FKIE_CVE-2025-68472
Vulnerability from fkie_nvd - Published: 2026-01-12 17:15 - Updated: 2026-06-17 09:599.1 (Critical) - CVSS:3.1/
{
"affected": [
{
"affectedData": [
{
"product": "mindsdb",
"vendor": "mindsdb",
"versions": [
{
"status": "affected",
"version": "\u003c 25.11.1"
}
]
}
],
"source": "security-advisories@github.com"
}
],
"configurations": [
{
"nodes": [
{
"cpeMatch": [
{
"criteria": "cpe:2.3:a:mindsdb:mindsdb:*:*:*:*:*:*:*:*",
"matchCriteriaId": "3B7E2336-7EE3-4597-A6C6-FAA24532F38C",
"versionEndExcluding": "25.11.1",
"vulnerable": true
}
],
"negate": false,
"operator": "OR"
}
]
}
],
"cveTags": [],
"descriptions": [
{
"lang": "en",
"value": "MindsDB is a platform for building artificial intelligence from enterprise data. Prior to version 25.11.1, an unauthenticated path traversal in the file upload API lets any caller read arbitrary files from the server filesystem and move them into MindsDB\u2019s storage, exposing sensitive data. The PUT handler in file.py directly joins user-controlled data into a filesystem path when the request body is JSON and source_type is not \"url\". Only multipart uploads and URL-sourced uploads receive sanitization; JSON uploads lack any call to clear_filename or equivalent checks. This vulnerability is fixed in 25.11.1."
},
{
"lang": "es",
"value": "MindsDB es una plataforma para construir inteligencia artificial a partir de datos empresariales. Antes de la versi\u00f3n 25.11.1, un salto de ruta no autenticado en la API de carga de archivos permite a cualquier llamador leer archivos arbitrarios del sistema de archivos del servidor y moverlos al almacenamiento de MindsDB, exponiendo datos sensibles. El manejador PUT en file.py une directamente datos controlados por el usuario en una ruta del sistema de archivos cuando el cuerpo de la solicitud es JSON y source_type no es \u0027url\u0027. Solo las cargas multipart y las cargas con origen en URL reciben saneamiento; las cargas JSON carecen de cualquier llamada a clear_filename o comprobaciones equivalentes. Esta vulnerabilidad est\u00e1 corregida en 25.11.1."
}
],
"id": "CVE-2025-68472",
"lastModified": "2026-06-17T09:59:07.200",
"metrics": {
"cvssMetricV31": [
{
"cvssData": {
"attackComplexity": "LOW",
"attackVector": "ADJACENT_NETWORK",
"availabilityImpact": "HIGH",
"baseScore": 8.1,
"baseSeverity": "HIGH",
"confidentialityImpact": "NONE",
"integrityImpact": "HIGH",
"privilegesRequired": "NONE",
"scope": "UNCHANGED",
"userInteraction": "NONE",
"vectorString": "CVSS:3.1/AV:A/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:N/I:H/A:H",
"version": "3.1"
},
"exploitabilityScore": 2.8,
"impactScore": 5.2,
"source": "security-advisories@github.com",
"type": "Secondary"
},
{
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"attackComplexity": "LOW",
"attackVector": "NETWORK",
"availabilityImpact": "HIGH",
"baseScore": 9.1,
"baseSeverity": "CRITICAL",
"confidentialityImpact": "HIGH",
"integrityImpact": "NONE",
"privilegesRequired": "NONE",
"scope": "UNCHANGED",
"userInteraction": "NONE",
"vectorString": "CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:N/A:H",
"version": "3.1"
},
"exploitabilityScore": 3.9,
"impactScore": 5.2,
"source": "nvd@nist.gov",
"type": "Primary"
}
],
"ssvcV203": [
{
"source": "134c704f-9b21-4f2e-91b3-4a467353bcc0",
"ssvcData": {
"id": "CVE-2025-68472",
"options": [
{
"exploitation": "poc"
},
{
"automatable": "no"
},
{
"technicalImpact": "partial"
}
],
"role": "CISA Coordinator",
"timestamp": "2026-01-12T18:36:34.460933Z",
"version": "2.0.3"
}
}
]
},
"published": "2026-01-12T17:15:52.887",
"references": [
{
"source": "security-advisories@github.com",
"tags": [
"Exploit",
"Vendor Advisory"
],
"url": "https://github.com/mindsdb/mindsdb/security/advisories/GHSA-qqhf-pm3j-96g7"
},
{
"source": "af854a3a-2127-422b-91ae-364da2661108",
"url": "https://www.bluerock.io/post/cve-2025-68472-mindsdb-file-upload-path-traversal"
}
],
"sourceIdentifier": "security-advisories@github.com",
"vulnStatus": "Modified",
"weaknesses": [
{
"description": [
{
"lang": "en",
"value": "CWE-22"
},
{
"lang": "en",
"value": "CWE-23"
},
{
"lang": "en",
"value": "CWE-36"
}
],
"source": "security-advisories@github.com",
"type": "Secondary"
}
]
}
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Sightings
| Author | Source | Type | Date | Other |
|---|
Nomenclature
- Seen: The vulnerability was mentioned, discussed, or observed by the user.
- Confirmed: The vulnerability has been validated from an analyst's perspective.
- Published Proof of Concept: A public proof of concept is available for this vulnerability.
- Exploited: The vulnerability was observed as exploited by the user who reported the sighting.
- Patched: The vulnerability was observed as successfully patched by the user who reported the sighting.
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- Not confirmed: The user expressed doubt about the validity of the vulnerability.
- Not patched: The vulnerability was not observed as successfully patched by the user who reported the sighting.
Vulnerability timeline
Sightings and recorded dates, grouped by day · UTC
How durations are calculated
Following the VTEM framework (Black Hat USA 2015), time to patch starts when the vendor or a coordinator was informed, total time to patch at discovery, and disclosure to patch at public disclosure; vendor response time runs from the report to its acknowledgement. Time to exploit and time unpatched start at the earliest discovery or report, falling back to public disclosure. Unpatched time ends at the first recorded patch, or the calculation time when no patch is recorded. Exploitation to patch shows the interval between those two events; a published proof of concept is a public exploit, not exploitation.
Each result shows its source dates. A negative interval means the end event came first; when date-only inputs leave the order open, the result says so. Date-only inputs are approximate. The earliest evidence wins: KEV report dates and sightings are labelled as such. Records describing another vulnerability are listed but never calculated from, and a PoC alone does not establish exploitation. Missing patch evidence does not prove that no patch exists. Filters below change the event list only.
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Related by attack behaviour
Vulnerabilities whose description is nearest to this one in the vector space of the CIRCL/vulnerability-attack-technique-biencoder model. This is a similarity search over the bi-encoder space (plain cosine), not a classification, and it has no measured accuracy.