FKIE_CVE-2026-20082
Vulnerability from fkie_nvd - Published: 2026-03-04 18:16 - Updated: 2026-06-17 10:17| Vendor | Product | Version | |
|---|---|---|---|
| cisco | adaptive_security_appliance_software | * |
{
"affected": [
{
"affectedData": [
{
"product": "Cisco Secure Firewall Adaptive Security Appliance (ASA) Software",
"vendor": "Cisco",
"versions": [
{
"status": "affected",
"version": "9.20.4.14"
}
]
}
],
"source": "psirt@cisco.com"
}
],
"configurations": [
{
"nodes": [
{
"cpeMatch": [
{
"criteria": "cpe:2.3:o:cisco:adaptive_security_appliance_software:*:*:*:*:*:*:*:*",
"matchCriteriaId": "3C406217-1C8A-49CD-8A46-2AD883D21035",
"versionEndExcluding": "9.20.4.19",
"versionStartIncluding": "9.20.4.14",
"vulnerable": true
}
],
"negate": false,
"operator": "OR"
}
]
}
],
"cveTags": [],
"descriptions": [
{
"lang": "en",
"value": "A vulnerability in the handling of the embryonic connection limits in Cisco Secure Firewall Adaptive Security Appliance (ASA) Software could allow an unauthenticated, remote attacker to cause incoming TCP SYN packets to be dropped incorrectly.\r\n\r This vulnerability is due to improper handling of new, incoming TCP connections that are destined to management or data interfaces when the device is under a TCP SYN flood attack. An attacker could exploit this vulnerability by sending a crafted stream of traffic to an affected device. A successful exploit could allow the attacker to prevent all incoming TCP connections to the device from being established, including remote management access, Remote Access VPN (RAVPN) connections, and all network protocols that are TCP-based. This results in a denial of service (DoS) condition for affected features."
},
{
"lang": "es",
"value": "Una vulnerabilidad en el manejo de los l\u00edmites de conexi\u00f3n embrionaria en el software Cisco Secure Firewall Adaptive Security Appliance (ASA) podr\u00eda permitir a un atacante remoto no autenticado causar que los paquetes TCP SYN entrantes sean descartados incorrectamente. Esta vulnerabilidad se debe a un manejo inadecuado de las nuevas conexiones TCP entrantes que est\u00e1n destinadas a interfaces de gesti\u00f3n o de datos cuando el dispositivo est\u00e1 bajo un ataque de inundaci\u00f3n TCP SYN. Un atacante podr\u00eda explotar esta vulnerabilidad enviando un flujo de tr\u00e1fico manipulado a un dispositivo afectado. Un exploit exitoso podr\u00eda permitir al atacante evitar que se establezcan todas las conexiones TCP entrantes al dispositivo, incluyendo el acceso de gesti\u00f3n remota, las conexiones de VPN de Acceso Remoto (RAVPN) y todos los protocolos de red basados en TCP. Esto resulta en una condici\u00f3n de denegaci\u00f3n de servicio (DoS) para las caracter\u00edsticas afectadas."
}
],
"id": "CVE-2026-20082",
"lastModified": "2026-06-17T10:17:02.830",
"metrics": {
"cvssMetricV31": [
{
"cvssData": {
"attackComplexity": "LOW",
"attackVector": "NETWORK",
"availabilityImpact": "HIGH",
"baseScore": 8.6,
"baseSeverity": "HIGH",
"confidentialityImpact": "NONE",
"integrityImpact": "NONE",
"privilegesRequired": "NONE",
"scope": "CHANGED",
"userInteraction": "NONE",
"vectorString": "CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:C/C:N/I:N/A:H",
"version": "3.1"
},
"exploitabilityScore": 3.9,
"impactScore": 4.0,
"source": "psirt@cisco.com",
"type": "Secondary"
}
],
"ssvcV203": [
{
"source": "134c704f-9b21-4f2e-91b3-4a467353bcc0",
"ssvcData": {
"id": "CVE-2026-20082",
"options": [
{
"exploitation": "none"
},
{
"automatable": "yes"
},
{
"technicalImpact": "partial"
}
],
"role": "CISA Coordinator",
"timestamp": "2026-03-04T20:52:44.973008Z",
"version": "2.0.3"
}
}
]
},
"published": "2026-03-04T18:16:24.483",
"references": [
{
"source": "psirt@cisco.com",
"tags": [
"Vendor Advisory"
],
"url": "https://sec.cloudapps.cisco.com/security/center/content/CiscoSecurityAdvisory/cisco-sa-asa-dos-FCvLD6vR"
}
],
"sourceIdentifier": "psirt@cisco.com",
"vulnStatus": "Analyzed",
"weaknesses": [
{
"description": [
{
"lang": "en",
"value": "CWE-772"
}
],
"source": "psirt@cisco.com",
"type": "Secondary"
}
]
}
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Sightings
| Author | Source | Type | Date | Other |
|---|
Nomenclature
- Seen: The vulnerability was mentioned, discussed, or observed by the user.
- Confirmed: The vulnerability has been validated from an analyst's perspective.
- Published Proof of Concept: A public proof of concept is available for this vulnerability.
- Exploited: The vulnerability was observed as exploited by the user who reported the sighting.
- Patched: The vulnerability was observed as successfully patched by the user who reported the sighting.
- Not exploited: The vulnerability was not observed as exploited by the user who reported the sighting.
- Not confirmed: The user expressed doubt about the validity of the vulnerability.
- Not patched: The vulnerability was not observed as successfully patched by the user who reported the sighting.
Vulnerability timeline
Sightings and recorded dates, grouped by day · UTC
How durations are calculated
Following the VTEM framework (Black Hat USA 2015), time to patch starts when the vendor or a coordinator was informed, total time to patch at discovery, and disclosure to patch at public disclosure; vendor response time runs from the report to its acknowledgement. Time to exploit and time unpatched start at the earliest discovery or report, falling back to public disclosure. Unpatched time ends at the first recorded patch, or the calculation time when no patch is recorded. Exploitation to patch shows the interval between those two events; a published proof of concept is a public exploit, not exploitation.
Each result shows its source dates. A negative interval means the end event came first; when date-only inputs leave the order open, the result says so. Date-only inputs are approximate. The earliest evidence wins: KEV report dates and sightings are labelled as such. Records describing another vulnerability are listed but never calculated from, and a PoC alone does not establish exploitation. Missing patch evidence does not prove that no patch exists. Filters below change the event list only.
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Vulnerabilities whose description is nearest to this one in the vector space of the CIRCL/vulnerability-attack-technique-biencoder model. This is a similarity search over the bi-encoder space (plain cosine), not a classification, and it has no measured accuracy.