FKIE_CVE-2026-22022

Vulnerability from fkie_nvd - Published: 2026-01-21 14:16 - Updated: 2026-06-17 10:19
Severity
8.2 (High) - CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:L/A:N
Summary
Deployments of Apache Solr 5.3.0 through 9.10.0 that rely on Solr's "Rule Based Authorization Plugin" are vulnerable to allowing unauthorized access to certain Solr APIs, due to insufficiently strict input validation in those components.  Only deployments that meet all of the following criteria are impacted by this vulnerability: * Use of Solr's "RuleBasedAuthorizationPlugin" * A RuleBasedAuthorizationPlugin config (see security.json) that specifies multiple "roles" * A RuleBasedAuthorizationPlugin permission list (see security.json) that uses one or more of the following pre-defined permission rules: "config-read", "config-edit", "schema-read", "metrics-read", or "security-read". * A RuleBasedAuthorizationPlugin permission list that doesn't define the "all" pre-defined permission * A networking setup that allows clients to make unfiltered network requests to Solr. (i.e. user-submitted HTTP/HTTPS requests reach Solr as-is, unmodified or restricted by any intervening proxy or gateway) Users can mitigate this vulnerability by ensuring that their RuleBasedAuthorizationPlugin configuration specifies the "all" pre-defined permission and associates the permission with an "admin" or other privileged role.  Users can also upgrade to a Solr version outside of the impacted range, such as the recently released Solr 9.10.1.
References
security@apache.orghttps://lists.apache.org/thread/d59hqbgo7p62myq7mgfpz7or8n1j7wbnMailing List, Vendor Advisory
af854a3a-2127-422b-91ae-364da2661108http://www.openwall.com/lists/oss-security/2026/01/20/4Mailing List, Third Party Advisory
Impacted products
Vendor Product Version
apache solr *
To clipboard 

{
  "affected": [
    {
      "affectedData": [
        {
          "defaultStatus": "unaffected",
          "product": "Apache Solr",
          "vendor": "Apache Software Foundation",
          "versions": [
            {
              "lessThanOrEqual": "9.10.0",
              "status": "affected",
              "version": "5.3",
              "versionType": "semver"
            }
          ]
        }
      ],
      "source": "security@apache.org"
    }
  ],
  "configurations": [
    {
      "nodes": [
        {
          "cpeMatch": [
            {
              "criteria": "cpe:2.3:a:apache:solr:*:*:*:*:*:*:*:*",
              "matchCriteriaId": "2F2760AF-9E4B-4552-847C-DE58D908164F",
              "versionEndExcluding": "9.10.1",
              "versionStartIncluding": "5.3.0",
              "vulnerable": true
            }
          ],
          "negate": false,
          "operator": "OR"
        }
      ]
    }
  ],
  "cveTags": [],
  "descriptions": [
    {
      "lang": "en",
      "value": "Deployments of Apache Solr 5.3.0 through 9.10.0 that rely on Solr\u0027s \"Rule Based Authorization Plugin\" are vulnerable to allowing unauthorized access to certain Solr APIs, due to insufficiently strict input validation in those components.\u00a0 Only deployments that meet all of the following criteria are impacted by this vulnerability:\n\n  *  Use of Solr\u0027s \"RuleBasedAuthorizationPlugin\"\n  *  A RuleBasedAuthorizationPlugin config (see security.json) that specifies multiple \"roles\"\n  *  A RuleBasedAuthorizationPlugin permission list (see security.json) that uses one or more of the following pre-defined permission rules: \"config-read\", \"config-edit\", \"schema-read\", \"metrics-read\", or \"security-read\".\n  *  A RuleBasedAuthorizationPlugin permission list that doesn\u0027t define the \"all\" pre-defined permission\n  *  A networking setup that allows clients to make unfiltered network requests to Solr. (i.e. user-submitted HTTP/HTTPS requests reach Solr as-is, unmodified or restricted by any intervening proxy or gateway)\n\nUsers can mitigate this vulnerability by ensuring that their RuleBasedAuthorizationPlugin configuration specifies the \"all\" pre-defined permission and associates the permission with an \"admin\" or other privileged role.\u00a0 Users can also upgrade to a Solr version outside of the impacted range, such as the recently released Solr 9.10.1."
    },
    {
      "lang": "es",
      "value": "Las implementaciones de Apache Solr 5.3.0 hasta 9.10.0 que dependen del \u0027Rule Based Authorization Plugin\u0027 de Solr son vulnerables a permitir acceso no autorizado a ciertas APIs de Solr, debido a una validaci\u00f3n de entrada insuficientemente estricta en esos componentes. Solo las implementaciones que cumplen todos los siguientes criterios se ven afectadas por esta vulnerabilidad:\n\n  *  Uso del \u0027RuleBasedAuthorizationPlugin\u0027 de Solr\n  *  Una configuraci\u00f3n de RuleBasedAuthorizationPlugin (ver security.json) que especifica m\u00faltiples \u0027roles\u0027\n  *  Una lista de permisos de RuleBasedAuthorizationPlugin (ver security.json) que utiliza una o m\u00e1s de las siguientes reglas de permiso predefinidas: \u0027config-read\u0027, \u0027config-edit\u0027, \u0027schema-read\u0027, \u0027metrics-read\u0027 o \u0027security-read\u0027.\n  *  Una lista de permisos de RuleBasedAuthorizationPlugin que no define el permiso predefinido \u0027all\u0027\n  *  Una configuraci\u00f3n de red que permite a los clientes realizar solicitudes de red sin filtrar a Solr. (es decir, las solicitudes HTTP/HTTPS enviadas por el usuario llegan a Solr tal cual, sin modificar ni restringir por ning\u00fan proxy o puerta de enlace intermedio)\n\nLos usuarios pueden mitigar esta vulnerabilidad asegur\u00e1ndose de que su configuraci\u00f3n de RuleBasedAuthorizationPlugin especifique el permiso predefinido \u0027all\u0027 y asocie el permiso con un rol \u0027admin\u0027 u otro rol privilegiado. Los usuarios tambi\u00e9n pueden actualizar a una versi\u00f3n de Solr fuera del rango afectado, como el recientemente lanzado Solr 9.10.1."
    }
  ],
  "id": "CVE-2026-22022",
  "lastModified": "2026-06-17T10:19:22.350",
  "metrics": {
    "cvssMetricV31": [
      {
        "cvssData": {
          "attackComplexity": "LOW",
          "attackVector": "NETWORK",
          "availabilityImpact": "NONE",
          "baseScore": 8.2,
          "baseSeverity": "HIGH",
          "confidentialityImpact": "HIGH",
          "integrityImpact": "LOW",
          "privilegesRequired": "NONE",
          "scope": "UNCHANGED",
          "userInteraction": "NONE",
          "vectorString": "CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:L/A:N",
          "version": "3.1"
        },
        "exploitabilityScore": 3.9,
        "impactScore": 4.2,
        "source": "134c704f-9b21-4f2e-91b3-4a467353bcc0",
        "type": "Secondary"
      }
    ],
    "ssvcV203": [
      {
        "source": "134c704f-9b21-4f2e-91b3-4a467353bcc0",
        "ssvcData": {
          "id": "CVE-2026-22022",
          "options": [
            {
              "exploitation": "none"
            },
            {
              "automatable": "yes"
            },
            {
              "technicalImpact": "partial"
            }
          ],
          "role": "CISA Coordinator",
          "timestamp": "2026-01-21T15:34:12.691456Z",
          "version": "2.0.3"
        }
      }
    ]
  },
  "published": "2026-01-21T14:16:06.573",
  "references": [
    {
      "source": "security@apache.org",
      "tags": [
        "Mailing List",
        "Vendor Advisory"
      ],
      "url": "https://lists.apache.org/thread/d59hqbgo7p62myq7mgfpz7or8n1j7wbn"
    },
    {
      "source": "af854a3a-2127-422b-91ae-364da2661108",
      "tags": [
        "Mailing List",
        "Third Party Advisory"
      ],
      "url": "http://www.openwall.com/lists/oss-security/2026/01/20/4"
    }
  ],
  "sourceIdentifier": "security@apache.org",
  "vulnStatus": "Analyzed",
  "weaknesses": [
    {
      "description": [
        {
          "lang": "en",
          "value": "CWE-285"
        }
      ],
      "source": "security@apache.org",
      "type": "Secondary"
    }
  ]
}



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