Vulnerability-Lookup

Vulnerability from bitnami_vulndb

Published

2026-09-29 08:56

Modified

2026-09-29 09:14

Summary

rclone serve docker Path Traversal via Volume Name

Details

rclone versions 1.56.0 through 1.75.0 contain a path traversal vulnerability in the rclone serve docker volume plugin. newVolume() in cmd/serve/docker/volume.go computes a volume's mountpoint as filepath.Join(drv.root, name) from the attacker-supplied name field of a Docker VolumeDriver.Create request without verifying that the result stays within drv.root (default /var/lib/docker-volumes/rclone), and checkMountpoint() then creates that directory with file.MkdirAll before mounting. A volume name containing enough .. components (e.g. "../../../../../../etc") therefore resolves outside the base directory, allowing anyone able to submit a VolumeDriver.Create request to the plugin socket — normally the Docker daemon, or a workload that can request named volumes in a multi-tenant orchestration setup — to make the privileged rclone plugin process create a directory and mount a remote filesystem specified in the same request at an arbitrary host path, shadowing or disrupting system directories. The advisory notes Volume.restoreState() had the same missing validation when reloading persisted volume state. Fixed in 1.75.1.

JSON

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{
  "affected": [
    {
      "package": {
        "ecosystem": "Bitnami",
        "name": "rclone",
        "purl": "pkg:bitnami/rclone"
      },
      "ranges": [
        {
          "events": [
            {
              "introduced": "1.56.0"
            },
            {
              "fixed": "1.75.1"
            }
          ],
          "type": "SEMVER"
        }
      ],
      "severity": [
        {
          "score": "CVSS:4.0/AV:L/AC:L/AT:N/PR:H/UI:N/VC:N/VI:L/VA:L/SC:N/SI:N/SA:N/E:X/CR:X/IR:X/AR:X/MAV:X/MAC:X/MAT:X/MPR:X/MUI:X/MVC:X/MVI:X/MVA:X/MSC:X/MSI:X/MSA:X/S:X/AU:X/R:X/V:X/RE:X/U:X",
          "type": "CVSS_V4"
        }
      ]
    }
  ],
  "aliases": [
    "CVE-2026-93987"
  ],
  "database_specific": {
    "cpes": [
      "cpe:2.3:a:rclone:rclone:*:*:*:*:*:go:*:*"
    ],
    "severity": "Medium"
  },
  "details": "rclone versions 1.56.0 through 1.75.0 contain a path traversal vulnerability in the `rclone serve docker` volume plugin. newVolume() in cmd/serve/docker/volume.go computes a volume\u0027s mountpoint as filepath.Join(drv.root, name) from the attacker-supplied `name` field of a Docker VolumeDriver.Create request without verifying that the result stays within drv.root (default /var/lib/docker-volumes/rclone), and checkMountpoint() then creates that directory with file.MkdirAll before mounting. A volume name containing enough `..` components (e.g. \"../../../../../../etc\") therefore resolves outside the base directory, allowing anyone able to submit a VolumeDriver.Create request to the plugin socket \u2014 normally the Docker daemon, or a workload that can request named volumes in a multi-tenant orchestration setup \u2014 to make the privileged rclone plugin process create a directory and mount a remote filesystem specified in the same request at an arbitrary host path, shadowing or disrupting system directories. The advisory notes Volume.restoreState() had the same missing validation when reloading persisted volume state. Fixed in 1.75.1.",
  "id": "BIT-rclone-2026-93987",
  "modified": "2026-09-29T09:14:51.928Z",
  "published": "2026-09-29T08:56:54.219Z",
  "references": [
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://github.com/rclone/rclone/security/advisories/GHSA-p6vx-hf7p-98j6"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2026-93987"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://www.vulncheck.com/advisories/rclone-serve-docker-path-traversal-via-volume-name"
    }
  ],
  "schema_version": "1.6.2",
  "summary": "rclone serve docker Path Traversal via Volume Name"
}

CVE-2026-93987 (GCVE-0-2026-93987)

Vulnerability from cvelistv5 – Published: 2026-09-19 11:53 – Updated: 2026-09-21 18:29

Title

rclone serve docker Path Traversal via Volume Name

Summary

rclone versions 1.56.0 through 1.75.0 contain a path traversal vulnerability in the `rclone serve docker` volume plugin. newVolume() in cmd/serve/docker/volume.go computes a volume's mountpoint as filepath.Join(drv.root, name) from the attacker-supplied `name` field of a Docker VolumeDriver.Create request without verifying that the result stays within drv.root (default /var/lib/docker-volumes/rclone), and checkMountpoint() then creates that directory with file.MkdirAll before mounting. A volume name containing enough `..` components (e.g. "../../../../../../etc") therefore resolves outside the base directory, allowing anyone able to submit a VolumeDriver.Create request to the plugin socket — normally the Docker daemon, or a workload that can request named volumes in a multi-tenant orchestration setup — to make the privileged rclone plugin process create a directory and mount a remote filesystem specified in the same request at an arbitrary host path, shadowing or disrupting system directories. The advisory notes Volume.restoreState() had the same missing validation when reloading persisted volume state. Fixed in 1.75.1.

Severity

4.6 (Medium)


                        
                          CVSS:4.0/AV:L/AC:L/AT:N/PR:H/UI:N/VC:N/VI:L/VA:L/SC:N/SI:N/SA:N

3.4 (Low)


                        
                          CVSS:3.1/AV:L/AC:L/PR:H/UI:N/S:U/C:N/I:L/A:L

SSVC

Exploitation: poc Automatable: no Technical Impact: partial

CISA Coordinator · CISA-ADP (v2.0.3)

Decision recorded 2026-09-21 18:28 UTC

CWE

CWE-73 - External Control of File Name or Path

Assigner

VulnCheck CNA under the mitre root

CNA scorecard B 84/100 over 7607 records in the last 180 days details

References

2 references

URL	Tags
https://github.com/rclone/rclone/security/advisor…	vendor-advisory
https://www.vulncheck.com/advisories/rclone-serve…	third-party-advisory

Impacted products

1 product

Vendor	Product	Version
rclone	rclone	Affected: 1.56.0 , < 1.75.1 (semver) Unaffected: 1.75.1 (semver) cpe:2.3:a:rclone:rclone::::::::

Date Public

2026-09-04 00:00

Credits

iaohkut ncw

Show details on NVD website

JSON

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{
  "containers": {
    "adp": [
      {
        "metrics": [
          {
            "other": {
              "content": {
                "id": "CVE-2026-93987",
                "options": [
                  {
                    "Exploitation": "poc"
                  },
                  {
                    "Automatable": "no"
                  },
                  {
                    "Technical Impact": "partial"
                  }
                ],
                "role": "CISA Coordinator",
                "timestamp": "2026-09-21T18:28:40.978217Z",
                "version": "2.0.3"
              },
              "type": "ssvc"
            }
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        ],
        "providerMetadata": {
          "dateUpdated": "2026-09-21T18:29:11.792Z",
          "orgId": "134c704f-9b21-4f2e-91b3-4a467353bcc0",
          "shortName": "CISA-ADP"
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            "url": "https://github.com/rclone/rclone/security/advisories/GHSA-p6vx-hf7p-98j6"
          }
        ],
        "title": "CISA ADP Vulnrichment"
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    ],
    "cna": {
      "affected": [
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          "defaultStatus": "unaffected",
          "packageURL": "pkg:golang/github.com/rclone/rclone",
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            },
            {
              "status": "unaffected",
              "version": "1.75.1",
              "versionType": "semver"
            }
          ]
        }
      ],
      "cpeApplicability": [
        {
          "nodes": [
            {
              "cpeMatch": [
                {
                  "criteria": "cpe:2.3:a:rclone:rclone:*:*:*:*:*:*:*:*",
                  "versionEndExcluding": "1.75.1",
                  "versionStartIncluding": "1.56.0",
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      "datePublic": "2026-09-04T00:00:00.000Z",
      "descriptions": [
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          "lang": "en",
          "value": "rclone versions 1.56.0 through 1.75.0 contain a path traversal vulnerability in the `rclone serve docker` volume plugin. newVolume() in cmd/serve/docker/volume.go computes a volume\u0027s mountpoint as filepath.Join(drv.root, name) from the attacker-supplied `name` field of a Docker VolumeDriver.Create request without verifying that the result stays within drv.root (default /var/lib/docker-volumes/rclone), and checkMountpoint() then creates that directory with file.MkdirAll before mounting. A volume name containing enough `..` components (e.g. \"../../../../../../etc\") therefore resolves outside the base directory, allowing anyone able to submit a VolumeDriver.Create request to the plugin socket \u2014 normally the Docker daemon, or a workload that can request named volumes in a multi-tenant orchestration setup \u2014 to make the privileged rclone plugin process create a directory and mount a remote filesystem specified in the same request at an arbitrary host path, shadowing or disrupting system directories. The advisory notes Volume.restoreState() had the same missing validation when reloading persisted volume state. Fixed in 1.75.1."
        }
      ],
      "metrics": [
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            "attackComplexity": "LOW",
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            "privilegesRequired": "HIGH",
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            "userInteraction": "NONE",
            "vectorString": "CVSS:4.0/AV:L/AC:L/AT:N/PR:H/UI:N/VC:N/VI:L/VA:L/SC:N/SI:N/SA:N",
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            "confidentialityImpact": "NONE",
            "integrityImpact": "LOW",
            "privilegesRequired": "HIGH",
            "scope": "UNCHANGED",
            "userInteraction": "NONE",
            "vectorString": "CVSS:3.1/AV:L/AC:L/PR:H/UI:N/S:U/C:N/I:L/A:L",
            "version": "3.1"
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      "problemTypes": [
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          "descriptions": [
            {
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      "providerMetadata": {
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          "url": "https://github.com/rclone/rclone/security/advisories/GHSA-p6vx-hf7p-98j6"
        },
        {
          "name": "VulnCheck Advisory: rclone serve docker Path Traversal via Volume Name",
          "tags": [
            "third-party-advisory"
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          "url": "https://www.vulncheck.com/advisories/rclone-serve-docker-path-traversal-via-volume-name"
        }
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      "title": "rclone serve docker Path Traversal via Volume Name",
      "x_generator": {
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  "cveMetadata": {
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    "datePublished": "2026-09-19T11:53:38.413Z",
    "dateReserved": "2026-09-19T10:55:49.093Z",
    "dateUpdated": "2026-09-21T18:29:11.792Z",
    "state": "PUBLISHED"
  },
  "dataType": "CVE_RECORD",
  "dataVersion": "5.2"
}

Sightings

Author	Source	Type	Date	Other

Nomenclature

Seen: The vulnerability was mentioned, discussed, or observed by the user.
Confirmed: The vulnerability has been validated from an analyst's perspective.
Published Proof of Concept: A public proof of concept is available for this vulnerability.
Exploited: The vulnerability was observed as exploited by the user who reported the sighting.
Patched: The vulnerability was observed as successfully patched by the user who reported the sighting.
Not exploited: The vulnerability was not observed as exploited by the user who reported the sighting.
Not confirmed: The user expressed doubt about the validity of the vulnerability.
Not patched: The vulnerability was not observed as successfully patched by the user who reported the sighting.

Vulnerability timeline

Sightings and recorded dates, grouped by day · UTC

Order JSON

How durations are calculated

Following the VTEM framework (Black Hat USA 2015), time to patch starts when the vendor or a coordinator was informed, total time to patch at discovery, and disclosure to patch at public disclosure; vendor response time runs from the report to its acknowledgement. Time to exploit and time unpatched start at the earliest discovery or report, falling back to public disclosure. Unpatched time ends at the first recorded patch, or the calculation time when no patch is recorded. Exploitation to patch shows the interval between those two events; a published proof of concept is a public exploit, not exploitation.

Each result shows its source dates. A negative interval means the end event came first; when date-only inputs leave the order open, the result says so. Date-only inputs are approximate. The earliest evidence wins: KEV report dates and sightings are labelled as such. Records describing another vulnerability are listed but never calculated from, and a PoC alone does not establish exploitation. Missing patch evidence does not prove that no patch exists. Filters below change the event list only.

Publication & reservation Sightings KEV catalogs Other timestamps

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The MITRE ATT&CK techniques below are AI-generated suggestions, inferred from the description of the vulnerability by the CIRCL/vulnerability-attack-technique-classification-roberta-base model, served locally by ML-Gateway. They have not been verified by an analyst and are provided for guidance only.
The approach is described in our paper Mapping CVEs to MITRE ATT&CK Techniques: A Curated Gold-Set Classifier and the Limits of LLM-Assisted Label Expansion.
Browse all ATT&CK techniques and the vulnerabilities related to each.

Related by attack behaviour

Vulnerabilities whose description is nearest to this one in the vector space of the CIRCL/vulnerability-attack-technique-biencoder model. This is a similarity search over the bi-encoder space (plain cosine), not a classification, and it has no measured accuracy.

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