FKIE_CVE-2025-68809
Vulnerability from fkie_nvd - Published: 2026-01-13 16:16 - Updated: 2026-10-30 13:18
Severity
Summary
In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
ksmbd: vfs: fix race on m_flags in vfs_cache
ksmbd maintains delete-on-close and pending-delete state in
ksmbd_inode->m_flags. In vfs_cache.c this field is accessed under
inconsistent locking: some paths read and modify m_flags under
ci->m_lock while others do so without taking the lock at all.
Examples:
- ksmbd_query_inode_status() and __ksmbd_inode_close() use
ci->m_lock when checking or updating m_flags.
- ksmbd_inode_pending_delete(), ksmbd_set_inode_pending_delete(),
ksmbd_clear_inode_pending_delete() and ksmbd_fd_set_delete_on_close()
used to read and modify m_flags without ci->m_lock.
This creates a potential data race on m_flags when multiple threads
open, close and delete the same file concurrently. In the worst case
delete-on-close and pending-delete bits can be lost or observed in an
inconsistent state, leading to confusing delete semantics (files that
stay on disk after delete-on-close, or files that disappear while still
in use).
Fix it by:
- Making ksmbd_query_inode_status() look at m_flags under ci->m_lock
after dropping inode_hash_lock.
- Adding ci->m_lock protection to all helpers that read or modify
m_flags (ksmbd_inode_pending_delete(), ksmbd_set_inode_pending_delete(),
ksmbd_clear_inode_pending_delete(), ksmbd_fd_set_delete_on_close()).
- Keeping the existing ci->m_lock protection in __ksmbd_inode_close(),
and moving the actual unlink/xattr removal outside the lock.
This unifies the locking around m_flags and removes the data race while
preserving the existing delete-on-close behaviour.
References
Impacted products
| Vendor | Product | Version |
|---|
{
"affected": [
{
"affectedData": [
{
"defaultStatus": "unaffected",
"product": "Linux",
"programFiles": [
"fs/smb/server/vfs_cache.c"
],
"repo": "https://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/stable/linux.git",
"vendor": "Linux",
"versions": [
{
"lessThan": "a4fd1fdf505facfae26b5654c9eff321f4cbc1a7",
"status": "affected",
"version": "f44158485826c076335d6860d35872271a83791d",
"versionType": "git"
},
{
"lessThan": "5adad9727a815c26013b0d41cfee92ffa7d4037c",
"status": "affected",
"version": "f44158485826c076335d6860d35872271a83791d",
"versionType": "git"
},
{
"lessThan": "ccc78781041589ea383e61d5d7a1e9a31b210b93",
"status": "affected",
"version": "f44158485826c076335d6860d35872271a83791d",
"versionType": "git"
},
{
"lessThan": "ee63729760f5b61a66f345c54dc4c7514e62383d",
"status": "affected",
"version": "f44158485826c076335d6860d35872271a83791d",
"versionType": "git"
},
{
"lessThan": "991f8a79db99b14c48d20d2052c82d65b9186cad",
"status": "affected",
"version": "f44158485826c076335d6860d35872271a83791d",
"versionType": "git"
}
]
},
{
"defaultStatus": "affected",
"product": "Linux",
"programFiles": [
"fs/smb/server/vfs_cache.c"
],
"repo": "https://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/stable/linux.git",
"vendor": "Linux",
"versions": [
{
"status": "affected",
"version": "5.15"
},
{
"lessThan": "5.15",
"status": "unaffected",
"version": "0",
"versionType": "semver"
},
{
"lessThanOrEqual": "6.1.*",
"status": "unaffected",
"version": "6.1.191",
"versionType": "semver"
},
{
"lessThanOrEqual": "6.6.*",
"status": "unaffected",
"version": "6.6.120",
"versionType": "semver"
},
{
"lessThanOrEqual": "6.12.*",
"status": "unaffected",
"version": "6.12.64",
"versionType": "semver"
},
{
"lessThanOrEqual": "6.18.*",
"status": "unaffected",
"version": "6.18.3",
"versionType": "semver"
},
{
"lessThanOrEqual": "*",
"status": "unaffected",
"version": "6.19",
"versionType": "original_commit_for_fix"
}
]
}
],
"source": "416baaa9-dc9f-4396-8d5f-8c081fb06d67"
}
],
"cveTags": [],
"descriptions": [
{
"lang": "en",
"value": "In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:\n\nksmbd: vfs: fix race on m_flags in vfs_cache\n\nksmbd maintains delete-on-close and pending-delete state in\nksmbd_inode-\u003em_flags. In vfs_cache.c this field is accessed under\ninconsistent locking: some paths read and modify m_flags under\nci-\u003em_lock while others do so without taking the lock at all.\n\nExamples:\n\n - ksmbd_query_inode_status() and __ksmbd_inode_close() use\n ci-\u003em_lock when checking or updating m_flags.\n - ksmbd_inode_pending_delete(), ksmbd_set_inode_pending_delete(),\n ksmbd_clear_inode_pending_delete() and ksmbd_fd_set_delete_on_close()\n used to read and modify m_flags without ci-\u003em_lock.\n\nThis creates a potential data race on m_flags when multiple threads\nopen, close and delete the same file concurrently. In the worst case\ndelete-on-close and pending-delete bits can be lost or observed in an\ninconsistent state, leading to confusing delete semantics (files that\nstay on disk after delete-on-close, or files that disappear while still\nin use).\n\nFix it by:\n\n - Making ksmbd_query_inode_status() look at m_flags under ci-\u003em_lock\n after dropping inode_hash_lock.\n - Adding ci-\u003em_lock protection to all helpers that read or modify\n m_flags (ksmbd_inode_pending_delete(), ksmbd_set_inode_pending_delete(),\n ksmbd_clear_inode_pending_delete(), ksmbd_fd_set_delete_on_close()).\n - Keeping the existing ci-\u003em_lock protection in __ksmbd_inode_close(),\n and moving the actual unlink/xattr removal outside the lock.\n\nThis unifies the locking around m_flags and removes the data race while\npreserving the existing delete-on-close behaviour."
},
{
"lang": "es",
"value": "En el kernel de Linux, la siguiente vulnerabilidad ha sido resuelta:\n\nksmbd: vfs: corregir condici\u00f3n de carrera en m_flags en vfs_cache\n\nksmbd mantiene el estado de eliminaci\u00f3n al cerrar y eliminaci\u00f3n pendiente en ksmbd_inode-\u0026gt;m_flags. En vfs_cache.c, este campo es accedido bajo un bloqueo inconsistente: algunas rutas leen y modifican m_flags bajo ci-\u0026gt;m_lock mientras que otras lo hacen sin tomar el bloqueo en absoluto.\n\nEjemplos:\n\n - ksmbd_query_inode_status() y __ksmbd_inode_close() usan ci-\u0026gt;m_lock al verificar o actualizar m_flags.\n - ksmbd_inode_pending_delete(), ksmbd_set_inode_pending_delete(), ksmbd_clear_inode_pending_delete() y ksmbd_fd_set_delete_on_close() sol\u00edan leer y modificar m_flags sin ci-\u0026gt;m_lock.\n\nEsto crea una potencial condici\u00f3n de carrera de datos en m_flags cuando m\u00faltiples hilos abren, cierran y eliminan el mismo archivo concurrentemente. En el peor de los casos, los bits de eliminaci\u00f3n al cerrar y eliminaci\u00f3n pendiente pueden perderse u observarse en un estado inconsistente, lo que lleva a sem\u00e1nticas de eliminaci\u00f3n confusas (archivos que permanecen en el disco despu\u00e9s de la eliminaci\u00f3n al cerrar, o archivos que desaparecen mientras a\u00fan est\u00e1n en uso).\n\nSolucionarlo mediante:\n\n - Haciendo que ksmbd_query_inode_status() examine m_flags bajo ci-\u0026gt;m_lock despu\u00e9s de liberar inode_hash_lock.\n - A\u00f1adiendo protecci\u00f3n ci-\u0026gt;m_lock a todas las funciones auxiliares que leen o modifican m_flags (ksmbd_inode_pending_delete(), ksmbd_set_inode_pending_delete(), ksmbd_clear_inode_pending_delete(), ksmbd_fd_set_delete_on_close()).\n - Manteniendo la protecci\u00f3n ci-\u0026gt;m_lock existente en __ksmbd_inode_close(), y moviendo la eliminaci\u00f3n real de unlink/xattr fuera del bloqueo.\n\nEsto unifica el bloqueo alrededor de m_flags y elimina la condici\u00f3n de carrera de datos mientras se preserva el comportamiento existente de eliminaci\u00f3n al cerrar."
}
],
"id": "CVE-2025-68809",
"lastModified": "2026-10-30T13:18:24.440",
"metrics": {
"cvssMetricV31": [
{
"cvssData": {
"attackComplexity": "LOW",
"attackVector": "NETWORK",
"availabilityImpact": "HIGH",
"baseScore": 9.1,
"baseSeverity": "CRITICAL",
"confidentialityImpact": "NONE",
"integrityImpact": "HIGH",
"privilegesRequired": "NONE",
"scope": "UNCHANGED",
"userInteraction": "NONE",
"vectorString": "CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:N/I:H/A:H",
"version": "3.1"
},
"exploitabilityScore": 3.9,
"impactScore": 5.2,
"source": "416baaa9-dc9f-4396-8d5f-8c081fb06d67",
"type": "Secondary"
}
]
},
"published": "2026-01-13T16:16:03.080",
"references": [
{
"source": "416baaa9-dc9f-4396-8d5f-8c081fb06d67",
"url": "https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/5adad9727a815c26013b0d41cfee92ffa7d4037c"
},
{
"source": "416baaa9-dc9f-4396-8d5f-8c081fb06d67",
"url": "https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/991f8a79db99b14c48d20d2052c82d65b9186cad"
},
{
"source": "416baaa9-dc9f-4396-8d5f-8c081fb06d67",
"url": "https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/a4fd1fdf505facfae26b5654c9eff321f4cbc1a7"
},
{
"source": "416baaa9-dc9f-4396-8d5f-8c081fb06d67",
"url": "https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/ccc78781041589ea383e61d5d7a1e9a31b210b93"
},
{
"source": "416baaa9-dc9f-4396-8d5f-8c081fb06d67",
"url": "https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/ee63729760f5b61a66f345c54dc4c7514e62383d"
}
],
"sourceIdentifier": "416baaa9-dc9f-4396-8d5f-8c081fb06d67",
"vulnStatus": "Deferred"
}
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Browse all ATT&CK techniques and the vulnerabilities related to each.
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