CERTA-2006-AVI-462
Vulnerability from certfr_avis - Published: 2006-10-24 - Updated: 2006-10-24
De multiples vulnérabilités présentes dans Novell eDirectory permettent à un utilisateur mal intentionné d'exécuter du code arbitraire à distance ou de réaliser un déni de service.
Description
NCP (NetWare Core Protocol) est le principal protocole utilisé par
Novell pour la transmission d'information entre le serveur NetWare et
ses clients.
Deux vulnérabilités de type dépassement de mémoire existent dans le
protocole NCP permettant à un utilisateur distant mal intentionné de
réaliser un deni de service, d'exécuter du code arbitraire ou de faire
anormalement grossir les journaux d'événements de Novell eDirectory.
Deux autres vulnérabilités existent dans la fonction
evtFilteredMonitorEventsRequest dues à une mauvaise gestion de
l'allocation et de la libération de la mémoire. Ces vulnérabilités
permettent à un utilisateur mal intentionné de réaliser un déni de
service ou d'exécuter du code arbitraire à distance.
Solution
Se référer au bulletin de sécurité de l'éditeur pour l'obtention des correctifs (cf. section Documentation).
Novell eDirectory versions antérieures à 8.8.1.
| Vendor | Product | Description |
|---|
| Title | Publication Time | Tags | |
|---|---|---|---|
|
|
|||
{
"$ref": "https://www.cert.ssi.gouv.fr/openapi.json",
"affected_systems": [],
"affected_systems_content": "\u003cp\u003eNovell eDirectory versions ant\u00e9rieures \u00e0 8.8.1.\u003c/p\u003e",
"content": "## Description\n\nNCP (NetWare Core Protocol) est le principal protocole utilis\u00e9 par\nNovell pour la transmission d\u0027information entre le serveur NetWare et\nses clients. \nDeux vuln\u00e9rabilit\u00e9s de type d\u00e9passement de m\u00e9moire existent dans le\nprotocole NCP permettant \u00e0 un utilisateur distant mal intentionn\u00e9 de\nr\u00e9aliser un deni de service, d\u0027ex\u00e9cuter du code arbitraire ou de faire\nanormalement grossir les journaux d\u0027\u00e9v\u00e9nements de Novell eDirectory. \nDeux autres vuln\u00e9rabilit\u00e9s existent dans la fonction\nevtFilteredMonitorEventsRequest dues \u00e0 une mauvaise gestion de\nl\u0027allocation et de la lib\u00e9ration de la m\u00e9moire. Ces vuln\u00e9rabilit\u00e9s\npermettent \u00e0 un utilisateur mal intentionn\u00e9 de r\u00e9aliser un d\u00e9ni de\nservice ou d\u0027ex\u00e9cuter du code arbitraire \u00e0 distance.\n\n## Solution\n\nSe r\u00e9f\u00e9rer au bulletin de s\u00e9curit\u00e9 de l\u0027\u00e9diteur pour l\u0027obtention des\ncorrectifs (cf. section Documentation).\n",
"cves": [
{
"name": "CVE-2006-4177",
"url": "https://www.cve.org/CVERecord?id=CVE-2006-4177"
},
{
"name": "CVE-2006-4520",
"url": "https://www.cve.org/CVERecord?id=CVE-2006-4520"
},
{
"name": "CVE-2006-4509",
"url": "https://www.cve.org/CVERecord?id=CVE-2006-4509"
},
{
"name": "CVE-2006-4510",
"url": "https://www.cve.org/CVERecord?id=CVE-2006-4510"
}
],
"initial_release_date": "2006-10-24T00:00:00",
"last_revision_date": "2006-10-24T00:00:00",
"links": [
{
"title": "Bulletin de s\u00e9curit\u00e9 Novell TID 3686202 du 23 octobre 2006 :",
"url": "http://www.novell.com/support/search.do?cmd=displayKC\u0026docType=kc\u0026externalId=3686202\u0026sliceID=SAL_Public\u0026dialogID=16474066\u0026stateId=0%200%2016472624"
},
{
"title": "Bulletin de s\u00e9curit\u00e9 Novell TID 3936018 du 23 octobre 2006 :",
"url": "http://www.novell.com/support/search.do?cmd=displayKC\u0026docType=kc\u0026externalId=3936018\u0026sliceID=SAL_Public\u0026dialogID=16474084\u0026stateId=0%200%2016472669"
},
{
"title": "Bulletin de s\u00e9curit\u00e9 Novell TID 3496175 du 23 octobre 2006 :",
"url": "http://www.novell.com/support/search.do?cmd=displayKC\u0026docType=kc\u0026externalId=3496175\u0026sliceID=SAL_Public\u0026dialogID=16474084\u0026stateId=0%200%2016472669"
},
{
"title": "Bulletin de s\u00e9curit\u00e9 Novell TID 3924657 du 23 octobre 2006 :",
"url": "http://www.novell.com/support/search.do?cmd=displayKC\u0026docType=kc\u0026externalId=3924657\u0026sliceID=SAL_Public\u0026dialogID=16474066\u0026stateId=0%200%2016472624"
}
],
"reference": "CERTA-2006-AVI-462",
"revisions": [
{
"description": "version initiale.",
"revision_date": "2006-10-24T00:00:00.000000"
}
],
"risks": [
{
"description": "D\u00e9ni de service \u00e0 distance"
},
{
"description": "Ex\u00e9cution de code arbitraire \u00e0 distance"
}
],
"summary": "De multiples vuln\u00e9rabilit\u00e9s pr\u00e9sentes dans Novell eDirectory permettent\n\u00e0 un utilisateur mal intentionn\u00e9 d\u0027ex\u00e9cuter du code arbitraire \u00e0\ndistance ou de r\u00e9aliser un d\u00e9ni de service.\n",
"title": "Multiples vuln\u00e9rabilit\u00e9s dans Novell eDirectory",
"vendor_advisories": [
{
"published_at": null,
"title": "Bulletin de s\u00e9curit\u00e9 de Novell eDirectory",
"url": null
}
]
}
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