CERTA-2009-AVI-255

Vulnerability from certfr_avis - Published: 2009-06-25 - Updated: 2009-06-25

Des vulnérabilités affectent des produits de vidéosurveillance Cisco et permettent à un utilisateur malveillant de provoquer un déni de service à distance ou de lire indûment des informations.

Description

Une vulnérabilité est présente dans Cisco Video Surveillance Stream Manager (CVE-2009-2045). Un utilisateur malveillant peut provoquer un redémarrage du système par le biais d'un paquet UDP particulier sur le port 37000.

Une vulnérabilité affecte les caméras IP de la série 2500, avec ou sans fil (CVE-2009-2046). Un utilisateur authentifié peut lire tout fichier présent sur la caméra au travers du serveur web embarqué, via le port 80 (HTTP) ou le port 443 (HTTPS).

Solution

Se référer au bulletin de sécurité de l'éditeur pour l'obtention des correctifs (cf. section Documentation).

None
Impacted products
Vendor Product Description
Cisco N/A Cisco Video Surveillance 2500 Series IP Camera firmware, versions antérieures à la version 2.1.
Cisco N/A Cisco Video Surveillance Stream Manager for the Cisco Video Surveillance Services Platform, versions antérieures à la version 5.3 ;
Cisco N/A Cisco Video Surveillance Stream Manager for the Cisco Video Surveillance Integrated Services Platform, versions antérieures à la version 5.3 ;
References

Show details on source website

{
  "$ref": "https://www.cert.ssi.gouv.fr/openapi.json",
  "affected_systems": [
    {
      "description": "Cisco Video Surveillance 2500 Series IP Camera firmware, versions ant\u00e9rieures \u00e0 la version 2.1.",
      "product": {
        "name": "N/A",
        "vendor": {
          "name": "Cisco",
          "scada": false
        }
      }
    },
    {
      "description": "Cisco Video Surveillance Stream Manager for the Cisco Video Surveillance Services Platform, versions ant\u00e9rieures \u00e0 la version 5.3 ;",
      "product": {
        "name": "N/A",
        "vendor": {
          "name": "Cisco",
          "scada": false
        }
      }
    },
    {
      "description": "Cisco Video Surveillance Stream Manager for the Cisco Video Surveillance Integrated Services Platform, versions ant\u00e9rieures \u00e0 la version 5.3 ;",
      "product": {
        "name": "N/A",
        "vendor": {
          "name": "Cisco",
          "scada": false
        }
      }
    }
  ],
  "affected_systems_content": null,
  "content": "## Description\n\nUne vuln\u00e9rabilit\u00e9 est pr\u00e9sente dans Cisco Video Surveillance Stream\nManager (CVE-2009-2045). Un utilisateur malveillant peut provoquer un\nred\u00e9marrage du syst\u00e8me par le biais d\u0027un paquet UDP particulier sur le\nport 37000.\n\nUne vuln\u00e9rabilit\u00e9 affecte les cam\u00e9ras IP de la s\u00e9rie 2500, avec ou sans\nfil (CVE-2009-2046). Un utilisateur authentifi\u00e9 peut lire tout fichier\npr\u00e9sent sur la cam\u00e9ra au travers du serveur web embarqu\u00e9, via le port 80\n(HTTP) ou le port 443 (HTTPS).\n\n## Solution\n\nSe r\u00e9f\u00e9rer au bulletin de s\u00e9curit\u00e9 de l\u0027\u00e9diteur pour l\u0027obtention des\ncorrectifs (cf. section Documentation).\n",
  "cves": [
    {
      "name": "CVE-2009-2046",
      "url": "https://www.cve.org/CVERecord?id=CVE-2009-2046"
    },
    {
      "name": "CVE-2009-2045",
      "url": "https://www.cve.org/CVERecord?id=CVE-2009-2045"
    }
  ],
  "initial_release_date": "2009-06-25T00:00:00",
  "last_revision_date": "2009-06-25T00:00:00",
  "links": [
    {
      "title": "Bulletin de s\u00e9curit\u00e9 Cisco 20090624-video du 24 juin 2009 :",
      "url": "http://www.cisco.com/warp/public/707/cisco-sa-20090624-video.shtml"
    }
  ],
  "reference": "CERTA-2009-AVI-255",
  "revisions": [
    {
      "description": "version initiale.",
      "revision_date": "2009-06-25T00:00:00.000000"
    }
  ],
  "risks": [
    {
      "description": "D\u00e9ni de service \u00e0 distance"
    },
    {
      "description": "Atteinte \u00e0 la confidentialit\u00e9 des donn\u00e9es"
    }
  ],
  "summary": "Des vuln\u00e9rabilit\u00e9s affectent des produits de vid\u00e9osurveillance Cisco et\npermettent \u00e0 un utilisateur malveillant de provoquer un d\u00e9ni de service\n\u00e0 distance ou de lire ind\u00fbment des informations.\n",
  "title": "Vuln\u00e9rabilit\u00e9s de produits Cisco Video Surveillance",
  "vendor_advisories": []
}



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