaId": "F71D92C0-C023-48BD-B3B6-70B638EEE298",
"vulnerable": true
},
{
"criteria": "cpe:2.3:o:linux:linux_kernel:6.19:rc4:*:*:*:*:*:*",
"matchCriteriaId": "13580667-0A98-40CC-B29F-D12790B91BDB",
"vulnerable": true
},
{
"criteria": "cpe:2.3:o:linux:linux_kernel:6.19:rc5:*:*:*:*:*:*",
"matchCriteriaId": "CAD1FED7-CF48-47BF-AC7D-7B6FA3C065FC",
"vulnerable": true
},
{
"criteria": "cpe:2.3:o:linux:linux_kernel:6.19:rc6:*:*:*:*:*:*",
"matchCriteriaId": "3EF854A1-ABB1-4E93-BE9A-44569EC76C0D",
"vulnerable": true
}
],
"negate": false,
"operator": "OR"
}
]
}
],
"cveTags": [],
"descriptions": [
{
"lang": "en",
"value": "In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:\n\ntracing: Fix crash on synthetic stacktrace field usage\n\nWhen creating a synthetic event based on an existing synthetic event that\nhad a stacktrace field and the new synthetic event used that field a\nkernel crash occurred:\n\n ~# cd /sys/kernel/tracing\n ~# echo \u0027s:stack unsigned long stack[];\u0027 \u003e dynamic_events\n ~# echo \u0027hist:keys=prev_pid:s0=common_stacktrace if prev_state \u0026 3\u0027 \u003e\u003e events/sched/sched_switch/trigger\n ~# echo \u0027hist:keys=next_pid:s1=$s0:onmatch(sched.sched_switch).trace(stack,$s1)\u0027 \u003e\u003e events/sched/sched_switch/trigger\n\nThe above creates a synthetic event that takes a stacktrace when a task\nschedules out in a non-running state and passes that stacktrace to the\nsched_switch event when that task schedules back in. It triggers the\n\"stack\" synthetic event that has a stacktrace as its field (called \"stack\").\n\n ~# echo \u0027s:syscall_stack s64 id; unsigned long stack[];\u0027 \u003e\u003e dynamic_events\n ~# echo \u0027hist:keys=common_pid:s2=stack\u0027 \u003e\u003e events/synthetic/stack/trigger\n ~# echo \u0027hist:keys=common_pid:s3=$s2,i0=id:onmatch(synthetic.stack).trace(syscall_stack,$i0,$s3)\u0027 \u003e\u003e events/raw_syscalls/sys_exit/trigger\n\nThe above makes another synthetic event called \"syscall_stack\" that\nattaches the first synthetic event (stack) to the sys_exit trace event and\nrecords the stacktrace from the stack event with the id of the system call\nthat is exiting.\n\nWhen enabling this event (or using it in a historgram):\n\n ~# echo 1 \u003e events/synthetic/syscall_stack/enable\n\nProduces a kernel crash!\n\n BUG: unable to handle page fault for address: 0000000000400010\n #PF: supervisor read access in kernel mode\n #PF: error_code(0x0000) - not-present page\n PGD 0 P4D 0\n Oops: Oops: 0000 [#1] SMP PTI\n CPU: 6 UID: 0 PID: 1257 Comm: bash Not tainted 6.16.3+deb14-amd64 #1 PREEMPT(lazy) Debian 6.16.3-1\n Hardware name: QEMU Standard PC (Q35 + ICH9, 2009), BIOS 1.17.0-debian-1.17.0-1 04/01/2014\n RIP: 0010:trace_event_raw_event_synth+0x90/0x380\n Code: c5 00 00 00 00 85 d2 0f 84 e1 00 00 00 31 db eb 34 0f 1f 00 66 66 2e 0f 1f 84 00 00 00 00 00 66 66 2e 0f 1f 84 00 00 00 00 00 \u003c49\u003e 8b 04 24 48 83 c3 01 8d 0c c5 08 00 00 00 01 cd 41 3b 5d 40 0f\n RSP: 0018:ffffd2670388f958 EFLAGS: 00010202\n RAX: ffff8ba1065cc100 RBX: 0000000000000000 RCX: 0000000000000000\n RDX: 0000000000000001 RSI: fffff266ffda7b90 RDI: ffffd2670388f9b0\n RBP: 0000000000000010 R08: ffff8ba104e76000 R09: ffffd2670388fa50\n R10: ffff8ba102dd42e0 R11: ffffffff9a908970 R12: 0000000000400010\n R13: ffff8ba10a246400 R14: ffff8ba10a710220 R15: fffff266ffda7b90\n FS: 00007fa3bc63f740(0000) GS:ffff8ba2e0f48000(0000) knlGS:0000000000000000\n CS: 0010 DS: 0000 ES: 0000 CR0: 0000000080050033\n CR2: 0000000000400010 CR3: 0000000107f9e003 CR4: 0000000000172ef0\n Call Trace:\n \u003cTASK\u003e\n ? __tracing_map_insert+0x208/0x3a0\n action_trace+0x67/0x70\n event_hist_trigger+0x633/0x6d0\n event_triggers_call+0x82/0x130\n trace_event_buffer_commit+0x19d/0x250\n trace_event_raw_event_sys_exit+0x62/0xb0\n syscall_exit_work+0x9d/0x140\n do_syscall_64+0x20a/0x2f0\n ? trace_event_raw_event_sched_switch+0x12b/0x170\n ? save_fpregs_to_fpstate+0x3e/0x90\n ? _raw_spin_unlock+0xe/0x30\n ? finish_task_switch.isra.0+0x97/0x2c0\n ? __rseq_handle_notify_resume+0xad/0x4c0\n ? __schedule+0x4b8/0xd00\n ? restore_fpregs_from_fpstate+0x3c/0x90\n ? switch_fpu_return+0x5b/0xe0\n ? do_syscall_64+0x1ef/0x2f0\n ? do_fault+0x2e9/0x540\n ? __handle_mm_fault+0x7d1/0xf70\n ? count_memcg_events+0x167/0x1d0\n ? handle_mm_fault+0x1d7/0x2e0\n ? do_user_addr_fault+0x2c3/0x7f0\n entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x76/0x7e\n\nThe reason is that the stacktrace field is not labeled as such, and is\ntreated as a normal field and not as a dynamic event that it is.\n\nIn trace_event_raw_event_synth() the event is field is still treated as a\ndynamic array, but the retrieval of the data is considered a normal field,\nand the reference is just the meta data:\n\n// Meta data is retrieved instead of a dynamic array\n---truncated---"
},
{
"lang": "es",
"value": "En el kernel de Linux, la siguiente vulnerabilidad ha sido resuelta: tracing: Correcci\u00f3n de un fallo al usar un campo de rastreo de pila sint\u00e9tico Al crear un evento sint\u00e9tico basado en un evento sint\u00e9tico existente que ten\u00eda un campo de rastreo de pila y el nuevo evento sint\u00e9tico usaba ese campo, ocurri\u00f3 un fallo del kernel: ~# cd /sys/kernel/tracing ~# echo \u0027s:stack unsigned long stack[];\u0027 \u0026gt; dynamic_events ~# echo \u0027hist:keys=prev_pid:s0=common_stacktrace if prev_state \u0026amp; 3\u0027 \u0026gt;\u0026gt; events/sched/sched_switch/trigger ~# echo \u0027hist:keys=next_pid:s1=$s0:onmatch(sched.sched_switch).trace(stack,$s1)\u0027 \u0026gt;\u0026gt; events/sched/sched_switch/trigger Lo anterior crea un evento sint\u00e9tico que toma un rastreo de pila cuando una tarea se desprograma en un estado no en ejecuci\u00f3n y pasa ese rastreo de pila al evento sched_switch cuando esa tarea se vuelve a programar. Activa el evento sint\u00e9tico \u0027stack\u0027 que tiene un rastreo de pila como su campo (llamado \u0027stack\u0027). ~# echo \u0027s:syscall_stack s64 id; unsigned long stack[];\u0027 \u0026gt;\u0026gt; dynamic_events ~# echo \u0027hist:keys=common_pid:s2=stack\u0027 \u0026gt;\u0026gt; events/synthetic/stack/trigger ~# echo \u0027hist:keys=common_pid:s3=$s2,i0=id:onmatch(synthetic.stack).trace(syscall_stack,$i0,$s3)\u0027 \u0026gt;\u0026gt; events/raw_syscalls/sys_exit/trigger Lo anterior crea otro evento sint\u00e9tico llamado \u0027syscall_stack\u0027 que adjunta el primer evento sint\u00e9tico (stack) al evento de rastreo sys_exit y registra el rastreo de pila del evento stack con el ID de la llamada al sistema que est\u00e1 saliendo. Al habilitar este evento (o al usarlo en un histograma): ~# echo 1 \u0026gt; events/synthetic/syscall_stack/enable \u00a1Produce un fallo del kernel! BUG: unable to handle page fault for address: 0000000000400010 #PF: supervisor read access in kernel mode #PF: error_code(0x0000) - not-present page PGD 0 P4D 0 Oops: Oops: 0000 [#1] SMP PTI CPU: 6 UID: 0 PID: 1257 Comm: bash Not tainted 6.16.3+deb14-amd64 #1 PREEMPT(lazy) Debian 6.16.3-1 Hardware name: QEMU Standard PC (Q35 + ICH9, 2009), BIOS 1.17.0-debian-1.17.0-1 04/01/2014 RIP: 0010:trace_event_raw_event_synth+0x90/0x380 Code: c5 00 00 00 00 85 d2 0f 84 e1 00 00 00 31 db eb 34 0f 1f 00 66 66 2e 0f 1f 84 00 00 00 00 00 66 66 2e 0f 1f 84 00 00 00 00 00 \u0026lt;49\u0026gt; 8b 04 24 48 83 c3 01 8d 0c c5 08 00 00 00 01 cd 41 3b 5d 40 0f RSP: 0018:ffffd2670388f958 EFLAGS: 00010202 RAX: ffff8ba1065cc100 RBX: 0000000000000000 RCX: 0000000000000000 RDX: 0000000000000001 RSI: fffff266ffda7b90 RDI: ffffd2670388f9b0 RBP: 0000000000000010 R08: ffff8ba104e76000 R09: ffffd2670388fa50 R10: ffff8ba102dd42e0 R11: ffffffff9a908970 R12: 0000000000400010 R13: ffff8ba10a246400 R14: ffff8ba10a710220 R15: fffff266ffda7b90 FS: 00007fa3bc63f740(0000) GS:ffff8ba2e0f48000(0000) knlGS:0000000000000000 CS: 0010 DS: 0000 ES: 0000 CR0: 0000000080050033 CR2: 0000000000400010 CR3: 0000000107f9e003 CR4: 0000000000172ef0 Call Trace: ? __tracing_map_insert+0x208/0x3a0 action_trace+0x67/0x70 event_hist_trigger+0x633/0x6d0 event_triggers_call+0x82/0x130 trace_event_buffer_commit+0x19d/0x250 trace_event_raw_event_sys_exit+0x62/0xb0 syscall_exit_work+0x9d/0x140 do_syscall_64+0x20a/0x2f0 ? trace_event_raw_event_sched_switch+0x12b/0x170 ? save_fpregs_to_fpstate+0x3e/0x90 ? _raw_spin_unlock+0xe/0x30 ? finish_task_switch.isra.0+0x97/0x2c0 ? __rseq_handle_notify_resume+0xad/0x4c0 ? __schedule+0x4b8/0xd00 ? restore_fpregs_from_fpstate+0x3c/0x90 ? switch_fpu_return+0x5b/0xe0 ? do_syscall_64+0x1ef/0x2f0 ? do_fault+0x2e9/0x540 ? __handle_mm_fault+0x7d1/0xf70 ? count_memcg_events+0x167/0x1d0 ? handle_mm_fault+0x1d7/0x2e0 ? do_user_addr_fault+0x2c3/0x7f0 entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x76/0x7e La raz\u00f3n es que el campo de rastreo de pila no est\u00e1 etiquetado como tal, y es tratado como un campo normal y no como un evento din\u00e1mico, que es lo que es. En trace_event_raw_ev"
}
],
"id": "CVE-2026-23088",
"lastModified": "2026-03-17T21:09:54.317",
"metrics": {
"cvssMetricV31": [
{
"cvssData": {
"attackComplexity": "LOW",
"attackVector": "LOCAL",
"availabilityImpact": "HIGH",
"baseScore": 5.5,
"baseSeverity": "MEDIUM",
"confidentialityImpact": "NONE",
"integrityImpact": "NONE",
"privilegesRequired": "LOW",
"scope": "UNCHANGED",
"userInteraction": "NONE",
"vectorString": "CVSS:3.1/AV:L/AC:L/PR:L/UI:N/S:U/C:N/I:N/A:H",
"version": "3.1"
},
"exploitabilityScore": 1.8,
"impactScore": 3.6,
"source": "nvd@nist.gov",
"type": "Primary"
}
]
},
"published": "2026-02-04T17:16:19.673",
"references": [
{
"source": "416baaa9-dc9f-4396-8d5f-8c081fb06d67",
"tags": [
"Patch"
],
"url": "https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/327af07dff6ab5650b21491eb4f69694999ff3d1"
},
{
"source": "416baaa9-dc9f-4396-8d5f-8c081fb06d67",
"tags": [
"Patch"
],
"url": "https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/3b90d099efa2b67239bd3b3dc3521ec584261748"
},
{
"source": "416baaa9-dc9f-4396-8d5f-8c081fb06d67",
"tags": [
"Patch"
],
"url": "https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/90f9f5d64cae4e72defd96a2a22760173cb3c9ec"
},
{
"source": "416baaa9-dc9f-4396-8d5f-8c081fb06d67",
"tags": [
"Patch"
],
"url": "https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/98ecbfb2598c9c7ca755a29f402da9d36c057077"
}
],
"sourceIdentifier": "416baaa9-dc9f-4396-8d5f-8c081fb06d67",
"vulnStatus": "Analyzed",
"weaknesses": [
{
"description": [
{
"lang": "en",
"value": "CWE-476"
}
],
"source": "nvd@nist.gov",
"type": "Primary"
}
]
}
Loading…
Loading…
Sightings
| Author | Source | Type | Date |
|---|
Nomenclature
- Seen: The vulnerability was mentioned, discussed, or observed by the user.
- Confirmed: The vulnerability has been validated from an analyst's perspective.
- Published Proof of Concept: A public proof of concept is available for this vulnerability.
- Exploited: The vulnerability was observed as exploited by the user who reported the sighting.
- Patched: The vulnerability was observed as successfully patched by the user who reported the sighting.
- Not exploited: The vulnerability was not observed as exploited by the user who reported the sighting.
- Not confirmed: The user expressed doubt about the validity of the vulnerability.
- Not patched: The vulnerability was not observed as successfully patched by the user who reported the sighting.
Loading…
Loading…