Vulnerability from bitnami_vulndb
WARNING:
Users of 6.x should upgrade to 6.2.4 or later as the fix was missed in previous 6.x releases.
See the following for more details: https://activemq.apache.org/security-advisories.data/CVE-2026-40046-announcement.txt https://www.cve.org/CVERecord?id=CVE-2026-40046
Original Report:
Apache ActiveMQ does not properly validate the remaining length field which may lead to an overflow during the decoding of malformed packets. When this integer overflow occurs, ActiveMQ may incorrectly compute the total Remaining Length and subsequently misinterpret the payload as multiple MQTT control packets which makes the broker susceptible to unexpected behavior when interacting with non-compliant clients. This behavior violates the MQTT v3.1.1 specification, which restricts Remaining Length to a maximum of 4 bytes. The scenario occurs on established connections after the authentication process. Brokers that are not enabling mqtt transport connectors are not impacted.
This issue affects Apache ActiveMQ: before 5.19.2, 6.0.0 to 6.1.8, and 6.2.0
Users are recommended to upgrade to version 5.19.2, 6.1.9, or 6.2.1, which fixes the issue.
{
"affected": [
{
"package": {
"ecosystem": "Bitnami",
"name": "activemq",
"purl": "pkg:bitnami/activemq"
},
"ranges": [
{
"events": [
{
"introduced": "0"
},
{
"fixed": "5.19.2"
},
{
"introduced": "6.0.0"
},
{
"fixed": "6.1.9"
},
{
"introduced": "6.2.0"
},
{
"fixed": "6.2.1"
}
],
"type": "SEMVER"
}
],
"severity": [
{
"score": "CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:L/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:H",
"type": "CVSS_V3"
}
]
}
],
"aliases": [
"CVE-2025-66168"
],
"database_specific": {
"cpes": [
"cpe:2.3:a:apache:activemq:*:*:*:*:*:maven:*:*"
],
"severity": "High"
},
"details": "WARNING:\n\nUsers of 6.x should upgrade to 6.2.4 or later as the fix was missed in previous 6.x releases.\n\nSee the\u00a0 following for more details:\n https://activemq.apache.org/security-advisories.data/CVE-2026-40046-announcement.txt \n https://www.cve.org/CVERecord?id=CVE-2026-40046 \n\n\n\nOriginal Report:\n\nApache ActiveMQ does not properly validate the remaining length field which may lead to an overflow during the decoding of malformed packets.\u00a0When this integer overflow occurs, ActiveMQ may incorrectly compute the total Remaining Length and subsequently misinterpret the payload as multiple MQTT control packets which makes\u00a0the broker susceptible to unexpected behavior when interacting with non-compliant clients.\u00a0This behavior violates the MQTT v3.1.1 specification, which restricts Remaining Length to a maximum of 4 bytes.\u00a0The scenario occurs on established connections after the authentication process. Brokers that are not enabling mqtt transport connectors are not impacted.\n\nThis issue affects Apache ActiveMQ: before 5.19.2, 6.0.0 to 6.1.8, and 6.2.0\n\nUsers are recommended to upgrade to version 5.19.2, 6.1.9, or 6.2.1, which fixes the issue.",
"id": "BIT-activemq-2025-66168",
"modified": "2026-09-08T08:34:36.952Z",
"published": "2026-03-06T08:36:37.326Z",
"references": [
{
"type": "ADVISORY",
"url": "http://www.openwall.com/lists/oss-security/2026/03/03/5"
},
{
"type": "ADVISORY",
"url": "https://lists.apache.org/thread/13n8mkrb2jf2y6yyhpgrkmpqcm7djyto"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2025-66168"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://activemq.apache.org/security-advisories.data/CVE-2026-40046-announcement.txt"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://www.cve.org/CVERecord?id=CVE-2026-40046"
}
],
"schema_version": "1.6.2",
"summary": "Apache ActiveMQ, Apache ActiveMQ All Module, Apache ActiveMQ MQTT Module: MQTT control packet remaining length field is not properly validated"
}
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Sightings
| Author | Source | Type | Date | Other |
|---|
Nomenclature
- Seen: The vulnerability was mentioned, discussed, or observed by the user.
- Confirmed: The vulnerability has been validated from an analyst's perspective.
- Published Proof of Concept: A public proof of concept is available for this vulnerability.
- Exploited: The vulnerability was observed as exploited by the user who reported the sighting.
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Vulnerability timeline
Sightings and recorded dates, grouped by day · UTC
How durations are calculated
Following the VTEM framework (Black Hat USA 2015), time to patch starts when the vendor or a coordinator was informed, total time to patch at discovery, and disclosure to patch at public disclosure; vendor response time runs from the report to its acknowledgement. Time to exploit and time unpatched start at the earliest discovery or report, falling back to public disclosure. Unpatched time ends at the first recorded patch, or the calculation time when no patch is recorded. Exploitation to patch shows the interval between those two events; a published proof of concept is a public exploit, not exploitation.
Each result shows its source dates. A negative interval means the end event came first; when date-only inputs leave the order open, the result says so. Date-only inputs are approximate. The earliest evidence wins: KEV report dates and sightings are labelled as such. Records describing another vulnerability are listed but never calculated from, and a PoC alone does not establish exploitation. Missing patch evidence does not prove that no patch exists. Filters below change the event list only.
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