FKIE_CVE-2026-23017

Vulnerability from fkie_nvd - Published: 2026-01-31 12:16 - Updated: 2026-02-03 16:44
Severity ?
Summary
In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: idpf: fix error handling in the init_task on load If the init_task fails during a driver load, we end up without vports and netdevs, effectively failing the entire process. In that state a subsequent reset will result in a crash as the service task attempts to access uninitialized resources. Following trace is from an error in the init_task where the CREATE_VPORT (op 501) is rejected by the FW: [40922.763136] idpf 0000:83:00.0: Device HW Reset initiated [40924.449797] idpf 0000:83:00.0: Transaction failed (op 501) [40958.148190] idpf 0000:83:00.0: HW reset detected [40958.161202] BUG: kernel NULL pointer dereference, address: 00000000000000a8 ... [40958.168094] Workqueue: idpf-0000:83:00.0-vc_event idpf_vc_event_task [idpf] [40958.168865] RIP: 0010:idpf_vc_event_task+0x9b/0x350 [idpf] ... [40958.177932] Call Trace: [40958.178491] <TASK> [40958.179040] process_one_work+0x226/0x6d0 [40958.179609] worker_thread+0x19e/0x340 [40958.180158] ? __pfx_worker_thread+0x10/0x10 [40958.180702] kthread+0x10f/0x250 [40958.181238] ? __pfx_kthread+0x10/0x10 [40958.181774] ret_from_fork+0x251/0x2b0 [40958.182307] ? __pfx_kthread+0x10/0x10 [40958.182834] ret_from_fork_asm+0x1a/0x30 [40958.183370] </TASK> Fix the error handling in the init_task to make sure the service and mailbox tasks are disabled if the error happens during load. These are started in idpf_vc_core_init(), which spawns the init_task and has no way of knowing if it failed. If the error happens on reset, following successful driver load, the tasks can still run, as that will allow the netdevs to attempt recovery through another reset. Stop the PTP callbacks either way as those will be restarted by the call to idpf_vc_core_init() during a successful reset.
Impacted products
Vendor Product Version

{
  "cveTags": [],
  "descriptions": [
    {
      "lang": "en",
      "value": "In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:\n\nidpf: fix error handling in the init_task on load\n\nIf the init_task fails during a driver load, we end up without vports and\nnetdevs, effectively failing the entire process. In that state a\nsubsequent reset will result in a crash as the service task attempts to\naccess uninitialized resources. Following trace is from an error in the\ninit_task where the CREATE_VPORT (op 501) is rejected by the FW:\n\n[40922.763136] idpf 0000:83:00.0: Device HW Reset initiated\n[40924.449797] idpf 0000:83:00.0: Transaction failed (op 501)\n[40958.148190] idpf 0000:83:00.0: HW reset detected\n[40958.161202] BUG: kernel NULL pointer dereference, address: 00000000000000a8\n...\n[40958.168094] Workqueue: idpf-0000:83:00.0-vc_event idpf_vc_event_task [idpf]\n[40958.168865] RIP: 0010:idpf_vc_event_task+0x9b/0x350 [idpf]\n...\n[40958.177932] Call Trace:\n[40958.178491]  \u003cTASK\u003e\n[40958.179040]  process_one_work+0x226/0x6d0\n[40958.179609]  worker_thread+0x19e/0x340\n[40958.180158]  ? __pfx_worker_thread+0x10/0x10\n[40958.180702]  kthread+0x10f/0x250\n[40958.181238]  ? __pfx_kthread+0x10/0x10\n[40958.181774]  ret_from_fork+0x251/0x2b0\n[40958.182307]  ? __pfx_kthread+0x10/0x10\n[40958.182834]  ret_from_fork_asm+0x1a/0x30\n[40958.183370]  \u003c/TASK\u003e\n\nFix the error handling in the init_task to make sure the service and\nmailbox tasks are disabled if the error happens during load. These are\nstarted in idpf_vc_core_init(), which spawns the init_task and has no way\nof knowing if it failed. If the error happens on reset, following\nsuccessful driver load, the tasks can still run, as that will allow the\nnetdevs to attempt recovery through another reset. Stop the PTP callbacks\neither way as those will be restarted by the call to idpf_vc_core_init()\nduring a successful reset."
    },
    {
      "lang": "es",
      "value": "En el kernel de Linux, la siguiente vulnerabilidad ha sido resuelta:\n\nidpf: corrige el manejo de errores en la init_task durante la carga\n\nSi la init_task falla durante la carga de un controlador, terminamos sin vports y netdevs, lo que provoca el fallo de todo el proceso. En ese estado, un reinicio posterior resultar\u00e1 en un fallo ya que la tarea de servicio intenta acceder a recursos no inicializados. La siguiente traza es de un error en la init_task donde el CREATE_VPORT (op 501) es rechazado por el FW:\n\n[40922.763136] idpf 0000:83:00.0: Device HW Reset initiated\n[40924.449797] idpf 0000:83:00.0: Transaction failed (op 501)\n[40958.148190] idpf 0000:83:00.0: HW reset detected\n[40958.161202] BUG: kernel NULL pointer dereference, address: 00000000000000a8\n...\n[40958.168094] Workqueue: idpf-0000:83:00.0-vc_event idpf_vc_event_task [idpf]\n[40958.168865] RIP: 0010:idpf_vc_event_task+0x9b/0x350 [idpf]\n...\n[40958.177932] Call Trace:\n[40958.178491]  \n[40958.179040]  process_one_work+0x226/0x6d0\n[40958.179609]  worker_thread+0x19e/0x340\n[40958.180158]  ? __pfx_worker_thread+0x10/0x10\n[40958.180702]  kthread+0x10f/0x250\n[40958.181238]  ? __pfx_kthread+0x10/0x10\n[40958.181774]  ret_from_fork+0x251/0x2b0\n[40958.182307]  ? __pfx_kthread+0x10/0x10\n[40958.182834]  ret_from_fork_asm+0x1a/0x30\n[40958.183370]  \n\nCorrige el manejo de errores en la init_task para asegurar que las tareas de servicio y de buz\u00f3n est\u00e9n deshabilitadas si el error ocurre durante la carga. Estas se inician en idpf_vc_core_init(), que genera la init_task y no tiene forma de saber si fall\u00f3. Si el error ocurre en el reinicio, despu\u00e9s de una carga exitosa del controlador, las tareas a\u00fan pueden ejecutarse, ya que eso permitir\u00e1 a los netdevs intentar la recuperaci\u00f3n a trav\u00e9s de otro reinicio. Det\u00e9n las devoluciones de llamada de PTP de cualquier manera, ya que estas se reiniciar\u00e1n con la llamada a idpf_vc_core_init() durante un reinicio exitoso."
    }
  ],
  "id": "CVE-2026-23017",
  "lastModified": "2026-02-03T16:44:36.630",
  "metrics": {},
  "published": "2026-01-31T12:16:05.000",
  "references": [
    {
      "source": "416baaa9-dc9f-4396-8d5f-8c081fb06d67",
      "url": "https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/4d792219fe6f891b5b557a607ac8a0a14eda6e38"
    },
    {
      "source": "416baaa9-dc9f-4396-8d5f-8c081fb06d67",
      "url": "https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/a514c374edcd33581cdcccf8faa7cc606a600319"
    }
  ],
  "sourceIdentifier": "416baaa9-dc9f-4396-8d5f-8c081fb06d67",
  "vulnStatus": "Awaiting Analysis"
}


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