Vulnerability from bitnami_vulndb
OpenBao exists to provide a software solution to manage, store, and distribute sensitive data including secrets, certificates, and keys. OpenBao before v2.3.0 allowed an attacker to perform unauthenticated, unaudited cancellation of root rekey and recovery rekey operations, effecting a denial of service. In OpenBao v2.2.0 and later, manually setting the configuration option disable_unauthed_rekey_endpoints=true allows an operator to deny these rarely-used endpoints on global listeners. A patch is available at commit fe75468822a22a88318c6079425357a02ae5b77b. In a future OpenBao release communicated on OpenBao's website, the maintainers will set this to true for all users and provide an authenticated alternative. As a workaround, if an active proxy or load balancer sits in front of OpenBao, an operator can deny requests to these endpoints from unauthorized IP ranges.
{
"affected": [
{
"package": {
"ecosystem": "Bitnami",
"name": "openbao",
"purl": "pkg:bitnami/openbao"
},
"ranges": [
{
"events": [
{
"introduced": "2.2.2"
},
{
"fixed": "2.3.1"
}
],
"type": "SEMVER"
}
],
"severity": [
{
"score": "CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:N/I:N/A:H",
"type": "CVSS_V3"
}
]
}
],
"aliases": [
"CVE-2025-52894"
],
"database_specific": {
"cpes": [
"cpe:2.3:a:openbao:openbao:*:*:*:*:*:go:*:*"
],
"severity": "High"
},
"details": "OpenBao exists to provide a software solution to manage, store, and distribute sensitive data including secrets, certificates, and keys. OpenBao before v2.3.0 allowed an attacker to perform unauthenticated, unaudited cancellation of root rekey and recovery rekey operations, effecting a denial of service. In OpenBao v2.2.0 and later, manually setting the configuration option `disable_unauthed_rekey_endpoints=true` allows an operator to deny these rarely-used endpoints on global listeners. A patch is available at commit fe75468822a22a88318c6079425357a02ae5b77b. In a future OpenBao release communicated on OpenBao\u0027s website, the maintainers will set this to `true` for all users and provide an authenticated alternative. As a workaround, if an active proxy or load balancer sits in front of OpenBao, an operator can deny requests to these endpoints from unauthorized IP ranges.",
"id": "BIT-openbao-2025-52894",
"modified": "2026-09-10T15:46:03.895Z",
"published": "2026-07-27T05:48:49.305Z",
"references": [
{
"type": "FIX",
"url": "https://github.com/openbao/openbao/commit/fe75468822a22a88318c6079425357a02ae5b77b"
},
{
"type": "ADVISORY",
"url": "https://github.com/openbao/openbao/security/advisories/GHSA-prpj-rchp-9j5h"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2025-52894"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://openbao.org/docs/deprecation"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://openbao.org/docs/deprecation/unauthed-rekey"
}
],
"schema_version": "1.6.2",
"summary": "OpenBao Vulnerable to Unauthenticated Rekey Operation Cancellation"
}
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Sightings
| Author | Source | Type | Date | Other |
|---|
Nomenclature
- Seen: The vulnerability was mentioned, discussed, or observed by the user.
- Confirmed: The vulnerability has been validated from an analyst's perspective.
- Published Proof of Concept: A public proof of concept is available for this vulnerability.
- Exploited: The vulnerability was observed as exploited by the user who reported the sighting.
- Patched: The vulnerability was observed as successfully patched by the user who reported the sighting.
- Not exploited: The vulnerability was not observed as exploited by the user who reported the sighting.
- Not confirmed: The user expressed doubt about the validity of the vulnerability.
- Not patched: The vulnerability was not observed as successfully patched by the user who reported the sighting.
Vulnerability timeline
Sightings and recorded dates, grouped by day · UTC
How durations are calculated
Following the VTEM framework (Black Hat USA 2015), time to patch starts when the vendor or a coordinator was informed, total time to patch at discovery, and disclosure to patch at public disclosure; vendor response time runs from the report to its acknowledgement. Time to exploit and time unpatched start at the earliest discovery or report, falling back to public disclosure. Unpatched time ends at the first recorded patch, or the calculation time when no patch is recorded. Exploitation to patch shows the interval between those two events; a published proof of concept is a public exploit, not exploitation.
Each result shows its source dates. A negative interval means the end event came first; when date-only inputs leave the order open, the result says so. Date-only inputs are approximate. The earliest evidence wins: KEV report dates and sightings are labelled as such. Records describing another vulnerability are listed but never calculated from, and a PoC alone does not establish exploitation. Missing patch evidence does not prove that no patch exists. Filters below change the event list only.
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Related by attack behaviour
Vulnerabilities whose description is nearest to this one in the vector space of the CIRCL/vulnerability-attack-technique-biencoder model. This is a similarity search over the bi-encoder space (plain cosine), not a classification, and it has no measured accuracy.