CERTA-2011-AVI-462
Vulnerability from certfr_avis - Published: 2011-08-22 - Updated: 2011-08-22
Une vulnérabilité permettant de contourner la politique de sécurité a été découverte dans EMC RSA Adaptive Authentication On-Premise (AAOP).
Description
Une faille a été découverte dans EMC RSA Adaptive Authentication On-Premise (AAOP). Cette vulnérabilité utilise le fait que AAOP autorise le rejeu de la procédure d'authentification durant une session. Un utilisateur authentifié est alors en mesure de rejouer cette procédure afin de contourner certaines restrictions de sécurité. Il est cependant nécessaire que cette personne dispose d'un moyen d'intercepter les données échangées lors de la procédure initiale.
Solution
Se référer au bulletin de sécurité de l'éditeur pour l'obtention des correctifs (cf. section Documentation).
None| Title | Publication Time | Tags | |||
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
|
|||||
{
"$ref": "https://www.cert.ssi.gouv.fr/openapi.json",
"affected_systems": [
{
"description": "EMC RSA Adaptive Authentication On-Premise version 6.0.2.1 SP2 et SP2 Patch 1 ;",
"product": {
"name": "N/A",
"vendor": {
"name": "N/A",
"scada": false
}
}
},
{
"description": "EMC RSA Adaptive Authentication On-Premise version 6.0.2.1 SP1 Patch 2 et SP1 Patch 3 ;",
"product": {
"name": "N/A",
"vendor": {
"name": "N/A",
"scada": false
}
}
},
{
"description": "EMC RSA Adaptive Authentication On-Premise version 6.0.2.1 SP3.",
"product": {
"name": "N/A",
"vendor": {
"name": "N/A",
"scada": false
}
}
}
],
"affected_systems_content": null,
"content": "## Description\n\nUne faille a \u00e9t\u00e9 d\u00e9couverte dans EMC RSA Adaptive Authentication\nOn-Premise (AAOP). Cette vuln\u00e9rabilit\u00e9 utilise le fait que AAOP autorise\nle rejeu de la proc\u00e9dure d\u0027authentification durant une session. Un\nutilisateur authentifi\u00e9 est alors en mesure de rejouer cette proc\u00e9dure\nafin de contourner certaines restrictions de s\u00e9curit\u00e9. Il est cependant\nn\u00e9cessaire que cette personne dispose d\u0027un moyen d\u0027intercepter les\ndonn\u00e9es \u00e9chang\u00e9es lors de la proc\u00e9dure initiale.\n\n## Solution\n\nSe r\u00e9f\u00e9rer au bulletin de s\u00e9curit\u00e9 de l\u0027\u00e9diteur pour l\u0027obtention des\ncorrectifs (cf. section Documentation).\n",
"cves": [
{
"name": "CVE-2011-2733",
"url": "https://www.cve.org/CVERecord?id=CVE-2011-2733"
}
],
"initial_release_date": "2011-08-22T00:00:00",
"last_revision_date": "2011-08-22T00:00:00",
"links": [],
"reference": "CERTA-2011-AVI-462",
"revisions": [
{
"description": "version initiale.",
"revision_date": "2011-08-22T00:00:00.000000"
}
],
"risks": [
{
"description": "Contournement de la politique de s\u00e9curit\u00e9"
}
],
"summary": "Une vuln\u00e9rabilit\u00e9 permettant de contourner la politique de s\u00e9curit\u00e9 a\n\u00e9t\u00e9 d\u00e9couverte dans EMC RSA Adaptive Authentication On-Premise (AAOP).\n",
"title": "Vuln\u00e9rabilit\u00e9 dans EMC RSA Adaptive Authentication On-Premise",
"vendor_advisories": [
{
"published_at": null,
"title": "Bulletin de s\u00e9curit\u00e9 ESA-2011-027 du 11 ao\u00fbt 2011",
"url": "http://seclists.org/bugtraq/2011/Aug/att-126/ESA-2011-027.txt"
}
]
}
Drag nodes to arrange them. Double-click a related vulnerability to open it, or a source to visit its link. The Physics button on the left tunes the layout and the simulation; the legend at the bottom left hides or shows nodes by kind and by sighting type.
Sightings
| Author | Source | Type | Date | Other |
|---|
Nomenclature
- Seen: The vulnerability was mentioned, discussed, or observed by the user.
- Confirmed: The vulnerability has been validated from an analyst's perspective.
- Published Proof of Concept: A public proof of concept is available for this vulnerability.
- Exploited: The vulnerability was observed as exploited by the user who reported the sighting.
- Patched: The vulnerability was observed as successfully patched by the user who reported the sighting.
- Not exploited: The vulnerability was not observed as exploited by the user who reported the sighting.
- Not confirmed: The user expressed doubt about the validity of the vulnerability.
- Not patched: The vulnerability was not observed as successfully patched by the user who reported the sighting.
Vulnerability timeline
Sightings and recorded dates, grouped by day · UTC
How durations are calculated
Following the VTEM framework (Black Hat USA 2015), time to patch starts when the vendor or a coordinator was informed, total time to patch at discovery, and disclosure to patch at public disclosure; vendor response time runs from the report to its acknowledgement. Time to exploit and time unpatched start at the earliest discovery or report, falling back to public disclosure. Unpatched time ends at the first recorded patch, or the calculation time when no patch is recorded. Exploitation to patch shows the interval between those two events; a published proof of concept is a public exploit, not exploitation.
Each result shows its source dates. A negative interval means the end event came first; when date-only inputs leave the order open, the result says so. Date-only inputs are approximate. The earliest evidence wins: KEV report dates and sightings are labelled as such. Records describing another vulnerability are listed but never calculated from, and a PoC alone does not establish exploitation. Missing patch evidence does not prove that no patch exists. Filters below change the event list only.
Loading timeline…
The approach is described in our paper Mapping CVEs to MITRE ATT&CK Techniques: A Curated Gold-Set Classifier and the Limits of LLM-Assisted Label Expansion.
Browse all ATT&CK techniques and the vulnerabilities related to each.
Related by attack behaviour
Vulnerabilities whose description is nearest to this one in the vector space of the CIRCL/vulnerability-attack-technique-biencoder model. This is a similarity search over the bi-encoder space (plain cosine), not a classification, and it has no measured accuracy.