Vulnerability from bitnami_vulndb
RabbitMQ is a messaging and streaming broker. Prior to versions 3.13.17, 4.0.22, 4.1.13, and 4.2.6, match_origin/1 returned the bare reflected Origin and allowed credentials even when the wildcard "" was configured, so the response echoed the attacker's origin together with Access-Control-Allow-Credentials. The affected code is rabbit_mgmt_cors.erl. When the management plugin is configured with a wildcard CORS origin (cors_allow_origins = ""), the handler reflects the request Origin back in Access-Control-Allow-Origin and also sends Access-Control-Allow-Credentials: true. A malicious web page that a signed-in administrator visits can then use that administrator's cached HTTP Basic credentials to issue authenticated, state-changing requests to the management API. Preconditions include The management plugin is configured with the wildcard cors_allow_origins = "*", which is an explicit operator misconfiguration A target administrator has a cached HTTP Basic-auth session in the browser. This issue is fixed in versions 3.13.17, 4.0.22, 4.1.13, and 4.2.6.
{
"affected": [
{
"package": {
"ecosystem": "Bitnami",
"name": "rabbitmq",
"purl": "pkg:bitnami/rabbitmq"
},
"ranges": [
{
"events": [
{
"introduced": "3.13.0"
},
{
"fixed": "3.13.17"
},
{
"introduced": "4.0.0"
},
{
"fixed": "4.0.22"
},
{
"introduced": "4.1.0"
},
{
"fixed": "4.1.13"
},
{
"introduced": "4.2.0"
},
{
"fixed": "4.2.6"
}
],
"type": "SEMVER"
}
],
"severity": [
{
"score": "CVSS:4.0/AV:N/AC:L/AT:P/PR:N/UI:P/VC:H/VI:H/VA:N/SC:N/SI:N/SA:N/E:X/CR:X/IR:X/AR:X/MAV:X/MAC:X/MAT:X/MPR:X/MUI:X/MVC:X/MVI:X/MVA:X/MSC:X/MSI:X/MSA:X/S:X/AU:X/R:X/V:X/RE:X/U:X",
"type": "CVSS_V4"
}
]
}
],
"aliases": [
"CVE-2026-66070"
],
"database_specific": {
"cpes": [
"cpe:2.3:a:vmware:rabbitmq:*:*:*:*:*:*:*:*"
],
"severity": "High"
},
"details": "RabbitMQ is a messaging and streaming broker. Prior to versions 3.13.17, 4.0.22, 4.1.13, and 4.2.6, match_origin/1 returned the bare reflected Origin and allowed credentials even when the wildcard \"\" was configured, so the response echoed the attacker\u0027s origin together with Access-Control-Allow-Credentials. The affected code is rabbit_mgmt_cors.erl. When the management plugin is configured with a wildcard CORS origin (cors_allow_origins = \"\"), the handler reflects the request Origin back in Access-Control-Allow-Origin and also sends Access-Control-Allow-Credentials: true. A malicious web page that a signed-in administrator visits can then use that administrator\u0027s cached HTTP Basic credentials to issue authenticated, state-changing requests to the management API. Preconditions include The management plugin is configured with the wildcard cors_allow_origins = \"*\", which is an explicit operator misconfiguration A target administrator has a cached HTTP Basic-auth session in the browser. This issue is fixed in versions 3.13.17, 4.0.22, 4.1.13, and 4.2.6.",
"id": "BIT-rabbitmq-2026-66070",
"modified": "2026-10-01T09:55:18.588Z",
"published": "2026-10-01T09:32:45.642Z",
"references": [
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://github.com/rabbitmq/rabbitmq-server/releases/tag/v4.2.6"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://github.com/rabbitmq/rabbitmq-server/security/advisories/GHSA-p3hp-v9wh-ghm7"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2026-66070"
}
],
"schema_version": "1.6.2",
"summary": "RabbitMQ: CORS * reflects Origin with Allow-Credentials"
}
Sightings
| Author | Source | Type | Date | Other |
|---|
Nomenclature
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