Vulnerability from bitnami_vulndb
RabbitMQ is a messaging and streaming broker. Prior to versions 3.13.15, 4.0.20, 4.1.11, 4.2.6, 4.3.0, When a binding is created on an x-jms-topic exchange, add_binding/3 reads the rjms_erlang_selector argument and passes it through erl_scan:string/1 then erl_parse:parse_term/1. erl_scan:string/1 interns every atom literal it tokenizes. validate_binding/2 is a no-op (-> ok.), there is no length cap, and the surrounding try/catch cannot reclaim atoms. The Java JMS client compiles selectors client-side, but the server does not enforce this , a raw AMQP client can send arbitrary selector strings. An authenticated low-privilege AMQP user confined to one vhost can crash the entire broker node (cross-tenant DoS) in <100 bind calls. Preconditions include rabbitmq_jms_topic_exchange plugin enabled (bundled; required for any JMS deployment) Authenticated AMQP user with read on an x-jms-topic exchange + write on a queue (or configure to declare both). This issue is fixed in versions 3.13.15, 4.0.20, 4.1.11, 4.2.6, 4.3.0.
{
"affected": [
{
"package": {
"ecosystem": "Bitnami",
"name": "rabbitmq",
"purl": "pkg:bitnami/rabbitmq"
},
"ranges": [
{
"events": [
{
"introduced": "3.13.0"
},
{
"fixed": "3.13.15"
},
{
"introduced": "4.0.0"
},
{
"fixed": "4.0.20"
},
{
"introduced": "4.1.0"
},
{
"fixed": "4.1.11"
},
{
"introduced": "4.2.0"
},
{
"fixed": "4.2.6"
}
],
"type": "SEMVER"
}
],
"severity": [
{
"score": "CVSS:4.0/AV:N/AC:L/AT:P/PR:L/UI:N/VC:N/VI:N/VA:H/SC:N/SI:N/SA:N/E:X/CR:X/IR:X/AR:X/MAV:X/MAC:X/MAT:X/MPR:X/MUI:X/MVC:X/MVI:X/MVA:X/MSC:X/MSI:X/MSA:X/S:X/AU:X/R:X/V:X/RE:X/U:X",
"type": "CVSS_V4"
}
]
}
],
"aliases": [
"CVE-2026-67220"
],
"database_specific": {
"cpes": [
"cpe:2.3:a:vmware:rabbitmq:*:*:*:*:*:*:*:*"
],
"severity": "Medium"
},
"details": "RabbitMQ is a messaging and streaming broker. Prior to versions 3.13.15, 4.0.20, 4.1.11, 4.2.6, 4.3.0, When a binding is created on an x-jms-topic exchange, add_binding/3 reads the rjms_erlang_selector argument and passes it through erl_scan:string/1 then erl_parse:parse_term/1. erl_scan:string/1 interns every atom literal it tokenizes. validate_binding/2 is a no-op (-\u003e ok.), there is no length cap, and the surrounding try/catch cannot reclaim atoms. The Java JMS client compiles selectors client-side, but the server does not enforce this , a raw AMQP client can send arbitrary selector strings. An authenticated low-privilege AMQP user confined to one vhost can crash the entire broker node (cross-tenant DoS) in \u003c100 bind calls. Preconditions include rabbitmq_jms_topic_exchange plugin enabled (bundled; required for any JMS deployment) Authenticated AMQP user with read on an x-jms-topic exchange + write on a queue (or configure to declare both). This issue is fixed in versions 3.13.15, 4.0.20, 4.1.11, 4.2.6, 4.3.0.",
"id": "BIT-rabbitmq-2026-67220",
"modified": "2026-10-01T09:55:18.588Z",
"published": "2026-10-01T09:33:06.164Z",
"references": [
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://github.com/rabbitmq/rabbitmq-server/releases/tag/v4.2.6"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://github.com/rabbitmq/rabbitmq-server/security/advisories/GHSA-r3qr-4h63-mvj2"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2026-67220"
}
],
"schema_version": "1.6.2",
"summary": "RabbitMQ: JMS topic exchange erl_scan atom exhaustion"
}
Sightings
| Author | Source | Type | Date | Other |
|---|
Nomenclature
- Seen: The vulnerability was mentioned, discussed, or observed by the user.
- Confirmed: The vulnerability has been validated from an analyst's perspective.
- Published Proof of Concept: A public proof of concept is available for this vulnerability.
- Exploited: The vulnerability was observed as exploited by the user who reported the sighting.
- Patched: The vulnerability was observed as successfully patched by the user who reported the sighting.
- Not exploited: The vulnerability was not observed as exploited by the user who reported the sighting.
- Not confirmed: The user expressed doubt about the validity of the vulnerability.
- Not patched: The vulnerability was not observed as successfully patched by the user who reported the sighting.
The approach is described in our paper Mapping CVEs to MITRE ATT&CK Techniques: A Curated Gold-Set Classifier and the Limits of LLM-Assisted Label Expansion.
Browse all ATT&CK techniques and the vulnerabilities related to each.
Related by attack behaviour
Vulnerabilities whose description is nearest to this one in the vector space of the CIRCL/vulnerability-attack-technique-biencoder model. This is a similarity search over the bi-encoder space (plain cosine), not a classification, and it has no measured accuracy.