CERTA-2010-AVI-134
Vulnerability from certfr_avis - Published: 2010-03-25 - Updated: 2010-03-25
Deux vulnérabilités dans Cisco Unified Communications Manager Express (CME) permettent de réaliser un déni de service à distance.
Description
Deux vulnérabilités ont été découvertes dans Cisco Unified Communications Manager Express. Une personne malintentionnée peut, à l'aide de paquets SCCP spécifiques, provoquer un redémarrage du matériel à distance. L'attaque nécessite d'avoir enregistré auprès de l'appareil ciblé l'adresse IP du téléphone de l'attaquant. Toutefois, si la fonctionnalité d'enregistrement automatique est activée (ce qui est le cas par défaut), l'attaque peut immédiatement suivre l'enregistrement de l'adresse IP.
Solution
Se référer au bulletin de sécurité de l'éditeur pour l'obtention des correctifs (cf. section Documentation).
Appareils Cisco IOS (incluant Cisco Unified Communications 500 Series) configurés pour les fonctionnalités Cisco Unified CME ou Cisco Unified SRST.
Une liste plus détaillée des systèmes affectés est disponible dans l'avis de l'éditeur.
| Vendor | Product | Description |
|---|
| Title | Publication Time | Tags | ||||||
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
|
||||||||
{
"$ref": "https://www.cert.ssi.gouv.fr/openapi.json",
"affected_systems": [],
"affected_systems_content": "\u003cP\u003eAppareils \u003cSPAN class=\"textit\"\u003eCisco IOS\u003c/SPAN\u003e (incluant \u003cSPAN class=\"textit\"\u003eCisco Unified Communications 500 Series\u003c/SPAN\u003e) configur\u00e9s pour les fonctionnalit\u00e9s \u003cSPAN class=\n \"textit\"\u003eCisco Unified CME\u003c/SPAN\u003e ou \u003cSPAN class=\"textit\"\u003eCisco Unified SRST\u003c/SPAN\u003e.\u003c/P\u003e \u003cP\u003eUne liste plus d\u00e9taill\u00e9e des syst\u00e8mes affect\u00e9s est disponible dans l\u0027avis de l\u0027\u00e9diteur.\u003c/P\u003e",
"content": "## Description\n\nDeux vuln\u00e9rabilit\u00e9s ont \u00e9t\u00e9 d\u00e9couvertes dans Cisco Unified\nCommunications Manager Express. Une personne malintentionn\u00e9e peut, \u00e0\nl\u0027aide de paquets SCCP sp\u00e9cifiques, provoquer un red\u00e9marrage du mat\u00e9riel\n\u00e0 distance. L\u0027attaque n\u00e9cessite d\u0027avoir enregistr\u00e9 aupr\u00e8s de l\u0027appareil\ncibl\u00e9 l\u0027adresse IP du t\u00e9l\u00e9phone de l\u0027attaquant. Toutefois, si la\nfonctionnalit\u00e9 d\u0027enregistrement automatique est activ\u00e9e (ce qui est le\ncas par d\u00e9faut), l\u0027attaque peut imm\u00e9diatement suivre l\u0027enregistrement de\nl\u0027adresse IP.\n\n## Solution\n\nSe r\u00e9f\u00e9rer au bulletin de s\u00e9curit\u00e9 de l\u0027\u00e9diteur pour l\u0027obtention des\ncorrectifs (cf. section Documentation).\n",
"cves": [
{
"name": "CVE-2010-0586",
"url": "https://www.cve.org/CVERecord?id=CVE-2010-0586"
},
{
"name": "CVE-2010-0585",
"url": "https://www.cve.org/CVERecord?id=CVE-2010-0585"
}
],
"initial_release_date": "2010-03-25T00:00:00",
"last_revision_date": "2010-03-25T00:00:00",
"links": [
{
"title": "Bulletin de s\u00e9curit\u00e9 Cisco 20100324-cucme du 24 mars 2010 :",
"url": "http://www.cisco.com/warp/public/707/cisco-sa-20100324-cucme.shtml"
}
],
"reference": "CERTA-2010-AVI-134",
"revisions": [
{
"description": "version initiale.",
"revision_date": "2010-03-25T00:00:00.000000"
}
],
"risks": [
{
"description": "D\u00e9ni de service \u00e0 distance"
}
],
"summary": "Deux vuln\u00e9rabilit\u00e9s dans \u003cspan class=\"textit\"\u003eCisco Unified\nCommunications Manager Express\u003c/span\u003e (CME) permettent de r\u00e9aliser un\nd\u00e9ni de service \u00e0 distance.\n",
"title": "Vuln\u00e9rabilit\u00e9s dans Cisco Unified Communications Manager Express",
"vendor_advisories": [
{
"published_at": null,
"title": "Bulletin de s\u00e9curit\u00e9 cisco-sa-20100324-cucme du 24 mars 2010",
"url": null
}
]
}
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