FKIE_CVE-2023-25187
Vulnerability from fkie_nvd - Published: 2023-06-16 20:15 - Updated: 2024-12-12 21:15
Severity ?
6.3 (Medium) - CVSS:3.1/AV:L/AC:H/PR:H/UI:R/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:H
7.0 (High) - CVSS:3.1/AV:L/AC:H/PR:L/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:H
7.0 (High) - CVSS:3.1/AV:L/AC:H/PR:L/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:H
Summary
An issue was discovered on NOKIA Airscale ASIKA Single RAN devices before 21B. Nokia Single RAN commissioning procedures do not change (factory-time installed) default SSH public/private key values that are specific to a network operator. As a result, the CSP internal BTS network SSH server (disabled by default) continues to apply the default SSH public/private key values. These keys don't give access to BTS, because service user authentication is username/password-based on top of SSH. Nokia factory installed default SSH keys are meant to be changed from operator-specific values during the BTS deployment commissioning phase. However, before the 21B release, BTS commissioning manuals did not provide instructions to change default SSH keys (to BTS operator-specific values). This leads to a possibility for malicious operations staff (inside a CSP network) to attempt MITM exploitation of BTS service user access, during the moments that SSH is enabled for Nokia service personnel to perform troubleshooting activities.
References
Impacted products
| Vendor | Product | Version | |
|---|---|---|---|
| nokia | asika_airscale_firmware | 19b | |
| nokia | asika_airscale_firmware | 20a | |
| nokia | asika_airscale_firmware | 20b | |
| nokia | asika_airscale_firmware | 20c | |
| nokia | asika_airscale_firmware | 21a | |
| nokia | asika_airscale | - |
{
"configurations": [
{
"nodes": [
{
"cpeMatch": [
{
"criteria": "cpe:2.3:o:nokia:asika_airscale_firmware:19b:*:*:*:*:*:*:*",
"matchCriteriaId": "FE8E3A0E-3B21-49D8-A4EE-33FE5FBA7B51",
"vulnerable": true
},
{
"criteria": "cpe:2.3:o:nokia:asika_airscale_firmware:20a:*:*:*:*:*:*:*",
"matchCriteriaId": "A612E565-7686-4C20-99AF-67B283328A42",
"vulnerable": true
},
{
"criteria": "cpe:2.3:o:nokia:asika_airscale_firmware:20b:*:*:*:*:*:*:*",
"matchCriteriaId": "5AE52024-F5EE-42F6-AC3A-702E87B1ABF2",
"vulnerable": true
},
{
"criteria": "cpe:2.3:o:nokia:asika_airscale_firmware:20c:*:*:*:*:*:*:*",
"matchCriteriaId": "DA68A71E-A8FB-4448-BE75-318E4582FC43",
"vulnerable": true
},
{
"criteria": "cpe:2.3:o:nokia:asika_airscale_firmware:21a:*:*:*:*:*:*:*",
"matchCriteriaId": "B2FAA373-A46D-48A6-8A08-F66F4F3604C7",
"vulnerable": true
}
],
"negate": false,
"operator": "OR"
},
{
"cpeMatch": [
{
"criteria": "cpe:2.3:h:nokia:asika_airscale:-:*:*:*:*:*:*:*",
"matchCriteriaId": "61C0B724-C7EA-4214-98CF-49812292332B",
"vulnerable": false
}
],
"negate": false,
"operator": "OR"
}
],
"operator": "AND"
}
],
"cveTags": [],
"descriptions": [
{
"lang": "en",
"value": "An issue was discovered on NOKIA Airscale ASIKA Single RAN devices before 21B. Nokia Single RAN commissioning procedures do not change (factory-time installed) default SSH public/private key values that are specific to a network operator. As a result, the CSP internal BTS network SSH server (disabled by default) continues to apply the default SSH public/private key values. These keys don\u0027t give access to BTS, because service user authentication is username/password-based on top of SSH. Nokia factory installed default SSH keys are meant to be changed from operator-specific values during the BTS deployment commissioning phase. However, before the 21B release, BTS commissioning manuals did not provide instructions to change default SSH keys (to BTS operator-specific values). This leads to a possibility for malicious operations staff (inside a CSP network) to attempt MITM exploitation of BTS service user access, during the moments that SSH is enabled for Nokia service personnel to perform troubleshooting activities."
}
],
"id": "CVE-2023-25187",
"lastModified": "2024-12-12T21:15:06.680",
"metrics": {
"cvssMetricV31": [
{
"cvssData": {
"attackComplexity": "HIGH",
"attackVector": "LOCAL",
"availabilityImpact": "HIGH",
"baseScore": 6.3,
"baseSeverity": "MEDIUM",
"confidentialityImpact": "HIGH",
"integrityImpact": "HIGH",
"privilegesRequired": "HIGH",
"scope": "UNCHANGED",
"userInteraction": "REQUIRED",
"vectorString": "CVSS:3.1/AV:L/AC:H/PR:H/UI:R/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:H",
"version": "3.1"
},
"exploitabilityScore": 0.3,
"impactScore": 5.9,
"source": "cve@mitre.org",
"type": "Secondary"
},
{
"cvssData": {
"attackComplexity": "HIGH",
"attackVector": "LOCAL",
"availabilityImpact": "HIGH",
"baseScore": 7.0,
"baseSeverity": "HIGH",
"confidentialityImpact": "HIGH",
"integrityImpact": "HIGH",
"privilegesRequired": "LOW",
"scope": "UNCHANGED",
"userInteraction": "NONE",
"vectorString": "CVSS:3.1/AV:L/AC:H/PR:L/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:H",
"version": "3.1"
},
"exploitabilityScore": 1.0,
"impactScore": 5.9,
"source": "nvd@nist.gov",
"type": "Primary"
}
]
},
"published": "2023-06-16T20:15:09.297",
"references": [
{
"source": "cve@mitre.org",
"tags": [
"Exploit",
"Third Party Advisory",
"VDB Entry"
],
"url": "http://packetstormsecurity.com/files/173055/Nokia-ASIKA-7.13.52-Private-Key-Disclosure.html"
},
{
"source": "cve@mitre.org",
"tags": [
"Product"
],
"url": "https://Nokia.com"
},
{
"source": "cve@mitre.org",
"tags": [
"Vendor Advisory"
],
"url": "https://www.nokia.com/about-us/security-and-privacy/product-security-advisory/cve-2023-25187/"
},
{
"source": "af854a3a-2127-422b-91ae-364da2661108",
"tags": [
"Exploit",
"Third Party Advisory",
"VDB Entry"
],
"url": "http://packetstormsecurity.com/files/173055/Nokia-ASIKA-7.13.52-Private-Key-Disclosure.html"
},
{
"source": "af854a3a-2127-422b-91ae-364da2661108",
"tags": [
"Product"
],
"url": "https://Nokia.com"
},
{
"source": "af854a3a-2127-422b-91ae-364da2661108",
"tags": [
"Vendor Advisory"
],
"url": "https://www.nokia.com/about-us/security-and-privacy/product-security-advisory/cve-2023-25187/"
}
],
"sourceIdentifier": "cve@mitre.org",
"vulnStatus": "Modified",
"weaknesses": [
{
"description": [
{
"lang": "en",
"value": "CWE-798"
}
],
"source": "nvd@nist.gov",
"type": "Primary"
},
{
"description": [
{
"lang": "en",
"value": "CWE-798"
}
],
"source": "134c704f-9b21-4f2e-91b3-4a467353bcc0",
"type": "Secondary"
}
]
}
Loading…
Loading…
Experimental. This forecast is provided for visualization only and may change without notice. Do not use it for operational decisions.
Forecast uses a logistic model when the trend is rising, or an exponential decay model when the trend is falling. Fitted via linearized least squares.
Sightings
| Author | Source | Type | Date | Other |
|---|
Nomenclature
- Seen: The vulnerability was mentioned, discussed, or observed by the user.
- Confirmed: The vulnerability has been validated from an analyst's perspective.
- Published Proof of Concept: A public proof of concept is available for this vulnerability.
- Exploited: The vulnerability was observed as exploited by the user who reported the sighting.
- Patched: The vulnerability was observed as successfully patched by the user who reported the sighting.
- Not exploited: The vulnerability was not observed as exploited by the user who reported the sighting.
- Not confirmed: The user expressed doubt about the validity of the vulnerability.
- Not patched: The vulnerability was not observed as successfully patched by the user who reported the sighting.
Loading…
Loading…