FKIE_CVE-2025-71194
Vulnerability from fkie_nvd - Published: 2026-02-04 17:16 - Updated: 2026-02-06 17:16
Severity ?
Summary
In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
btrfs: fix deadlock in wait_current_trans() due to ignored transaction type
When wait_current_trans() is called during start_transaction(), it
currently waits for a blocked transaction without considering whether
the given transaction type actually needs to wait for that particular
transaction state. The btrfs_blocked_trans_types[] array already defines
which transaction types should wait for which transaction states, but
this check was missing in wait_current_trans().
This can lead to a deadlock scenario involving two transactions and
pending ordered extents:
1. Transaction A is in TRANS_STATE_COMMIT_DOING state
2. A worker processing an ordered extent calls start_transaction()
with TRANS_JOIN
3. join_transaction() returns -EBUSY because Transaction A is in
TRANS_STATE_COMMIT_DOING
4. Transaction A moves to TRANS_STATE_UNBLOCKED and completes
5. A new Transaction B is created (TRANS_STATE_RUNNING)
6. The ordered extent from step 2 is added to Transaction B's
pending ordered extents
7. Transaction B immediately starts commit by another task and
enters TRANS_STATE_COMMIT_START
8. The worker finally reaches wait_current_trans(), sees Transaction B
in TRANS_STATE_COMMIT_START (a blocked state), and waits
unconditionally
9. However, TRANS_JOIN should NOT wait for TRANS_STATE_COMMIT_START
according to btrfs_blocked_trans_types[]
10. Transaction B is waiting for pending ordered extents to complete
11. Deadlock: Transaction B waits for ordered extent, ordered extent
waits for Transaction B
This can be illustrated by the following call stacks:
CPU0 CPU1
btrfs_finish_ordered_io()
start_transaction(TRANS_JOIN)
join_transaction()
# -EBUSY (Transaction A is
# TRANS_STATE_COMMIT_DOING)
# Transaction A completes
# Transaction B created
# ordered extent added to
# Transaction B's pending list
btrfs_commit_transaction()
# Transaction B enters
# TRANS_STATE_COMMIT_START
# waiting for pending ordered
# extents
wait_current_trans()
# waits for Transaction B
# (should not wait!)
Task bstore_kv_sync in btrfs_commit_transaction waiting for ordered
extents:
__schedule+0x2e7/0x8a0
schedule+0x64/0xe0
btrfs_commit_transaction+0xbf7/0xda0 [btrfs]
btrfs_sync_file+0x342/0x4d0 [btrfs]
__x64_sys_fdatasync+0x4b/0x80
do_syscall_64+0x33/0x40
entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x44/0xa9
Task kworker in wait_current_trans waiting for transaction commit:
Workqueue: btrfs-syno_nocow btrfs_work_helper [btrfs]
__schedule+0x2e7/0x8a0
schedule+0x64/0xe0
wait_current_trans+0xb0/0x110 [btrfs]
start_transaction+0x346/0x5b0 [btrfs]
btrfs_finish_ordered_io.isra.0+0x49b/0x9c0 [btrfs]
btrfs_work_helper+0xe8/0x350 [btrfs]
process_one_work+0x1d3/0x3c0
worker_thread+0x4d/0x3e0
kthread+0x12d/0x150
ret_from_fork+0x1f/0x30
Fix this by passing the transaction type to wait_current_trans() and
checking btrfs_blocked_trans_types[cur_trans->state] against the given
type before deciding to wait. This ensures that transaction types which
are allowed to join during certain blocked states will not unnecessarily
wait and cause deadlocks.
References
Impacted products
| Vendor | Product | Version |
|---|
{
"cveTags": [],
"descriptions": [
{
"lang": "en",
"value": "In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:\n\nbtrfs: fix deadlock in wait_current_trans() due to ignored transaction type\n\nWhen wait_current_trans() is called during start_transaction(), it\ncurrently waits for a blocked transaction without considering whether\nthe given transaction type actually needs to wait for that particular\ntransaction state. The btrfs_blocked_trans_types[] array already defines\nwhich transaction types should wait for which transaction states, but\nthis check was missing in wait_current_trans().\n\nThis can lead to a deadlock scenario involving two transactions and\npending ordered extents:\n\n 1. Transaction A is in TRANS_STATE_COMMIT_DOING state\n\n 2. A worker processing an ordered extent calls start_transaction()\n with TRANS_JOIN\n\n 3. join_transaction() returns -EBUSY because Transaction A is in\n TRANS_STATE_COMMIT_DOING\n\n 4. Transaction A moves to TRANS_STATE_UNBLOCKED and completes\n\n 5. A new Transaction B is created (TRANS_STATE_RUNNING)\n\n 6. The ordered extent from step 2 is added to Transaction B\u0027s\n pending ordered extents\n\n 7. Transaction B immediately starts commit by another task and\n enters TRANS_STATE_COMMIT_START\n\n 8. The worker finally reaches wait_current_trans(), sees Transaction B\n in TRANS_STATE_COMMIT_START (a blocked state), and waits\n unconditionally\n\n 9. However, TRANS_JOIN should NOT wait for TRANS_STATE_COMMIT_START\n according to btrfs_blocked_trans_types[]\n\n 10. Transaction B is waiting for pending ordered extents to complete\n\n 11. Deadlock: Transaction B waits for ordered extent, ordered extent\n waits for Transaction B\n\nThis can be illustrated by the following call stacks:\n CPU0 CPU1\n btrfs_finish_ordered_io()\n start_transaction(TRANS_JOIN)\n join_transaction()\n # -EBUSY (Transaction A is\n # TRANS_STATE_COMMIT_DOING)\n # Transaction A completes\n # Transaction B created\n # ordered extent added to\n # Transaction B\u0027s pending list\n btrfs_commit_transaction()\n # Transaction B enters\n # TRANS_STATE_COMMIT_START\n # waiting for pending ordered\n # extents\n wait_current_trans()\n # waits for Transaction B\n # (should not wait!)\n\nTask bstore_kv_sync in btrfs_commit_transaction waiting for ordered\nextents:\n\n __schedule+0x2e7/0x8a0\n schedule+0x64/0xe0\n btrfs_commit_transaction+0xbf7/0xda0 [btrfs]\n btrfs_sync_file+0x342/0x4d0 [btrfs]\n __x64_sys_fdatasync+0x4b/0x80\n do_syscall_64+0x33/0x40\n entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x44/0xa9\n\nTask kworker in wait_current_trans waiting for transaction commit:\n\n Workqueue: btrfs-syno_nocow btrfs_work_helper [btrfs]\n __schedule+0x2e7/0x8a0\n schedule+0x64/0xe0\n wait_current_trans+0xb0/0x110 [btrfs]\n start_transaction+0x346/0x5b0 [btrfs]\n btrfs_finish_ordered_io.isra.0+0x49b/0x9c0 [btrfs]\n btrfs_work_helper+0xe8/0x350 [btrfs]\n process_one_work+0x1d3/0x3c0\n worker_thread+0x4d/0x3e0\n kthread+0x12d/0x150\n ret_from_fork+0x1f/0x30\n\nFix this by passing the transaction type to wait_current_trans() and\nchecking btrfs_blocked_trans_types[cur_trans-\u003estate] against the given\ntype before deciding to wait. This ensures that transaction types which\nare allowed to join during certain blocked states will not unnecessarily\nwait and cause deadlocks."
}
],
"id": "CVE-2025-71194",
"lastModified": "2026-02-06T17:16:19.230",
"metrics": {},
"published": "2026-02-04T17:16:11.297",
"references": [
{
"source": "416baaa9-dc9f-4396-8d5f-8c081fb06d67",
"url": "https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/5037b342825df7094a4906d1e2a9674baab50cb2"
},
{
"source": "416baaa9-dc9f-4396-8d5f-8c081fb06d67",
"url": "https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/8b0bb145d3bc264360f525c9717653be3522e528"
},
{
"source": "416baaa9-dc9f-4396-8d5f-8c081fb06d67",
"url": "https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/99da896614d17e8a84aeb2b2d464ac046cc8633d"
},
{
"source": "416baaa9-dc9f-4396-8d5f-8c081fb06d67",
"url": "https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/9ac63333d600732a56b35ee1fa46836da671eb50"
},
{
"source": "416baaa9-dc9f-4396-8d5f-8c081fb06d67",
"url": "https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/d7b04b40ac8e6d814e35202a0e1568809b818295"
},
{
"source": "416baaa9-dc9f-4396-8d5f-8c081fb06d67",
"url": "https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/dc84036c173cff6a432d9ab926298850b1d2a659"
},
{
"source": "416baaa9-dc9f-4396-8d5f-8c081fb06d67",
"url": "https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/e563f59395981fcd69d130761290929806e728d6"
}
],
"sourceIdentifier": "416baaa9-dc9f-4396-8d5f-8c081fb06d67",
"vulnStatus": "Awaiting Analysis"
}
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Sightings
| Author | Source | Type | Date |
|---|
Nomenclature
- Seen: The vulnerability was mentioned, discussed, or observed by the user.
- Confirmed: The vulnerability has been validated from an analyst's perspective.
- Published Proof of Concept: A public proof of concept is available for this vulnerability.
- Exploited: The vulnerability was observed as exploited by the user who reported the sighting.
- Patched: The vulnerability was observed as successfully patched by the user who reported the sighting.
- Not exploited: The vulnerability was not observed as exploited by the user who reported the sighting.
- Not confirmed: The user expressed doubt about the validity of the vulnerability.
- Not patched: The vulnerability was not observed as successfully patched by the user who reported the sighting.
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