{
  "affected": [
    {
      "package": {
        "ecosystem": "Go",
        "name": "github.com/gorilla/csrf"
      },
      "ranges": [
        {
          "events": [
            {
              "introduced": "0"
            },
            {
              "fixed": "1.7.3"
            }
          ],
          "type": "ECOSYSTEM"
        }
      ]
    }
  ],
  "aliases": [
    "CVE-2025-24358"
  ],
  "database_specific": {
    "cwe_ids": [
      "CWE-352"
    ],
    "github_reviewed": true,
    "github_reviewed_at": "2025-04-14T15:26:07Z",
    "nvd_published_at": "2025-04-15T19:16:07Z",
    "severity": "MODERATE"
  },
  "details": "### Summary\n\ngorilla/csrf is vulnerable to CSRF via form submission from origins that share a top level domain with the target origin.\n\n### Details\n\ngorilla/csrf does not validate the Origin header against an allowlist. Its executes its validation of the Referer header for cross-origin requests only when it believes the request is being served over TLS. It determines this by inspecting the `r.URL.Scheme` value. However, this value is never populated for \"server\" requests [per the Go spec](https://pkg.go.dev/net/http#Request), and so this check does not run in practice. \n```\n\t// URL specifies either the URI being requested (for server\n\t// requests) or the URL to access (for client requests).\n\t//\n\t// For server requests, the URL is parsed from the URI\n\t// supplied on the Request-Line as stored in RequestURI.  For\n\t// most requests, fields other than Path and RawQuery will be\n\t// empty. (See [RFC 7230, Section 5.3](https://rfc-editor.org/rfc/rfc7230.html#section-5.3))\n\t//\n\t// For client requests, the URL\u0027s Host specifies the server to\n\t// connect to, while the Request\u0027s Host field optionally\n\t// specifies the Host header value to send in the HTTP\n\t// request.\n\tURL *[url](https://pkg.go.dev/net/url).[URL](https://pkg.go.dev/net/url#URL)\n```\n\n### PoC\n\n- create trusted origin `target.example.test` protected with gorilla/csrf and served over TLS hosting form on `/submit`\n- create attacker origin `attack.example.test` served over TLS\n- attacker exfiltrates token \u0026 cookie combination from `target.example.test` \n- attacker sets exfiltrated cookie with `domain=.example.test and path=/submit`\n  - as the cookie has a more specific path than `/` (the default for CSRF cookies) it will be sent first by the browser on submit to our target origin\n- submit form from `attack.example.test` with exfiltrated CSRF form token\n- observe valid form submission as `attack.example.test` Origin / Referer headers are not validated. \n\n### Impact\n\nThis vulnerability allows an attacker who has gained XSS on a subdomain or top level domain to perform authenticated form submissions against gorilla/csrf protected targets that share the same top level domain.\n\nThis bug has existed in gorilla/csrf since its initial release in 2015.",
  "id": "GHSA-rq77-p4h8-4crw",
  "modified": "2025-05-01T12:31:16Z",
  "published": "2025-04-14T15:26:07Z",
  "references": [
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://github.com/gorilla/csrf/security/advisories/GHSA-rq77-p4h8-4crw"
    },
    {
      "type": "ADVISORY",
      "url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2025-24358"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://github.com/gorilla/csrf/commit/9dd6af1f6d30fc79fb0d972394deebdabad6b5eb"
    },
    {
      "type": "PACKAGE",
      "url": "https://github.com/gorilla/csrf"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://lists.debian.org/debian-lts-announce/2025/05/msg00002.html"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://pkg.go.dev/vuln/GO-2025-3607"
    }
  ],
  "schema_version": "1.4.0",
  "severity": [
    {
      "score": "CVSS:4.0/AV:N/AC:L/AT:P/PR:N/UI:P/VC:N/VI:H/VA:N/SC:N/SI:N/SA:N/E:P",
      "type": "CVSS_V4"
    }
  ],
  "summary": "gorilla/csrf CSRF vulnerability due to broken Referer validation"
}