MAL-2026-4729
Vulnerability from ossf_malicious_packages
-= Per source details. Do not edit below this line.=-
Source: amazon-inspector (ae14bab8e5a11636f7a395fccf88119f5294c3639c8f71b6b2e3f199282bb584)
On npm install, scripts/postinstall.js fetches a companion-<platform>-<arch> binary from github.com/palmthree-studio/whiteboard-agent/releases/download/nightly/... — a mutable release tag (not pinned to package version 1.4.24) with no SHA/signature verification — chmods it 0755, and in non-TTY installs (CI, agent, scripted environments) spawns it detached. The same non-TTY path generates an admin account with a random 16-hex password, starts the companion HTTP server on 127.0.0.1:3001 with COMPANION_LOCALHOST_BYPASS=1, then spawns cloudflared tunnel --url http://localhost:3001, publishing the local server to a public *.trycloudflare.com URL. The combination is install-time-triggered remote ingress: anyone who learns or guesses the tunnel URL can reach the companion API on the installer's host without authentication beyond the random credential, which is itself generated and stored locally without user notification. README documents wendy start performing tunnel exposure interactively, but does not warn that npm install itself does this silently in non-interactive environments — the typical CI / build-agent / container scenario. Independently, the nightly mutable-tag binary fetch means every install (and reinstall/update) pulls whatever bytes are at that tag at that moment; a stolen publish credential or a future malicious push compromises every installation without any version bump.
{
"affected": [
{
"database_specific": {
"cwes": [
{
"cweId": "CWE-506",
"description": "The product contains code that appears to be malicious in nature.",
"name": "Embedded Malicious Code"
},
{
"cweId": "CWE-506",
"description": "The product contains code that appears to be malicious in nature.",
"name": "Embedded Malicious Code"
}
],
"indicators": {
"domains": [
"github.com",
"release-assets.githubusercontent.com"
],
"evidence_files": [
{
"path": "scripts/postinstall.js",
"sha256": "34ae9c5bdfd0edbb15f91ac02dfda2e7a8612afcfd1ff0db650e9671c3af1c03",
"tlsh": "9032b54b64ea26350be26d6adb0fc0627d56c203121ecd64bc9e934c9f91834d252aff"
}
],
"package_integrity": [
{
"filename": "whiteboard-agent-1.4.24.tgz",
"hashes": {
"sha1": "06d40bd6e3335f98f9d737ec96919df0593030ec",
"sha512_sri": "sha512-jp488FXiEw2iQ1UMXBk5hfydW/Cwx+otIZ8gb363U/eF8DNVEQrGThm9BjurEzlwrto83W9IwWW9KTXKryvmeQ=="
}
}
]
}
},
"package": {
"ecosystem": "npm",
"name": "whiteboard-agent"
},
"versions": [
"1.4.23",
"1.4.24"
]
}
],
"credits": [
{
"contact": [
"actran@amazon.com"
],
"name": "Amazon Inspector",
"type": "FINDER"
}
],
"database_specific": {
"malicious-packages-origins": [
{
"id": "IN-MAL-2026-003236",
"import_time": "2026-05-26T05:50:15.949237568Z",
"modified_time": "2026-05-19T18:13:33Z",
"sha256": "1439bfcea8e17e7548b566977c8ff1c319abaaaf97ac845ef8ec253c9ed1299f",
"source": "amazon-inspector",
"versions": [
"1.4.23"
]
},
{
"id": "IN-MAL-2026-003246",
"import_time": "2026-05-26T05:50:17.033164804Z",
"modified_time": "2026-05-19T18:53:21Z",
"sha256": "ae14bab8e5a11636f7a395fccf88119f5294c3639c8f71b6b2e3f199282bb584",
"source": "amazon-inspector",
"versions": [
"1.4.24"
]
},
{
"id": "IN-MAL-2026-003247",
"import_time": "2026-05-26T05:50:17.327915419Z",
"modified_time": "2026-05-19T18:53:22Z",
"sha256": "1f81bb09fa354423bc8eb9b247ae087f1e52ed976b6a027ef8219bc758292bce",
"source": "amazon-inspector",
"versions": [
"1.4.24"
]
},
{
"id": "IN-MAL-2026-003235",
"import_time": "2026-05-26T05:50:15.842348868Z",
"modified_time": "2026-05-19T18:13:33Z",
"sha256": "31b31b26999860c740d57ded85fededdb4d999069d2df83ee6e60809b56bb57e",
"source": "amazon-inspector",
"versions": [
"1.4.23"
]
}
]
},
"details": "\n---\n_-= Per source details. Do not edit below this line.=-_\n\n## Source: amazon-inspector (ae14bab8e5a11636f7a395fccf88119f5294c3639c8f71b6b2e3f199282bb584)\nOn `npm install`, scripts/postinstall.js fetches a `companion-\u003cplatform\u003e-\u003carch\u003e` binary from `github.com/palmthree-studio/whiteboard-agent/releases/download/nightly/...` \u2014 a mutable release tag (not pinned to package version 1.4.24) with no SHA/signature verification \u2014 chmods it 0755, and in non-TTY installs (CI, agent, scripted environments) spawns it detached. The same non-TTY path generates an `admin` account with a random 16-hex password, starts the companion HTTP server on 127.0.0.1:3001 with `COMPANION_LOCALHOST_BYPASS=1`, then spawns `cloudflared tunnel --url http://localhost:3001`, publishing the local server to a public `*.trycloudflare.com` URL. The combination is install-time-triggered remote ingress: anyone who learns or guesses the tunnel URL can reach the companion API on the installer\u0027s host without authentication beyond the random credential, which is itself generated and stored locally without user notification. README documents `wendy start` performing tunnel exposure interactively, but does not warn that `npm install` itself does this silently in non-interactive environments \u2014 the typical CI / build-agent / container scenario. Independently, the `nightly` mutable-tag binary fetch means every install (and reinstall/update) pulls whatever bytes are at that tag at that moment; a stolen publish credential or a future malicious push compromises every installation without any version bump.\n",
"id": "MAL-2026-4729",
"modified": "2026-05-26T05:55:05Z",
"published": "2026-05-19T18:13:33Z",
"references": [
{
"type": "PACKAGE",
"url": "https://www.npmjs.com/package/whiteboard-agent/v/1.4.24"
},
{
"type": "PACKAGE",
"url": "https://www.npmjs.com/package/whiteboard-agent/v/1.4.23"
}
],
"schema_version": "1.7.4",
"summary": "Malicious code in whiteboard-agent (npm)"
}
Sightings
| Author | Source | Type | Date | Other |
|---|
Nomenclature
- Seen: The vulnerability was mentioned, discussed, or observed by the user.
- Confirmed: The vulnerability has been validated from an analyst's perspective.
- Published Proof of Concept: A public proof of concept is available for this vulnerability.
- Exploited: The vulnerability was observed as exploited by the user who reported the sighting.
- Patched: The vulnerability was observed as successfully patched by the user who reported the sighting.
- Not exploited: The vulnerability was not observed as exploited by the user who reported the sighting.
- Not confirmed: The user expressed doubt about the validity of the vulnerability.
- Not patched: The vulnerability was not observed as successfully patched by the user who reported the sighting.