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Vulnerability from cleanstart
Package spire-server-fips version 1.14.1-r1 fixes 6 vulnerabilities: ghsa-273p-m2cw-6833, ghsa-4c4x-jm2x-pf9j, ghsa-846p-jg2w-w324, ghsa-fcv2-xgw5-pqxf, ghsa-fphv-w9fq-2525...
| URL | Type | |
|---|---|---|
{
"affected": [
{
"package": {
"ecosystem": "Alpine",
"name": "spire-server-fips"
},
"ranges": [
{
"events": [
{
"introduced": "0"
},
{
"fixed": "1.14.1-r1"
}
],
"type": "ECOSYSTEM"
}
],
"versions": [
"1.14.1-r1"
]
}
],
"credits": [],
"database_specific": {},
"details": "Package spire-server-fips version 1.14.1-r1 fixes 6 vulnerabilities: ghsa-273p-m2cw-6833, ghsa-4c4x-jm2x-pf9j, ghsa-846p-jg2w-w324, ghsa-fcv2-xgw5-pqxf, ghsa-fphv-w9fq-2525...",
"id": "CLEANSTART-2026-FA78759",
"modified": "2026-07-30T09:36:39Z",
"published": "2026-07-30T07:10:53Z",
"references": [
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://github.com/spiffe/spire"
}
],
"related": [],
"schema_version": "1.7.3",
"summary": "Security fixes in spire-server-fips 1.14.1-r1",
"upstream": [
"ghsa-273p-m2cw-6833",
"ghsa-4c4x-jm2x-pf9j",
"ghsa-846p-jg2w-w324",
"ghsa-fcv2-xgw5-pqxf",
"ghsa-fphv-w9fq-2525",
"ghsa-jqc5-w2xx-5vq4"
]
}
GHSA-273P-M2CW-6833
Vulnerability from github – Published: 2026-01-22 18:41 – Updated: 2026-01-23 15:46Summary
Rekor’s cose v0.0.1 entry implementation can panic on attacker-controlled input when canonicalizing a proposed entry with an empty spec.message. validate() returns nil (success) when message is empty, leaving sign1Msg uninitialized, and Canonicalize() later dereferences v.sign1Msg.Payload.
Impact
A malformed proposed entry of the cose/v0.0.1 type can cause a panic on a thread within the Rekor process. The thread is recovered so the client receives a 500 error message and service still continues, so the availability impact of this is minimal.
Patches
Upgrade to v1.5.0
Workarounds
None
{
"affected": [
{
"database_specific": {
"last_known_affected_version_range": "\u003c= 1.4.3"
},
"package": {
"ecosystem": "Go",
"name": "github.com/sigstore/rekor"
},
"ranges": [
{
"events": [
{
"introduced": "0"
},
{
"fixed": "1.5.0"
}
],
"type": "ECOSYSTEM"
}
]
}
],
"aliases": [
"CVE-2026-23831"
],
"database_specific": {
"cwe_ids": [
"CWE-476"
],
"github_reviewed": true,
"github_reviewed_at": "2026-01-22T18:41:23Z",
"nvd_published_at": "2026-01-22T22:16:19Z",
"severity": "MODERATE"
},
"details": "## Summary\n\nRekor\u2019s cose v0.0.1 entry implementation can panic on attacker-controlled input when canonicalizing a proposed entry with an empty `spec.message`. `validate()` returns nil (success) when `message` is empty, leaving `sign1Msg` uninitialized, and `Canonicalize()` later dereferences `v.sign1Msg.Payload`.\n\n## Impact\n\nA malformed proposed entry of the `cose/v0.0.1` type can cause a panic on a thread within the Rekor process. The thread is recovered so the client receives a 500 error message and service still continues, so the availability impact of this is minimal.\n\n## Patches\n\nUpgrade to v1.5.0\n\n## Workarounds\n\nNone",
"id": "GHSA-273p-m2cw-6833",
"modified": "2026-01-23T15:46:17Z",
"published": "2026-01-22T18:41:23Z",
"references": [
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://github.com/sigstore/rekor/security/advisories/GHSA-273p-m2cw-6833"
},
{
"type": "ADVISORY",
"url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2026-23831"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://github.com/sigstore/rekor/commit/39bae3d192bce48ef4ef2cbd1788fb5770fee8cd"
},
{
"type": "PACKAGE",
"url": "https://github.com/sigstore/rekor"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://github.com/sigstore/rekor/releases/tag/v1.5.0"
}
],
"schema_version": "1.4.0",
"severity": [
{
"score": "CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:N/I:N/A:L",
"type": "CVSS_V3"
}
],
"summary": "Rekor\u0027s COSE v0.0.1 entry type nil pointer dereference in Canonicalize via empty Message"
}
GHSA-4C4X-JM2X-PF9J
Vulnerability from github – Published: 2026-01-22 18:41 – Updated: 2026-01-23 15:49Summary
/api/v1/index/retrieve supports retrieving a public key via a user-provided URL, allowing attackers to trigger SSRF to arbitrary internal services.
Since the SSRF only can trigger GET requests, the request cannot mutate state. The response from the GET request is not returned to the caller so data exfiltration is not possible. A malicious actor could attempt to probe an internal network through Blind SSRF.
Impact
- SSRF to cloud metadata (169.254.169.254)
- SSRF to internal Kubernetes APIs
- SSRF to any service accessible from Fulcio's network
Patches
Upgrade to v1.5.0. Note that this is a breaking change to the search API and fully disables lookups by URL. If you require this feature, please reach out and we can discuss alternatives.
Workarounds
Disable the search endpoint with --enable_retrieve_api=false.
{
"affected": [
{
"database_specific": {
"last_known_affected_version_range": "\u003c= 1.4.3"
},
"package": {
"ecosystem": "Go",
"name": "github.com/sigstore/rekor"
},
"ranges": [
{
"events": [
{
"introduced": "0"
},
{
"fixed": "1.5.0"
}
],
"type": "ECOSYSTEM"
}
]
}
],
"aliases": [
"CVE-2026-24117"
],
"database_specific": {
"cwe_ids": [
"CWE-918"
],
"github_reviewed": true,
"github_reviewed_at": "2026-01-22T18:41:26Z",
"nvd_published_at": "2026-01-22T22:16:21Z",
"severity": "MODERATE"
},
"details": "## Summary\n\n`/api/v1/index/retrieve` supports retrieving a public key via a user-provided URL, allowing attackers to trigger SSRF to arbitrary internal services.\n\nSince the SSRF only can trigger GET requests, the request cannot mutate state. The response from the GET request is not returned to the caller so data exfiltration is not possible. A malicious actor could attempt to probe an internal network through [Blind SSRF](https://portswigger.net/web-security/ssrf/blind).\n\n## Impact\n\n* SSRF to cloud metadata (169.254.169.254)\n* SSRF to internal Kubernetes APIs\n* SSRF to any service accessible from Fulcio\u0027s network\n\n## Patches\n\nUpgrade to v1.5.0. Note that this is a breaking change to the search API and fully disables lookups by URL. If you require this feature, please reach out and we can discuss alternatives.\n\n## Workarounds\n\nDisable the search endpoint with `--enable_retrieve_api=false`.",
"id": "GHSA-4c4x-jm2x-pf9j",
"modified": "2026-01-23T15:49:13Z",
"published": "2026-01-22T18:41:26Z",
"references": [
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://github.com/sigstore/rekor/security/advisories/GHSA-4c4x-jm2x-pf9j"
},
{
"type": "ADVISORY",
"url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2026-24117"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://github.com/sigstore/rekor/commit/60ef2bceba192c5bf9327d003bceea8bf1f8275f"
},
{
"type": "PACKAGE",
"url": "https://github.com/sigstore/rekor"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://github.com/sigstore/rekor/releases/tag/v1.5.0"
}
],
"schema_version": "1.4.0",
"severity": [
{
"score": "CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:L/I:N/A:N",
"type": "CVSS_V3"
}
],
"summary": "Rekor affected by Server-Side Request Forgery (SSRF) via provided public key URL"
}
GHSA-846P-JG2W-W324
Vulnerability from github – Published: 2026-01-21 16:19 – Updated: 2026-01-22 15:43Security Disclosure: Client DoS via malformed server response
Summary
If the TUF repository (or any of its mirrors) returns invalid TUF metadata JSON (valid JSON but not well formed TUF metadata), the client will panic during parsing, causing a DoS. The panic happens before any signature is validated. This means that a compromised repository/mirror/cache can DoS clients without having access to any signing key.
Impact
Client crashes upon receiving and parsing malformed TUF metadata. This can cause long running services to enter an restart/crash loop.
Workarounds
None currently.
Affected code
The metadata.checkType function did not properly type assert the (untrusted) input causing it to panic on malformed data.
{
"affected": [
{
"package": {
"ecosystem": "Go",
"name": "github.com/theupdateframework/go-tuf/v2"
},
"ranges": [
{
"events": [
{
"introduced": "0"
},
{
"fixed": "2.3.1"
}
],
"type": "ECOSYSTEM"
}
]
}
],
"aliases": [
"CVE-2026-23991"
],
"database_specific": {
"cwe_ids": [
"CWE-617",
"CWE-754"
],
"github_reviewed": true,
"github_reviewed_at": "2026-01-21T16:19:28Z",
"nvd_published_at": "2026-01-22T03:15:47Z",
"severity": "MODERATE"
},
"details": "# Security Disclosure: Client DoS via malformed server response\n\n## Summary\n\nIf the TUF repository (or any of its mirrors) returns invalid TUF metadata JSON (valid JSON but not well formed TUF metadata), the client will panic _during parsing_, causing a DoS. The panic happens before any signature is validated. This means that a compromised repository/mirror/cache can DoS clients without having access to any signing key.\n\n## Impact \n\nClient crashes upon receiving and parsing malformed TUF metadata. This can cause long running services to enter an restart/crash loop.\n\n## Workarounds\n\nNone currently. \n\n## Affected code\n\nThe `metadata.checkType` function did not properly type assert the (untrusted) input causing it to panic on malformed data.",
"id": "GHSA-846p-jg2w-w324",
"modified": "2026-01-22T15:43:38Z",
"published": "2026-01-21T16:19:28Z",
"references": [
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://github.com/theupdateframework/go-tuf/security/advisories/GHSA-846p-jg2w-w324"
},
{
"type": "ADVISORY",
"url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2026-23991"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://github.com/theupdateframework/go-tuf/commit/73345ab6b0eb7e59d525dac17a428f043074cef6"
},
{
"type": "PACKAGE",
"url": "https://github.com/theupdateframework/go-tuf"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://github.com/theupdateframework/go-tuf/releases/tag/v2.3.1"
}
],
"schema_version": "1.4.0",
"severity": [
{
"score": "CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:H/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:N/I:N/A:H",
"type": "CVSS_V3"
}
],
"summary": "go-tuf affected by client DoS via malformed server response"
}
GHSA-FCV2-XGW5-PQXF
Vulnerability from github – Published: 2026-01-22 20:28 – Updated: 2026-02-27 21:37Summary
The legacy TUF client pkg/tuf/client.go, which supports caching target files to disk, constructs a filesystem path by joining a cache base directory with a target name sourced from signed target metadata, but it does not validate that the resulting path stays within the cache base directory.
Note that this should only affect clients that are directly using the TUF client in sigstore/sigstore or are using an older version of Cosign. As this TUF client implementation is deprecated, users should migrate to https://github.com/sigstore/sigstore-go/tree/main/pkg/tuf as soon as possible.
Note that this does not affect users of the public Sigstore deployment, where TUF metadata is validated by a quorum of trusted collaborators.
Impact
A malicious TUF repository can trigger arbitrary file overwriting, limited to the permissions that the calling process has.
Workarounds
Users can disable disk caching for the legacy client by setting SIGSTORE_NO_CACHE=true in the environment, migrate to https://github.com/sigstore/sigstore-go/tree/main/pkg/tuf, or upgrade to the latest sigstore/sigstore release.
{
"affected": [
{
"database_specific": {
"last_known_affected_version_range": "\u003c= 1.10.3"
},
"package": {
"ecosystem": "Go",
"name": "github.com/sigstore/sigstore"
},
"ranges": [
{
"events": [
{
"introduced": "0"
},
{
"fixed": "1.10.4"
}
],
"type": "ECOSYSTEM"
}
]
}
],
"aliases": [
"CVE-2026-24137"
],
"database_specific": {
"cwe_ids": [
"CWE-22"
],
"github_reviewed": true,
"github_reviewed_at": "2026-01-22T20:28:56Z",
"nvd_published_at": "2026-01-23T00:15:52Z",
"severity": "MODERATE"
},
"details": "## Summary\n\nThe legacy TUF client `pkg/tuf/client.go`, which supports caching target files to disk, constructs a filesystem path by joining a cache base directory with a target name sourced from signed target metadata, but it does not validate that the resulting path stays within the cache base directory.\n\nNote that this should only affect clients that are directly using the TUF client in sigstore/sigstore or are using an older version of Cosign. As this TUF client implementation is deprecated, users should migrate to https://github.com/sigstore/sigstore-go/tree/main/pkg/tuf as soon as possible.\n\nNote that this does not affect users of the public Sigstore deployment, where TUF metadata is validated by a quorum of trusted collaborators. \n\n## Impact\n\nA malicious TUF repository can trigger arbitrary file overwriting, limited to the permissions that the calling process has.\n\n## Workarounds\n\nUsers can disable disk caching for the legacy client by setting `SIGSTORE_NO_CACHE=true` in the environment, migrate to https://github.com/sigstore/sigstore-go/tree/main/pkg/tuf, or upgrade to the latest sigstore/sigstore release.",
"id": "GHSA-fcv2-xgw5-pqxf",
"modified": "2026-02-27T21:37:24Z",
"published": "2026-01-22T20:28:56Z",
"references": [
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://github.com/sigstore/sigstore/security/advisories/GHSA-fcv2-xgw5-pqxf"
},
{
"type": "ADVISORY",
"url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2026-24137"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://github.com/sigstore/sigstore/commit/8ec410a2993ea78083aecf0e473a85453039496e"
},
{
"type": "PACKAGE",
"url": "https://github.com/sigstore/sigstore"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://github.com/sigstore/sigstore/releases/tag/v1.10.4"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://pkg.go.dev/vuln/GO-2026-4358"
}
],
"schema_version": "1.4.0",
"severity": [
{
"score": "CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:H/PR:H/UI:N/S:C/C:N/I:H/A:N",
"type": "CVSS_V3"
}
],
"summary": "sigstore legacy TUF client allows for arbitrary file writes with target cache path traversal"
}
GHSA-FPHV-W9FQ-2525
Vulnerability from github – Published: 2026-01-21 16:19 – Updated: 2026-01-22 15:43Security Disclosure: Improper validation of configured threshold for delegations
Summary
A compromised or misconfigured TUF repository can have the configured value of signature thresholds set to 0, which effectively disables signature verification.
Impact
Unathorized modification to TUF metadata files is possible at rest, or during transit as no integrity checks are made.
Patches
Upgrade to v2.3.1
Workarounds
Always make sure that the TUF metadata roles are configured with a threshold of at least 1.
Affected code:
The metadata.VerifyDelegate did not verify the configured threshold prior to comparison. This means that a misconfigured TUF repository could disable the signature verification by setting the threshold to 0, or a negative value (and so always make the signature threshold computation to pass).
{
"affected": [
{
"package": {
"ecosystem": "Go",
"name": "github.com/theupdateframework/go-tuf/v2"
},
"ranges": [
{
"events": [
{
"introduced": "0"
},
{
"fixed": "2.3.1"
}
],
"type": "ECOSYSTEM"
}
]
}
],
"aliases": [
"CVE-2026-23992"
],
"database_specific": {
"cwe_ids": [
"CWE-347"
],
"github_reviewed": true,
"github_reviewed_at": "2026-01-21T16:19:32Z",
"nvd_published_at": "2026-01-22T03:15:47Z",
"severity": "MODERATE"
},
"details": "# Security Disclosure: Improper validation of configured threshold for delegations\n\n## Summary\n\nA compromised or misconfigured TUF repository can have the configured value of signature thresholds set to 0, which effectively disables signature verification. \n\n## Impact\n\nUnathorized modification to TUF metadata files is possible at rest, or during transit as no integrity checks are made.\n\n## Patches\n\nUpgrade to v2.3.1\n\n## Workarounds\n\nAlways make sure that the TUF metadata roles are configured with a threshold of at least 1.\n\n## Affected code:\n\nThe `metadata.VerifyDelegate` did not verify the configured threshold prior to comparison. This means that a misconfigured TUF repository could disable the signature verification by setting the threshold to 0, or a negative value (and so always make the signature threshold computation to pass).",
"id": "GHSA-fphv-w9fq-2525",
"modified": "2026-01-22T15:43:46Z",
"published": "2026-01-21T16:19:32Z",
"references": [
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://github.com/theupdateframework/go-tuf/security/advisories/GHSA-fphv-w9fq-2525"
},
{
"type": "ADVISORY",
"url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2026-23992"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://github.com/theupdateframework/go-tuf/commit/b38d91fdbc69dfe31fe9230d97dafe527ea854a0"
},
{
"type": "PACKAGE",
"url": "https://github.com/theupdateframework/go-tuf"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://github.com/theupdateframework/go-tuf/releases/tag/v2.3.1"
}
],
"schema_version": "1.4.0",
"severity": [
{
"score": "CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:H/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:N/I:H/A:N",
"type": "CVSS_V3"
}
],
"summary": "go-tuf improperly validates the configured threshold for delegations"
}
GHSA-JQC5-W2XX-5VQ4
Vulnerability from github – Published: 2026-01-26 23:49 – Updated: 2026-01-29 03:26Security Vulnerability: Path Traversal in TAP 4 Multirepo Client
Summary
go-tuf's TAP 4 Multirepo Client uses the map file repository name string (repoName) as a filesystem path component when selecting the local metadata cache directory. If an application accepts a map file from an untrusted source, an attacker can supply a repoName containing traversal (e.g., ../escaped-repo) and cause go-tuf to create directories and write the root metadata file outside the intended LocalMetadataDir cache base, within the running process's filesystem permissions.
Affected Component
| Field | Value |
|---|---|
| File | metadata/multirepo/multirepo.go |
| Function | (*MultiRepoClient) initTUFClients() error |
| Callsite | metadataDir := filepath.Join(client.Config.LocalMetadataDir, repoName) (around line 129 at the pinned commit) |
Impact
When the TAP 4 map file content is attacker-controlled, this enables arbitrary file write relative to the process permissions (via metadata persistence during client initialization). This can be used to overwrite files writable by the process (for example, configuration files in writable directories) and may enable further compromise depending on the deployment environment.
Note: Exploitability is deployment-dependent. If the map file is always local and trusted (not attacker-controlled), this reduces to a misconfiguration risk rather than a remotely triggerable issue.
Attacker Model
- Attacker can cause the application to load a TAP 4 map file whose
repositorieskeys are attacker-controlled (for example: fetched from a URL, supply-chain substituted, or otherwise attacker-influenced input). - Local caching is enabled (
DisableLocalCache=false) and the configuredLocalMetadataDiris writable by the running process.
Claim Ceiling: HIGH when the map file is attacker-controlled; if the map file is always local and trusted, this is closer to a configuration footgun and likely lands as MEDIUM/LOW.
| Field | Value |
|---|---|
| Affected Versions | ≤ 2.4.0 |
| Verified On | Commit bde5f18dc95dfac365fc452ee4e278e5fd66d4b4 (tag v2.4.0) |
Note: First affected version has not been bisected.
Reproduction
Attachments include poc.zip with:
- canonical.log (contains [CALLSITE_HIT], [PROOF_MARKER])
- control.log (contains [CALLSITE_HIT], [NC_MARKER], does not contain [PROOF_MARKER])
- fix.patch (minimal validation sketch)
Expected: Multirepo repository names are treated as identifiers; a TAP 4 map file containing traversal or absolute paths is rejected (or safely normalized so that all writes stay under LocalMetadataDir).
Actual: A traversal repoName escapes LocalMetadataDir and go-tuf persists root.json under the escaped path during initialization.
Run Local Repro
rm -rf _poc
mkdir -p _poc
unzip -q -o poc.zip -d _poc
cd _poc/poc
make canonical
make control
Workarounds
- Treat TAP 4 map files as trusted configuration only (do not fetch from untrusted sources).
- Validate repo names before passing the map file to go-tuf (reject absolute paths, path separators, and traversal components like
./..). - If acceptable for the application, disable local caching to avoid writing metadata to disk (
DisableLocalCache=true).
Suggested Remediation
Validate multirepo repository names as identifiers (not paths) before using them in filepath.Join. Reject:
- Absolute paths
- Path separators (/ and \)
- Traversal components (. and ..)
If it is important to accept a wider set of repo names, a safer alternative is to map repo names to a stable, validated directory name (for example via encoding or hashing) and to ensure all writes stay under the cache base directory.
Triage Questions
- Is the TAP 4 map file expected to ever be fetched from untrusted sources in supported deployments?
- Should invalid repo names be treated as a hard error (reject initialization), or as a soft error (skip that repository entry)?
Attachments
Reported by: Oleh
{
"affected": [
{
"package": {
"ecosystem": "Go",
"name": "github.com/theupdateframework/go-tuf/v2"
},
"ranges": [
{
"events": [
{
"introduced": "0"
},
{
"fixed": "2.4.1"
}
],
"type": "ECOSYSTEM"
}
]
}
],
"aliases": [
"CVE-2026-24686"
],
"database_specific": {
"cwe_ids": [
"CWE-22"
],
"github_reviewed": true,
"github_reviewed_at": "2026-01-26T23:49:55Z",
"nvd_published_at": "2026-01-27T01:16:02Z",
"severity": "MODERATE"
},
"details": "# Security Vulnerability: Path Traversal in TAP 4 Multirepo Client\n\n## Summary\n\ngo-tuf\u0027s TAP 4 Multirepo Client uses the map file repository name string (`repoName`) as a filesystem path component when selecting the local metadata cache directory. If an application accepts a map file from an untrusted source, an attacker can supply a `repoName` containing traversal (e.g., `../escaped-repo`) and cause go-tuf to create directories and write the root metadata file outside the intended `LocalMetadataDir` cache base, within the running process\u0027s filesystem permissions.\n\n## Affected Component\n\n| Field | Value |\n|-------|-------|\n| **File** | `metadata/multirepo/multirepo.go` |\n| **Function** | `(*MultiRepoClient) initTUFClients() error` |\n| **Callsite** | `metadataDir := filepath.Join(client.Config.LocalMetadataDir, repoName)` (around line 129 at the pinned commit) |\n\n## Impact\n\nWhen the TAP 4 map file content is attacker-controlled, this enables arbitrary file write relative to the process permissions (via metadata persistence during client initialization). This can be used to overwrite files writable by the process (for example, configuration files in writable directories) and may enable further compromise depending on the deployment environment.\n\n\u003e **Note:** Exploitability is deployment-dependent. If the map file is always local and trusted (not attacker-controlled), this reduces to a misconfiguration risk rather than a remotely triggerable issue.\n\n## Attacker Model\n\n- Attacker can cause the application to load a TAP 4 map file whose `repositories` keys are attacker-controlled (for example: fetched from a URL, supply-chain substituted, or otherwise attacker-influenced input).\n- Local caching is enabled (`DisableLocalCache=false`) and the configured `LocalMetadataDir` is writable by the running process.\n\n**Claim Ceiling:** HIGH when the map file is attacker-controlled; if the map file is always local and trusted, this is closer to a configuration footgun and likely lands as MEDIUM/LOW.\n\n| Field | Value |\n|-------|-------|\n| **Affected Versions** | \u2264 2.4.0 |\n| **Verified On** | Commit `bde5f18dc95dfac365fc452ee4e278e5fd66d4b4` (tag v2.4.0) |\n\n\u003e **Note:** First affected version has not been bisected.\n\n## Reproduction\n\nAttachments include `poc.zip` with:\n- `canonical.log` (contains `[CALLSITE_HIT]`, `[PROOF_MARKER]`)\n- `control.log` (contains `[CALLSITE_HIT]`, `[NC_MARKER]`, does not contain `[PROOF_MARKER]`)\n- `fix.patch` (minimal validation sketch)\n\n**Expected:** Multirepo repository names are treated as identifiers; a TAP 4 map file containing traversal or absolute paths is rejected (or safely normalized so that all writes stay under `LocalMetadataDir`).\n\n**Actual:** A traversal `repoName` escapes `LocalMetadataDir` and go-tuf persists `root.json` under the escaped path during initialization.\n\n### Run Local Repro\n\n```bash\nrm -rf _poc\nmkdir -p _poc\nunzip -q -o poc.zip -d _poc\ncd _poc/poc\nmake canonical\nmake control\n```\n\n## Workarounds\n\n1. Treat TAP 4 map files as trusted configuration only (do not fetch from untrusted sources).\n2. Validate repo names before passing the map file to go-tuf (reject absolute paths, path separators, and traversal components like `.` / `..`).\n3. If acceptable for the application, disable local caching to avoid writing metadata to disk (`DisableLocalCache=true`).\n\n## Suggested Remediation\n\nValidate multirepo repository names as identifiers (not paths) before using them in `filepath.Join`. Reject:\n- Absolute paths\n- Path separators (`/` and `\\`)\n- Traversal components (`.` and `..`)\n\nIf it is important to accept a wider set of repo names, a safer alternative is to map repo names to a stable, validated directory name (for example via encoding or hashing) and to ensure all writes stay under the cache base directory.\n\n## Triage Questions\n\n1. Is the TAP 4 map file expected to ever be fetched from untrusted sources in supported deployments?\n2. Should invalid repo names be treated as a hard error (reject initialization), or as a soft error (skip that repository entry)?\n\n## Attachments\n\n- [poc.zip](https://github.com/user-attachments/files/24849854/poc.zip)\n- [addendum.md](https://github.com/user-attachments/files/24849855/addendum.md)\n- [e2e.zip](https://github.com/user-attachments/files/24849856/e2e.zip)\n- [PR_DESCRIPTION.md](https://github.com/user-attachments/files/24849858/PR_DESCRIPTION.md)\n\n---\n\n*Reported by: Oleh*",
"id": "GHSA-jqc5-w2xx-5vq4",
"modified": "2026-01-29T03:26:24Z",
"published": "2026-01-26T23:49:55Z",
"references": [
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://github.com/theupdateframework/go-tuf/security/advisories/GHSA-jqc5-w2xx-5vq4"
},
{
"type": "ADVISORY",
"url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2026-24686"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://github.com/theupdateframework/go-tuf/commit/d361e2ea24e427581343dee5c7a32b485d79fcc0"
},
{
"type": "PACKAGE",
"url": "https://github.com/theupdateframework/go-tuf"
}
],
"schema_version": "1.4.0",
"severity": [
{
"score": "CVSS:3.1/AV:L/AC:H/PR:L/UI:N/S:U/C:N/I:H/A:N",
"type": "CVSS_V3"
}
],
"summary": "go-tuf Path Traversal in TAP 4 Multirepo Client Allows Arbitrary File Write via Malicious Repository Names"
}
Sightings
| Author | Source | Type | Date | Other |
|---|
Nomenclature
- Seen: The vulnerability was mentioned, discussed, or observed by the user.
- Confirmed: The vulnerability has been validated from an analyst's perspective.
- Published Proof of Concept: A public proof of concept is available for this vulnerability.
- Exploited: The vulnerability was observed as exploited by the user who reported the sighting.
- Patched: The vulnerability was observed as successfully patched by the user who reported the sighting.
- Not exploited: The vulnerability was not observed as exploited by the user who reported the sighting.
- Not confirmed: The user expressed doubt about the validity of the vulnerability.
- Not patched: The vulnerability was not observed as successfully patched by the user who reported the sighting.