CVE-2020-28055 (GCVE-0-2020-28055)
Vulnerability from cvelistv5 – Published: 2020-11-10 17:53 – Updated: 2024-08-04 16:33
VLAI?
Summary
A vulnerability in the TCL Android Smart TV series V8-R851T02-LF1 V295 and below and V8-T658T01-LF1 V373 and below by TCL Technology Group Corporation allows a local unprivileged attacker, such as a malicious App, to read & write to the /data/vendor/tcl, /data/vendor/upgrade, and /var/TerminalManager directories within the TV file system. An attacker, such as a malicious APK or local unprivileged user could perform fake system upgrades by writing to the /data/vendor/upgrage folder.
Severity ?
No CVSS data available.
CWE
- n/a
Assigner
References
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}
}
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Sightings
| Author | Source | Type | Date |
|---|
Nomenclature
- Seen: The vulnerability was mentioned, discussed, or observed by the user.
- Confirmed: The vulnerability has been validated from an analyst's perspective.
- Published Proof of Concept: A public proof of concept is available for this vulnerability.
- Exploited: The vulnerability was observed as exploited by the user who reported the sighting.
- Patched: The vulnerability was observed as successfully patched by the user who reported the sighting.
- Not exploited: The vulnerability was not observed as exploited by the user who reported the sighting.
- Not confirmed: The user expressed doubt about the validity of the vulnerability.
- Not patched: The vulnerability was not observed as successfully patched by the user who reported the sighting.
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