FKIE_CVE-2026-23066

Vulnerability from fkie_nvd - Published: 2026-02-04 17:16 - Updated: 2026-02-05 14:57
Severity ?
Summary
In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: rxrpc: Fix recvmsg() unconditional requeue If rxrpc_recvmsg() fails because MSG_DONTWAIT was specified but the call at the front of the recvmsg queue already has its mutex locked, it requeues the call - whether or not the call is already queued. The call may be on the queue because MSG_PEEK was also passed and so the call was not dequeued or because the I/O thread requeued it. The unconditional requeue may then corrupt the recvmsg queue, leading to things like UAFs or refcount underruns. Fix this by only requeuing the call if it isn't already on the queue - and moving it to the front if it is already queued. If we don't queue it, we have to put the ref we obtained by dequeuing it. Also, MSG_PEEK doesn't dequeue the call so shouldn't call rxrpc_notify_socket() for the call if we didn't use up all the data on the queue, so fix that also.
References
416baaa9-dc9f-4396-8d5f-8c081fb06d67https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/2c28769a51deb6022d7fbd499987e237a01dd63a
416baaa9-dc9f-4396-8d5f-8c081fb06d67https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/930114425065f7ace6e0c0630fab4af75e059ea8
Impacted products
Vendor Product Version
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{
  "cveTags": [],
  "descriptions": [
    {
      "lang": "en",
      "value": "In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:\n\nrxrpc: Fix recvmsg() unconditional requeue\n\nIf rxrpc_recvmsg() fails because MSG_DONTWAIT was specified but the call at\nthe front of the recvmsg queue already has its mutex locked, it requeues\nthe call - whether or not the call is already queued.  The call may be on\nthe queue because MSG_PEEK was also passed and so the call was not dequeued\nor because the I/O thread requeued it.\n\nThe unconditional requeue may then corrupt the recvmsg queue, leading to\nthings like UAFs or refcount underruns.\n\nFix this by only requeuing the call if it isn\u0027t already on the queue - and\nmoving it to the front if it is already queued.  If we don\u0027t queue it, we\nhave to put the ref we obtained by dequeuing it.\n\nAlso, MSG_PEEK doesn\u0027t dequeue the call so shouldn\u0027t call\nrxrpc_notify_socket() for the call if we didn\u0027t use up all the data on the\nqueue, so fix that also."
    },
    {
      "lang": "es",
      "value": "En el kernel de Linux, la siguiente vulnerabilidad ha sido resuelta:\n\nrxrpc: Correcci\u00f3n del reenqueque incondicional de recvmsg()\n\nSi rxrpc_recvmsg() falla porque se especific\u00f3 MSG_DONTWAIT pero la llamada al frente de la cola de recvmsg ya tiene su mutex bloqueado, reenquequea la llamada, est\u00e9 o no la llamada ya en la cola. La llamada puede estar en la cola porque tambi\u00e9n se pas\u00f3 MSG_PEEK y por lo tanto la llamada no fue desencolada o porque el hilo de E/S la reenqueque\u00f3.\n\nEl reenqueque incondicional puede entonces corromper la cola de recvmsg, lo que lleva a cosas como UAFs o subdesbordamientos de refcount.\n\nSolucione esto reenquequeando la llamada solo si no est\u00e1 ya en la cola, y movi\u00e9ndola al frente si ya est\u00e1 en la cola. Si no la encolamos, tenemos que liberar la referencia que obtuvimos al desencolarla.\n\nAdem\u00e1s, MSG_PEEK no desencola la llamada, por lo que no deber\u00eda llamar a rxrpc_notify_socket() para la llamada si no consumimos todos los datos de la cola, as\u00ed que corrija eso tambi\u00e9n."
    }
  ],
  "id": "CVE-2026-23066",
  "lastModified": "2026-02-05T14:57:20.563",
  "metrics": {},
  "published": "2026-02-04T17:16:17.303",
  "references": [
    {
      "source": "416baaa9-dc9f-4396-8d5f-8c081fb06d67",
      "url": "https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/2c28769a51deb6022d7fbd499987e237a01dd63a"
    },
    {
      "source": "416baaa9-dc9f-4396-8d5f-8c081fb06d67",
      "url": "https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/930114425065f7ace6e0c0630fab4af75e059ea8"
    }
  ],
  "sourceIdentifier": "416baaa9-dc9f-4396-8d5f-8c081fb06d67",
  "vulnStatus": "Awaiting Analysis"
}


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