CNVD-2015-03377

Vulnerability from cnvd - Published: 2015-07-06
VLAI Severity ?
Title
MAS中国移动代理服务器SQL注入漏洞
Description
WAS中国移动代理服务器是为满足信息化程度高的集团客户通过移动终端实现移动办公、生产控制、营销服务等信息化需求,在集团客户Intranet内部署与其OA、ERP、CRP等应用系统进行应用耦合的网关。 MAS中国移动代理服务器存在通用型SQL注入漏洞,允许攻击者利用此漏洞获取数据库敏感信息。
Severity
Patch Name
中国移动MAS代理服务器存在SQL注入漏洞
Patch Description
已经转由CNCERT向中国移动集团公司通报,由其后续协调网站管理部门处置.
Formal description

1) 所有的查询语句都使用数据库提供的参数化查询接口,参数化的语句使用参数而不是将用户输入变量嵌入到SQL语句中。 2) 对进入数据库的特殊字符('"\<>&*;等)进行转义处理,或编码转换。 3) 确认每种数据的类型,比如数字型的数据就必须是数字,数据库中的存储字段必须对应为int型。 4) 数据长度应该严格规定,能在一定程度上防止比较长的SQL注入语句无法正确执行。 5) 网站每个数据层的编码统一,建议全部使用UTF-8编码,上下层编码不一致有可能导致一些过滤模型被绕过。 6) 严格限制网站所用数据库账号的权限,给此用户仅提供能够满足其工作的权限,从而最大限度的减少注入攻击对数据库的危害。 7) 避免网站显示SQL错误信息,比如类型错误、字段不匹配等,防止攻击者利用这些错误信息进行一些判断。

Impacted products
Name
中国移动 WAS代理服务器
Show details on source website

{
  "description": "WAS\u4e2d\u56fd\u79fb\u52a8\u4ee3\u7406\u670d\u52a1\u5668\u662f\u4e3a\u6ee1\u8db3\u4fe1\u606f\u5316\u7a0b\u5ea6\u9ad8\u7684\u96c6\u56e2\u5ba2\u6237\u901a\u8fc7\u79fb\u52a8\u7ec8\u7aef\u5b9e\u73b0\u79fb\u52a8\u529e\u516c\u3001\u751f\u4ea7\u63a7\u5236\u3001\u8425\u9500\u670d\u52a1\u7b49\u4fe1\u606f\u5316\u9700\u6c42\uff0c\u5728\u96c6\u56e2\u5ba2\u6237Intranet\u5185\u90e8\u7f72\u4e0e\u5176OA\u3001ERP\u3001CRP\u7b49\u5e94\u7528\u7cfb\u7edf\u8fdb\u884c\u5e94\u7528\u8026\u5408\u7684\u7f51\u5173\u3002\r\n\r\nMAS\u4e2d\u56fd\u79fb\u52a8\u4ee3\u7406\u670d\u52a1\u5668\u5b58\u5728\u901a\u7528\u578bSQL\u6ce8\u5165\u6f0f\u6d1e\uff0c\u5141\u8bb8\u653b\u51fb\u8005\u5229\u7528\u6b64\u6f0f\u6d1e\u83b7\u53d6\u6570\u636e\u5e93\u654f\u611f\u4fe1\u606f\u3002",
  "discovererName": "\u5e84\u6587\u751f",
  "formalWay": "1) \u6240\u6709\u7684\u67e5\u8be2\u8bed\u53e5\u90fd\u4f7f\u7528\u6570\u636e\u5e93\u63d0\u4f9b\u7684\u53c2\u6570\u5316\u67e5\u8be2\u63a5\u53e3\uff0c\u53c2\u6570\u5316\u7684\u8bed\u53e5\u4f7f\u7528\u53c2\u6570\u800c\u4e0d\u662f\u5c06\u7528\u6237\u8f93\u5165\u53d8\u91cf\u5d4c\u5165\u5230SQL\u8bed\u53e5\u4e2d\u3002\r\n2) \u5bf9\u8fdb\u5165\u6570\u636e\u5e93\u7684\u7279\u6b8a\u5b57\u7b26\uff08\u0027\"\\\u003c\u003e\u0026*;\u7b49\uff09\u8fdb\u884c\u8f6c\u4e49\u5904\u7406\uff0c\u6216\u7f16\u7801\u8f6c\u6362\u3002\r\n3) \u786e\u8ba4\u6bcf\u79cd\u6570\u636e\u7684\u7c7b\u578b\uff0c\u6bd4\u5982\u6570\u5b57\u578b\u7684\u6570\u636e\u5c31\u5fc5\u987b\u662f\u6570\u5b57\uff0c\u6570\u636e\u5e93\u4e2d\u7684\u5b58\u50a8\u5b57\u6bb5\u5fc5\u987b\u5bf9\u5e94\u4e3aint\u578b\u3002\r\n4) \u6570\u636e\u957f\u5ea6\u5e94\u8be5\u4e25\u683c\u89c4\u5b9a\uff0c\u80fd\u5728\u4e00\u5b9a\u7a0b\u5ea6\u4e0a\u9632\u6b62\u6bd4\u8f83\u957f\u7684SQL\u6ce8\u5165\u8bed\u53e5\u65e0\u6cd5\u6b63\u786e\u6267\u884c\u3002\r\n5) \u7f51\u7ad9\u6bcf\u4e2a\u6570\u636e\u5c42\u7684\u7f16\u7801\u7edf\u4e00\uff0c\u5efa\u8bae\u5168\u90e8\u4f7f\u7528UTF-8\u7f16\u7801\uff0c\u4e0a\u4e0b\u5c42\u7f16\u7801\u4e0d\u4e00\u81f4\u6709\u53ef\u80fd\u5bfc\u81f4\u4e00\u4e9b\u8fc7\u6ee4\u6a21\u578b\u88ab\u7ed5\u8fc7\u3002\r\n6) \u4e25\u683c\u9650\u5236\u7f51\u7ad9\u6240\u7528\u6570\u636e\u5e93\u8d26\u53f7\u7684\u6743\u9650\uff0c\u7ed9\u6b64\u7528\u6237\u4ec5\u63d0\u4f9b\u80fd\u591f\u6ee1\u8db3\u5176\u5de5\u4f5c\u7684\u6743\u9650\uff0c\u4ece\u800c\u6700\u5927\u9650\u5ea6\u7684\u51cf\u5c11\u6ce8\u5165\u653b\u51fb\u5bf9\u6570\u636e\u5e93\u7684\u5371\u5bb3\u3002\r\n7) \u907f\u514d\u7f51\u7ad9\u663e\u793aSQL\u9519\u8bef\u4fe1\u606f\uff0c\u6bd4\u5982\u7c7b\u578b\u9519\u8bef\u3001\u5b57\u6bb5\u4e0d\u5339\u914d\u7b49\uff0c\u9632\u6b62\u653b\u51fb\u8005\u5229\u7528\u8fd9\u4e9b\u9519\u8bef\u4fe1\u606f\u8fdb\u884c\u4e00\u4e9b\u5224\u65ad\u3002",
  "isEvent": "\u901a\u7528\u8f6f\u786c\u4ef6\u6f0f\u6d1e",
  "number": "CNVD-2015-03377",
  "openTime": "2015-07-06",
  "patchDescription": "\u5df2\u7ecf\u8f6c\u7531CNCERT\u5411\u4e2d\u56fd\u79fb\u52a8\u96c6\u56e2\u516c\u53f8\u901a\u62a5,\u7531\u5176\u540e\u7eed\u534f\u8c03\u7f51\u7ad9\u7ba1\u7406\u90e8\u95e8\u5904\u7f6e.",
  "patchName": "\u4e2d\u56fd\u79fb\u52a8MAS\u4ee3\u7406\u670d\u52a1\u5668\u5b58\u5728SQL\u6ce8\u5165\u6f0f\u6d1e",
  "products": {
    "product": "\u4e2d\u56fd\u79fb\u52a8 WAS\u4ee3\u7406\u670d\u52a1\u5668"
  },
  "serverity": "\u9ad8",
  "submitTime": "2015-05-21",
  "title": "MAS\u4e2d\u56fd\u79fb\u52a8\u4ee3\u7406\u670d\u52a1\u5668SQL\u6ce8\u5165\u6f0f\u6d1e"
}


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Sightings

Author Source Type Date

Nomenclature

  • Seen: The vulnerability was mentioned, discussed, or observed by the user.
  • Confirmed: The vulnerability has been validated from an analyst's perspective.
  • Published Proof of Concept: A public proof of concept is available for this vulnerability.
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  • Not confirmed: The user expressed doubt about the validity of the vulnerability.
  • Not patched: The vulnerability was not observed as successfully patched by the user who reported the sighting.


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