CERTA-2010-AVI-208

Vulnerability from certfr_avis - Published: 2010-05-12 - Updated: 2010-05-12

Une vulnérabilité dans Cisco IronPort Desktop Flag Plug-in for Outlook provoque l'envoi en clair de messages électroniques censés être chiffrés.

Description

Le module Cisco IronPort Desktop Flag Plug-in for Outlook permet aux utilisateurs de Microsoft Outlook d'envoyer des messages chiffrés via un boîtier Cisco IronPort Encryption Appliance ou Email Security Appliance.

Si plusieurs messages électroniques sont rédigés simultanément et que le bouton Send Secure est utilisé pour l'envoi, alors il se peut que seul le premier de ces messages soit chiffré.

Solution

Se référer au bulletin de sécurité de l'éditeur pour l'obtention des correctifs (cf. section Documentation).

Cisco IronPort Desktop Flag Plug-in for Outlook versions 6.2.4.3 à 6.5.0-006 (non incluse).

Impacted products
Vendor Product Description

Show details on source website

{
  "$ref": "https://www.cert.ssi.gouv.fr/openapi.json",
  "affected_systems": [],
  "affected_systems_content": "\u003cP\u003e\u003cSPAN class=\"textit\"\u003eCisco IronPort Desktop Flag Plug-in for  Outlook\u003c/SPAN\u003e versions 6.2.4.3 \u00e0 6.5.0-006 (non incluse).\u003c/P\u003e",
  "content": "## Description\n\nLe module Cisco IronPort Desktop Flag Plug-in for Outlook permet aux\nutilisateurs de Microsoft Outlook d\u0027envoyer des messages chiffr\u00e9s via un\nbo\u00eetier Cisco IronPort Encryption Appliance ou Email Security Appliance.\n\nSi plusieurs messages \u00e9lectroniques sont r\u00e9dig\u00e9s simultan\u00e9ment et que le\nbouton Send Secure est utilis\u00e9 pour l\u0027envoi, alors il se peut que seul\nle premier de ces messages soit chiffr\u00e9.\n\n## Solution\n\nSe r\u00e9f\u00e9rer au bulletin de s\u00e9curit\u00e9 de l\u0027\u00e9diteur pour l\u0027obtention des\ncorrectifs (cf. section Documentation).\n",
  "cves": [
    {
      "name": "CVE-2010-1568",
      "url": "https://www.cve.org/CVERecord?id=CVE-2010-1568"
    }
  ],
  "initial_release_date": "2010-05-12T00:00:00",
  "last_revision_date": "2010-05-12T00:00:00",
  "links": [
    {
      "title": "Bulletin de s\u00e9curit\u00e9 Cisco 20100511-ironport du 11 mai 2010    :",
      "url": "http://www.cisco.com/warp/public/707/cisco-sr-20100511-ironport.shtml"
    }
  ],
  "reference": "CERTA-2010-AVI-208",
  "revisions": [
    {
      "description": "version initiale.",
      "revision_date": "2010-05-12T00:00:00.000000"
    }
  ],
  "risks": [
    {
      "description": "Contournement de la politique de s\u00e9curit\u00e9"
    }
  ],
  "summary": "Une vuln\u00e9rabilit\u00e9 dans \u003cspan class=\"textit\"\u003eCisco IronPort Desktop Flag\nPlug-in for Outlook\u003c/span\u003e provoque l\u0027envoi en clair de messages\n\u00e9lectroniques cens\u00e9s \u00eatre chiffr\u00e9s.\n",
  "title": "Vuln\u00e9rabilit\u00e9 dans Cisco IronPort Desktop Flag Plug-in for Outlook",
  "vendor_advisories": [
    {
      "published_at": null,
      "title": "Bulletin de s\u00e9curit\u00e9 cisco-sr-20100511-ironport du 11 mai 2010",
      "url": null
    }
  ]
}



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