CERTA-2009-AVI-102

Vulnerability from certfr_avis - Published: 2009-03-18 - Updated: 2009-03-18

Une vulnérabilité a été identifiée dans le serveur de téléphonie sur IP Asterisk. Un message SIP construit de manière particulière peut perturber le fonctionnement du service.

Description

Une vulnérabilité a été identifiée dans le serveur de téléphonie sur IP Asterisk. Elle concerne les fonctions sip_uri_headers_cmp() et sip_uri_params_cmp() qui ne manipulent pas correctement les informations contenues par certaines trames. Cette vulnérabilité fonctionne avec l'option de configuration pedantic activée. La vulnérabilité peut être exploitée par une personne distante pour perturber le fonctionnement du service de téléphonie.

Solution

Se référer au bulletin de sécurité AST-2009-002 pour l'obtention des correctifs (cf. section Documentation).

None
Impacted products
Vendor Product Description
Asterisk Asterisk Asterisk Business Edition version C.2.3.
Asterisk Asterisk Asterisk Open Source, branche 1.4.x pour les versions 1.4.22, 1.4.23 et 1.4.23.1 (sans à la révision 174082) ;
Asterisk Asterisk Asterisk Open Source, branche 1.6.0.x pour les versions antérieures à 1.6.0.6 (sans la révision 174085) ;
Asterisk Asterisk Asterisk Open Source, branche 1.6.1.x pour les versions antérieures à 1.6.1.0-rc2 (sans la révision 174086) ;

Show details on source website

{
  "$ref": "https://www.cert.ssi.gouv.fr/openapi.json",
  "affected_systems": [
    {
      "description": "Asterisk Business Edition version C.2.3.",
      "product": {
        "name": "Asterisk",
        "vendor": {
          "name": "Asterisk",
          "scada": false
        }
      }
    },
    {
      "description": "Asterisk Open Source, branche 1.4.x pour les versions 1.4.22, 1.4.23 et 1.4.23.1 (sans \u00e0 la r\u00e9vision 174082) ;",
      "product": {
        "name": "Asterisk",
        "vendor": {
          "name": "Asterisk",
          "scada": false
        }
      }
    },
    {
      "description": "Asterisk Open Source, branche 1.6.0.x pour les versions ant\u00e9rieures \u00e0 1.6.0.6 (sans la r\u00e9vision 174085) ;",
      "product": {
        "name": "Asterisk",
        "vendor": {
          "name": "Asterisk",
          "scada": false
        }
      }
    },
    {
      "description": "Asterisk Open Source, branche 1.6.1.x pour les versions ant\u00e9rieures \u00e0 1.6.1.0-rc2 (sans la r\u00e9vision 174086) ;",
      "product": {
        "name": "Asterisk",
        "vendor": {
          "name": "Asterisk",
          "scada": false
        }
      }
    }
  ],
  "affected_systems_content": null,
  "content": "## Description\n\nUne vuln\u00e9rabilit\u00e9 a \u00e9t\u00e9 identifi\u00e9e dans le serveur de t\u00e9l\u00e9phonie sur IP\nAsterisk. Elle concerne les fonctions sip_uri_headers_cmp() et\nsip_uri_params_cmp() qui ne manipulent pas correctement les informations\ncontenues par certaines trames. Cette vuln\u00e9rabilit\u00e9 fonctionne avec\nl\u0027option de configuration pedantic activ\u00e9e. La vuln\u00e9rabilit\u00e9 peut \u00eatre\nexploit\u00e9e par une personne distante pour perturber le fonctionnement du\nservice de t\u00e9l\u00e9phonie.\n\n## Solution\n\nSe r\u00e9f\u00e9rer au bulletin de s\u00e9curit\u00e9 AST-2009-002 pour l\u0027obtention des\ncorrectifs (cf. section Documentation).\n",
  "cves": [
    {
      "name": "CVE-2009-0871",
      "url": "https://www.cve.org/CVERecord?id=CVE-2009-0871"
    }
  ],
  "initial_release_date": "2009-03-18T00:00:00",
  "last_revision_date": "2009-03-18T00:00:00",
  "links": [
    {
      "title": "Site du projet Asterisk\u00a0:",
      "url": "http://www.asterisk.org/security"
    },
    {
      "title": "Bulletin de s\u00e9curit\u00e9 AST-2009-002 de digium Asterisk du 10    mars 2009\u00a0:",
      "url": "http://downloads.digium.com/pub/security/AST-2009-002.html"
    }
  ],
  "reference": "CERTA-2009-AVI-102",
  "revisions": [
    {
      "description": "version initiale.",
      "revision_date": "2009-03-18T00:00:00.000000"
    }
  ],
  "risks": [
    {
      "description": "D\u00e9ni de service \u00e0 distance"
    }
  ],
  "summary": "Une vuln\u00e9rabilit\u00e9 a \u00e9t\u00e9 identifi\u00e9e dans le serveur de t\u00e9l\u00e9phonie sur IP\nAsterisk. Un message SIP construit de mani\u00e8re particuli\u00e8re peut\nperturber le fonctionnement du service.\n",
  "title": "Vuln\u00e9rabilit\u00e9 dans Asterisk",
  "vendor_advisories": [
    {
      "published_at": null,
      "title": "Bulletin de s\u00e9curit\u00e9 Asterisk AST-2009-002 du 10 mars 2009",
      "url": null
    }
  ]
}



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