Vulnerability from bitnami_vulndb
Published
2026-10-01 09:26
Modified
2026-10-01 09:55
Summary
Kyverno before 1.19.1 SSRF via legacy apiCall service executor
Details

Kyverno before 1.19.1 is vulnerable to server-side request forgery. The default egress blocklist (169.254.169.254, 169.254.169.253, metadata.google.internal, 127.0.0.0/8, ::1/128) and the scoped-token control were wired only into the new CEL http.Get/Post library and were never applied to the legacy apiCall service executor (pkg/engine/apicall/executor.go) or to the GlobalContextEntry external-API path, which handle every non-CEL context[].apiCall.service call. Because these paths use a plain net/http client with no egress filtering and no validation of the configured service URL, a ClusterPolicy or GlobalContextEntry author — or, where a deployed policy templates the service URL from the admission resource, a lower-privileged resource submitter — can cause Kyverno to issue GET/POST requests to an arbitrary host, including the cloud metadata endpoint, loopback, and any in-cluster service, reading cloud instance credentials and reaching internal endpoints with Kyverno's network position. The executor also unconditionally attaches Kyverno's projected ServiceAccount token to the attacker-chosen destination; the token is audience-scoped, limiting its replay value. Fixed in 1.19.1.

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{
  "affected": [
    {
      "package": {
        "ecosystem": "Bitnami",
        "name": "kyverno",
        "purl": "pkg:bitnami/kyverno"
      },
      "ranges": [
        {
          "events": [
            {
              "introduced": "0"
            },
            {
              "fixed": "1.19.1"
            }
          ],
          "type": "SEMVER"
        }
      ],
      "severity": [
        {
          "score": "CVSS:4.0/AV:N/AC:L/AT:N/PR:H/UI:N/VC:H/VI:L/VA:N/SC:H/SI:L/SA:N/E:X/CR:X/IR:X/AR:X/MAV:X/MAC:X/MAT:X/MPR:X/MUI:X/MVC:X/MVI:X/MVA:X/MSC:X/MSI:X/MSA:X/S:X/AU:X/R:X/V:X/RE:X/U:X",
          "type": "CVSS_V4"
        }
      ]
    }
  ],
  "aliases": [
    "CVE-2026-100705"
  ],
  "database_specific": {
    "cpes": [
      "cpe:2.3:a:kyverno:kyverno:*:*:*:*:*:go:*:*"
    ],
    "severity": "High"
  },
  "details": "Kyverno before 1.19.1 is vulnerable to server-side request forgery. The default egress blocklist (169.254.169.254, 169.254.169.253, metadata.google.internal, 127.0.0.0/8, ::1/128) and the scoped-token control were wired only into the new CEL http.Get/Post library and were never applied to the legacy apiCall service executor (pkg/engine/apicall/executor.go) or to the GlobalContextEntry external-API path, which handle every non-CEL context[].apiCall.service call. Because these paths use a plain net/http client with no egress filtering and no validation of the configured service URL, a ClusterPolicy or GlobalContextEntry author \u2014 or, where a deployed policy templates the service URL from the admission resource, a lower-privileged resource submitter \u2014 can cause Kyverno to issue GET/POST requests to an arbitrary host, including the cloud metadata endpoint, loopback, and any in-cluster service, reading cloud instance credentials and reaching internal endpoints with Kyverno\u0027s network position. The executor also unconditionally attaches Kyverno\u0027s projected ServiceAccount token to the attacker-chosen destination; the token is audience-scoped, limiting its replay value. Fixed in 1.19.1.",
  "id": "BIT-kyverno-2026-100705",
  "modified": "2026-10-01T09:55:18.588Z",
  "published": "2026-10-01T09:26:25.976Z",
  "references": [
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://github.com/kyverno/kyverno/security/advisories/GHSA-q825-p383-r9v5"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2026-100705"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://www.vulncheck.com/advisories/kyverno-before-1.19.1-ssrf-via-legacy-apicall-service-executor"
    }
  ],
  "schema_version": "1.6.2",
  "summary": "Kyverno before 1.19.1 SSRF via legacy apiCall service executor"
}



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