CERTA-2006-AVI-394
Vulnerability from certfr_avis - Published: 2006-09-14 - Updated: 2006-09-14
Deux vulnérabilités permettant respectivement d'exécuter du code arbitraire à distance ou de provoquer un déni de service ont été découverte dans le logiciel antivirus de Symantec.
Description
Deux vulnérabilités ont été découvertes dans les suites logicielles antivirus de Symantec :
- la première vulnérabilité résulte d'une erreur dans le traitement d'un message de notification malformé. Un utilisateur mal intentionné peut, grâce à un message spécialement construit, exécuter des commandes arbitraires à distance. Ces commandes sont exécutées avec les privilèges SYSTEM ;
- la seconde vulnérabilité est présente au niveau du module de vérification en temps réel. Cette vulnérabilité peut être exploitée par l'intermédiaire d'un message de notification spécialement construit, conduisant alors à un déni de service.
Solution
Se référer au bulletin de sécurité de l'éditeur pour l'obtention des correctifs (cf. section Documentation).
None| Vendor | Product | Description | ||
|---|---|---|---|---|
| Symantec | N/A | Symantec Client Security 2.x ; | ||
| Symantec | N/A | Symantec AntiVirus Corporate Edition 10.0 ; | ||
| Symantec | N/A | Symantec AntiVirus Corporate Edition 9.x ; | ||
| Symantec | N/A | Symantec Client Security 1.x. | ||
| Symantec | N/A | Symantec AntiVirus Corporate Edition 8.1 ; | ||
| Symantec | N/A | Symantec Client Security 3.0 ; |
| Title | Publication Time | Tags | |||||||||
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
|
|||||||||||
{
"$ref": "https://www.cert.ssi.gouv.fr/openapi.json",
"affected_systems": [
{
"description": "Symantec Client Security 2.x ;",
"product": {
"name": "N/A",
"vendor": {
"name": "Symantec",
"scada": false
}
}
},
{
"description": "Symantec AntiVirus Corporate Edition 10.0 ;",
"product": {
"name": "N/A",
"vendor": {
"name": "Symantec",
"scada": false
}
}
},
{
"description": "Symantec AntiVirus Corporate Edition 9.x ;",
"product": {
"name": "N/A",
"vendor": {
"name": "Symantec",
"scada": false
}
}
},
{
"description": "Symantec Client Security 1.x.",
"product": {
"name": "N/A",
"vendor": {
"name": "Symantec",
"scada": false
}
}
},
{
"description": "Symantec AntiVirus Corporate Edition 8.1 ;",
"product": {
"name": "N/A",
"vendor": {
"name": "Symantec",
"scada": false
}
}
},
{
"description": "Symantec Client Security 3.0 ;",
"product": {
"name": "N/A",
"vendor": {
"name": "Symantec",
"scada": false
}
}
}
],
"affected_systems_content": null,
"content": "## Description\n\nDeux vuln\u00e9rabilit\u00e9s ont \u00e9t\u00e9 d\u00e9couvertes dans les suites logicielles\nantivirus de Symantec :\n\n- la premi\u00e8re vuln\u00e9rabilit\u00e9 r\u00e9sulte d\u0027une erreur dans le traitement\n d\u0027un message de notification malform\u00e9. Un utilisateur mal\n intentionn\u00e9 peut, gr\u00e2ce \u00e0 un message sp\u00e9cialement construit,\n ex\u00e9cuter des commandes arbitraires \u00e0 distance. Ces commandes sont\n ex\u00e9cut\u00e9es avec les privil\u00e8ges SYSTEM ;\n- la seconde vuln\u00e9rabilit\u00e9 est pr\u00e9sente au niveau du module de\n v\u00e9rification en temps r\u00e9el. Cette vuln\u00e9rabilit\u00e9 peut \u00eatre exploit\u00e9e\n par l\u0027interm\u00e9diaire d\u0027un message de notification sp\u00e9cialement\n construit, conduisant alors \u00e0 un d\u00e9ni de service.\n\n## Solution\n\nSe r\u00e9f\u00e9rer au bulletin de s\u00e9curit\u00e9 de l\u0027\u00e9diteur pour l\u0027obtention des\ncorrectifs (cf. section Documentation).\n",
"cves": [
{
"name": "CVE-2006-3454",
"url": "https://www.cve.org/CVERecord?id=CVE-2006-3454"
}
],
"initial_release_date": "2006-09-14T00:00:00",
"last_revision_date": "2006-09-14T00:00:00",
"links": [
{
"title": "Site de l\u0027\u00e9diteur :",
"url": "http://www.symantec.com"
},
{
"title": "Bulletin de s\u00e9curit\u00e9 de l\u0027\u00e9diteur du 13 septembre 2006 :",
"url": "http://securityresponse.symantec.com/avcenter/security/Content/2006.09.13.html"
}
],
"reference": "CERTA-2006-AVI-394",
"revisions": [
{
"description": "version initiale.",
"revision_date": "2006-09-14T00:00:00.000000"
}
],
"risks": [
{
"description": "D\u00e9ni de service \u00e0 distance"
},
{
"description": "Ex\u00e9cution de commandes arbitraires \u00e0 distance"
},
{
"description": "\u00c9l\u00e9vation de privil\u00e8ges"
}
],
"summary": "Deux vuln\u00e9rabilit\u00e9s permettant respectivement d\u0027ex\u00e9cuter du code\narbitraire \u00e0 distance ou de provoquer un d\u00e9ni de service ont \u00e9t\u00e9\nd\u00e9couverte dans le logiciel antivirus de Symantec.\n",
"title": "Multiples vuln\u00e9rabilit\u00e9s de l\u0027antivirus Symantec",
"vendor_advisories": [
{
"published_at": null,
"title": "Bulletin de s\u00e9curit\u00e9 Symantec du 13 septembre 2006",
"url": null
}
]
}
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