CERTA-2011-AVI-707
Vulnerability from certfr_avis - Published: 2011-12-19 - Updated: 2011-12-19
Deux vulnérabilités ont été corrigées dans EMC RSA Adaptative Authentication On-Premise et permettent à un utilisateur malintentionné de contourner la politique de sécurité.
Description
Deux vulnérabilités ont été corrigées dans EMC RSA Adaptative Authentication On-Premise.
La première permet à un utilisateur malintentionné de contourner certaines restrictions, soit sur un périphérique non enregistré, soit sur un périphérique enregistré en envoyant des données spécialement conçues (CVE-2011-2741).
La seconde permet à un utilisateur malintentionné de contourner des restrictions d'accès à certaines applications.
Solution
Se référer au bulletin de sécurité de l'éditeur pour l'obtention des correctifs (cf. section Documentation).
None| Vendor | Product | Description | ||
|---|---|---|---|---|
| N/A | N/A | EMC RSA Adaptative Authentication On-Premise 6.0.2.1 SP1 Patch 2 ; | ||
| N/A | N/A | EMC RSA Adaptative Authentication On-Premise 6.0.2.1 SP3. | ||
| N/A | N/A | EMC RSA Adaptative Authentication On-Premise 6.0.2.1 SP2 ; | ||
| N/A | N/A | EMC RSA Adaptative Authentication On-Premise 6.0.2.1 SP2 Patch 1 ; | ||
| N/A | N/A | EMC RSA Adaptative Authentication On-Premise 6.0.2.1 SP1 Patch 3 ; |
| Title | Publication Time | Tags | |||
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
|
|||||
{
"$ref": "https://www.cert.ssi.gouv.fr/openapi.json",
"affected_systems": [
{
"description": "EMC RSA Adaptative Authentication On-Premise 6.0.2.1 SP1 Patch 2 ;",
"product": {
"name": "N/A",
"vendor": {
"name": "N/A",
"scada": false
}
}
},
{
"description": "EMC RSA Adaptative Authentication On-Premise 6.0.2.1 SP3.",
"product": {
"name": "N/A",
"vendor": {
"name": "N/A",
"scada": false
}
}
},
{
"description": "EMC RSA Adaptative Authentication On-Premise 6.0.2.1 SP2 ;",
"product": {
"name": "N/A",
"vendor": {
"name": "N/A",
"scada": false
}
}
},
{
"description": "EMC RSA Adaptative Authentication On-Premise 6.0.2.1 SP2 Patch 1 ;",
"product": {
"name": "N/A",
"vendor": {
"name": "N/A",
"scada": false
}
}
},
{
"description": "EMC RSA Adaptative Authentication On-Premise 6.0.2.1 SP1 Patch 3 ;",
"product": {
"name": "N/A",
"vendor": {
"name": "N/A",
"scada": false
}
}
}
],
"affected_systems_content": null,
"content": "## Description\n\nDeux vuln\u00e9rabilit\u00e9s ont \u00e9t\u00e9 corrig\u00e9es dans EMC RSA Adaptative\nAuthentication On-Premise.\n\nLa premi\u00e8re permet \u00e0 un utilisateur malintentionn\u00e9 de contourner\ncertaines restrictions, soit sur un p\u00e9riph\u00e9rique non enregistr\u00e9, soit\nsur un p\u00e9riph\u00e9rique enregistr\u00e9 en envoyant des donn\u00e9es sp\u00e9cialement\ncon\u00e7ues (CVE-2011-2741).\n\nLa seconde permet \u00e0 un utilisateur malintentionn\u00e9 de contourner des\nrestrictions d\u0027acc\u00e8s \u00e0 certaines applications.\n\n## Solution\n\nSe r\u00e9f\u00e9rer au bulletin de s\u00e9curit\u00e9 de l\u0027\u00e9diteur pour l\u0027obtention des\ncorrectifs (cf. section Documentation).\n",
"cves": [
{
"name": "CVE-2011-2742",
"url": "https://www.cve.org/CVERecord?id=CVE-2011-2742"
},
{
"name": "CVE-2011-2741",
"url": "https://www.cve.org/CVERecord?id=CVE-2011-2741"
}
],
"initial_release_date": "2011-12-19T00:00:00",
"last_revision_date": "2011-12-19T00:00:00",
"links": [],
"reference": "CERTA-2011-AVI-707",
"revisions": [
{
"description": "version initiale.",
"revision_date": "2011-12-19T00:00:00.000000"
}
],
"risks": [
{
"description": "Contournement de la politique de s\u00e9curit\u00e9"
}
],
"summary": "Deux vuln\u00e9rabilit\u00e9s ont \u00e9t\u00e9 corrig\u00e9es dans EMC RSA Adaptative\nAuthentication On-Premise et permettent \u00e0 un utilisateur malintentionn\u00e9\nde contourner la politique de s\u00e9curit\u00e9.\n",
"title": "Vuln\u00e9rabilit\u00e9 dans EMC RSA Adaptative Authentication On-Premise",
"vendor_advisories": [
{
"published_at": null,
"title": "Bulletin de s\u00e9curit\u00e9 ESA-2011-036 du 06 d\u00e9cembre 2011",
"url": "http://seclists.org/bugtraq/2011/Dec/att-72/ESA-2011-036.txt"
}
]
}
Drag nodes to arrange them. Double-click a related vulnerability to open it, or a source to visit its link. The Physics button on the left tunes the layout and the simulation; the legend at the bottom left hides or shows nodes by kind and by sighting type.
Sightings
| Author | Source | Type | Date | Other |
|---|
Nomenclature
- Seen: The vulnerability was mentioned, discussed, or observed by the user.
- Confirmed: The vulnerability has been validated from an analyst's perspective.
- Published Proof of Concept: A public proof of concept is available for this vulnerability.
- Exploited: The vulnerability was observed as exploited by the user who reported the sighting.
- Patched: The vulnerability was observed as successfully patched by the user who reported the sighting.
- Not exploited: The vulnerability was not observed as exploited by the user who reported the sighting.
- Not confirmed: The user expressed doubt about the validity of the vulnerability.
- Not patched: The vulnerability was not observed as successfully patched by the user who reported the sighting.
Vulnerability timeline
Sightings and recorded dates, grouped by day · UTC
How durations are calculated
Following the VTEM framework (Black Hat USA 2015), time to patch starts when the vendor or a coordinator was informed, total time to patch at discovery, and disclosure to patch at public disclosure; vendor response time runs from the report to its acknowledgement. Time to exploit and time unpatched start at the earliest discovery or report, falling back to public disclosure. Unpatched time ends at the first recorded patch, or the calculation time when no patch is recorded. Exploitation to patch shows the interval between those two events; a published proof of concept is a public exploit, not exploitation.
Each result shows its source dates. A negative interval means the end event came first; when date-only inputs leave the order open, the result says so. Date-only inputs are approximate. The earliest evidence wins: KEV report dates and sightings are labelled as such. Records describing another vulnerability are listed but never calculated from, and a PoC alone does not establish exploitation. Missing patch evidence does not prove that no patch exists. Filters below change the event list only.
Loading timeline…
The approach is described in our paper Mapping CVEs to MITRE ATT&CK Techniques: A Curated Gold-Set Classifier and the Limits of LLM-Assisted Label Expansion.
Browse all ATT&CK techniques and the vulnerabilities related to each.
Related by attack behaviour
Vulnerabilities whose description is nearest to this one in the vector space of the CIRCL/vulnerability-attack-technique-biencoder model. This is a similarity search over the bi-encoder space (plain cosine), not a classification, and it has no measured accuracy.