{
  "affected": [
    {
      "package": {
        "ecosystem": "PyPI",
        "name": "langsmith"
      },
      "ranges": [
        {
          "events": [
            {
              "introduced": "0"
            },
            {
              "fixed": "0.8.18"
            }
          ],
          "type": "ECOSYSTEM"
        }
      ]
    }
  ],
  "aliases": [],
  "database_specific": {
    "cwe_ids": [
      "CWE-22",
      "CWE-346",
      "CWE-843"
    ],
    "github_reviewed": true,
    "github_reviewed_at": "2026-06-19T22:10:34Z",
    "nvd_published_at": null,
    "severity": "HIGH"
  },
  "details": "# Summary\n\nAn attacker who can send an HTTP request to a server running the LangSmith SDK\u0027s `TracingMiddleware` can cause that server to read an arbitrary file from its local filesystem and upload the contents to LangSmith as a trace attachment. Depending on how the distributed trace system is deployed, triggering a read may not require authentication. Retrieving the contents requires read access to the LangSmith workspace the traces are sent to. The net effect is a trust-boundary crossing: a party with workspace trace-read access (for example a low-privilege workspace member, a contractor, or a compromised teammate account) gains the ability to read files from any server running `TracingMiddleware`, a capability outside that workspace\u0027s intended trust boundary.\n\n# Impact\n\nConfidentiality (High): arbitrary read of files accessible to the server process, exposed to anyone with workspace trace-read access.\n\n# Details\n\nTwo defects combine. A field supplied through a tracing-propagation header was merged into the run without validation, allowing injection of run attributes including attachments (CWE-346). A type check intended to gate filesystem access did not match the type of the decoded input, so the guard never engaged (CWE-843). As a result, an attacker-named file is opened by the server and uploaded as a trace attachment by the background tracing thread (CWE-22).\n\n## Who can exploit this\n\n- Anyone reachable by HTTP can trigger the file read. Depending on how the distributed trace system is deployed, triggering may not require authentication.\n- Retrieving the file contents requires read access to the destination LangSmith workspace. The upload uses the server\u0027s own configured API key and workspace, which the attacker cannot redirect, so a zero-access outsider cannot retrieve the result; a workspace member, or anyone who has compromised one, can.\n\n# Remediation\n\nUpgrade the Python SDK to `\u003e= 0.8.18`.\n\n# Workarounds\n\nUntil upgrading, do not expose `TracingMiddleware` to untrusted HTTP traffic, and limit workspace trace-read access to trusted members.\n\n# Credits\n\nFirst reported by @Ryu7zz.",
  "id": "GHSA-f4xh-w4cj-qxq8",
  "modified": "2026-06-19T22:10:34Z",
  "published": "2026-06-19T22:10:34Z",
  "references": [
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://github.com/langchain-ai/langsmith-sdk/security/advisories/GHSA-f4xh-w4cj-qxq8"
    },
    {
      "type": "PACKAGE",
      "url": "https://github.com/langchain-ai/langsmith-sdk"
    }
  ],
  "schema_version": "1.4.0",
  "severity": [
    {
      "score": "CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:L/UI:N/S:C/C:H/I:N/A:N",
      "type": "CVSS_V3"
    }
  ],
  "summary": "LangSmith SDK TracingMiddleware: Arbitrary server-side file read"
}